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Abstract 
The failure of the centralized top down approach to management of common pool resources such 
as forests led policy makers and donors to conclude that devolution of forest management to local 
communities can be the only solution to such failures. Developing countries have thus resorted to 
devolution of forest management to forest adjacent communities through approaches such as joint 
forest management (JFM) and participatory forest management (PFM). PFM is part of the initiative 
towards devolution of power of management and decision making from government to local 
communities. Communities therefore self-organize into community forest associations (CFAs) or 
forest user groups to manage forest resources. In Kenya for instance, the recent and ongoing forest 
sector reforms as envisaged in the Forest Act (2005) and the Forest Act (2016) led to devolution of 
forest management through CFAs and provision of incentives such as plantation establishment and 
livelihood improvement scheme (PELIS), eco-tourism, harvesting of forest products among others. 
These efforts were aimed at deepening community participation in forest management and 
improving welfare of forest adjacent communities. 
However, despite the numerous efforts aimed at empowering communities to sustainably manage 
forest resources through PFM and provision of various incentives, the success of PFM in terms of 
efficiency, equity, accountability and environmental outcomes have been mixed. In this thesis, we 
contribute empirically to the understanding of how PFM can be successfully implemented and 
make suggestion for more inclusive, equitable and sustainable forest management in Kenya from 
a micro perspective using household and community level data collected from 22 CFAs in the Mau 
forest conservancy. We take into account the values and preferences attached to salient forest 
ecosystem services by local communities and how this can be used to design incentive schemes 
like PES to incentivize local communities and also influence devolution of forest management. We 
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also assess the impact of existing incentives specifically PELIS on welfare of forest adjacent 
communities as well as the environment and the heterogeneous impact of the scheme on household 
welfare. We then look at the context specific factors influencing the varying levels of success 
among the CFAs. The thesis therefore, comprises of three separate, but related analysis chapters. 
The second chapter seeks to determine the economic value of salient forest ecosystem services in 
Mau forest conservancy in Kenya and assess whether they are sufficient to incentivize local 
communities to engage in forest conservation through PES schemes and the implication on 
devolution of forest management to local communities through PFM. The choice experiment 
approach using the Bayesian efficient design was thus employed to estimate the welfare associated 
with the selected forest ecosystem attributes based on data collected from 321 randomly selected 
households in the Mau forest conservancy. We applied discrete choice econometric techniques 
namely the conditional logit, random parameter logit model and the random parameter logit model 
with interactions to enable consideration of preference heterogeneity. We also estimate the welfare 
impacts of various conservation policies. 
In the third chapter, we evaluate the welfare and environmental impact of incentive based 
conservation focusing on a unique incentive in Kenya known as PELIS. Using data collected from 
406 randomly selected households from the 22 CFAs, we employ Propensity Score Matching 
(PSM) to measure the mean impact of the scheme on forest cover and welfare of forest adjacent 
communities. We further employed the endogenous quantile treatment effects model to assess the 
heterogeneous impact of the scheme on household welfare while accounting for heterogeneity, 
selection bias and potential endogeneity. We also identify the determinants of household decision 
to participate in PELIS. 
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In the fourth chapter, we employ Ostrom’s Social Ecological Systems framework for analyzing 
complex ecological systems to identify the determinants of household level of participation in CFA 
activities and assess the determinants of successful collective management of forest resources as 
well as the link between level of participation and success of collective action. Using data collected 
from 518 randomly selected households from the 22 CFAs in the Mau, we estimated a logit model 
to identify the determinants of household level of participation and obtained the predicted 
probabilities of active household participation for use in the second stage regression. In the second 
stage, we employed OLS models and instrumental variable estimation using Lewbel (2012) 
heteroscedasticity based instruments with the predicted probabilities from the logit model as one 
of the explanatory variables. For robustness checks, using Principal Component Analysis, we 
constructed a third outcome variable, an indicator of successful collective management showing 
level of cooperation using forest management activities that CFAs participate in to assess the 
consistency of our estimates and any significant variation in the effect of the variables on outcome 
of successful collective action. 
Results from the second chapter revealed that, forest adjacent communities have higher willingness 
to pay for improvement in forest cover/forests structure, reduction of flood risk, and water 
purification and storage in that order but would experience loss in welfare for choosing an 
alternative with medium wildlife population. One significant finding from the study is the altruistic 
nature of forest adjacent communities as revealed by their high willingness to pay for flood 
mitigation showing that they are not just concerned with the private benefits accruing to them but 
also the welfare of the society. There is also considerable preference heterogeneity which to a large 
extent was determined by employment status of household head, ownership of PELIS plot, 
household size, and distance to the nearest edge of the forest. In terms of welfare, respondents 
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revealed that forest conservation policy and a combination of flood mitigation and forest 
conservation policy would have high welfare impacts on livelihoods of locals. 
Results from the third chapter revealed that on average, PELIS has significant and positive impact 
on overall household welfare and on the environment. However, in terms of welfare, the scheme 
cannot be defended on equity grounds as it has inequitable distributional impacts on household 
welfare. The scheme raises welfare of the least poor than the poorest and marginalizes sections of 
the community through elite capture and lack of market linkages. Determinants of household 
decision to participate in PELIS are also identified. 
In the fourth chapter, the empirical results suggest that success of collective action is associated 
with the level of household participation in CFA activities, distance to the forest resource, 
institutional quality, group size, and salience of the resource, among other factors. We also found 
that collective action is more successful when CFAs are formed through users’ self-motivation with 
frequent interaction with government institutions, provision of alternative lands through PELIS and 
when the forest cover is low. Factors influencing the level of household participation are also 
identified. 
A number of policy recommendations can be highlighted from the various chapters. First, policy 
makers need to understand local communities’ attitudes, values and preferences for various forest 
ecosystem services in deciding how to devolve forest management. The information on willingness 
to pay thus forms the basis for design of PES schemes and roll out, design and implementation of 
PFM. However, more research on the demand and supply side is needed as well as consideration 
of issues as to what private partners may consider worth involving in PES schemes. A 
demonstration of the significance of ecosystem services as input in the production process can also 
play a role in increasing environmental awareness and motivating forest adjacent communities to 
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conserve forest resources through PFM. This can also encourage shifts from socially unacceptable 
land management activities towards ecosystem oriented approaches. Second, policy makers need 
to ensure equity in access and management of forest resources and existing incentives to avoid 
further marginalization of any income group in order to ensure sustainability of the scheme. This 
can be achieved through exploring ways of improving market linkages for agricultural harvest from 
PELIS farms either through formation of forest user cooperatives or collaboration with relevant 
stakeholders. The design and implementation of the scheme should also be given due consideration 
if it is not to discriminate the very group that it is meant to benefit. 
Finally the study findings point to the need for: a robust diagnostic approach in devolution of forest 
management to local communities, considering diverse socio-economic and ecological settings; 
government intervention in reviving and re-institutionalizing existing and infant CFAs in an effort 
to promote PFM within the Mau forest and other parts of the country; and intense effort towards 
design of a mix of incentive schemes to encourage active and equal household participation in CFA 
activities. KFS should also consider increasing proportion of collected revenues (user-fees) that 
goes to CFAs and forest user groups to support the CFAs financially. 
xii 
List of Acronyms 
ASC: Alternative Specific Constant 
ATT: Average Treatment effect on the Treated 
CBO: Community Based Organization 
CBNRM: Community Based Natural Resource Management 
CE: Choice Experiment 
CFA: Community Forest Association 
CIA: Conditional Independence Assumption 
CL: Conditional Logit 
CPR: Common Pool Resources 
CVM: Contingent Valuation Method 
FGDs: Focus Group Discussion 
FUG: Forest User Group 
IIA: Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives 
IV: Instrumental Variable 
JFM: Joint Forest management 
KEFRI: Kenya Forestry Research Institute 
KFS: Kenya Forest Service 
KWS: Kenya Wildlife Service 
LR: Likelihood Ratio 
MNL: Multinomial Logit 
MWTP: Marginal Willingness to Pay 
NACOFA: National Alliance for Community Forests Associations 
xiii 
NEMA: National Environment Management Authority 
NGO: Non-Governmental Organization 
OLS: Ordinary Least Square 
PCA: Principal Component Analysis 
PELIS: Plantation Establishment and Livelihood Improvement Scheme 
PES: Payment for Ecosystem Services 
PEV: Participatory Environmental Valuation 
PFM: Participatory Forest Management 
PSM: Propensity Score Matching 
QTE: Quantile Treatment Effects 
RPL: Random Parameter Logit 
SESs: Social- Ecological Systems 
SQ: Status Quo 
TEV: Total Economic Value 
UNEP: United Nations Environment Programme 
WTP: Willingness to Pay 
xiv 
Table of Contents 
Dedication ............................................................................................................................ iv 
Acknowledgments.................................................................................................................. v 
Abstract ............................................................................................................................... vii 
List of Acronyms ................................................................................................................... xii 
Chapter One........................................................................................................................... 1 
1.1 Background ............................................................................................................................. 1 
1.1.1 Forest Conservation and Management in Kenya .................................................................... 3 
1.2 Motivation ............................................................................................................................... 7 
1.3 Objectives of the study ........................................................................................................... 11 
1.4 Description of the Study area ................................................................................................. 12 
1.5 Thesis Outline ........................................................................................................................ 14 
Chapter Two ........................................................................................................................ 16 
2.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................................... 17 
2.2  Value of Forest Ecosystem Services in Kenya ....................................................................... 18 
2.3 Related Literature ................................................................................................................. 23 
2.4 Methodology .......................................................................................................................... 27 
2.4.1 Survey design and data collection ........................................................................................... 27 
2.4.2 Experimental Design ................................................................................................................ 32 
2.4.3 Theoretical Framework............................................................................................................ 34 
2.5 Results and Discussion ........................................................................................................... 38 
2.5.1 Descriptive statistics ................................................................................................................. 38 
2.5.2 Model estimation results .......................................................................................................... 39 
2.5.3 Estimation of Willingness to Pay ............................................................................................. 48 
2.5.4 Welfare Estimates ..................................................................................................................... 50 
2.6 Conclusion and Policy Implications ....................................................................................... 53 
xv 
Chapter Three ...................................................................................................................... 56 
3.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................................... 57 
3.2 Related Literature ........................................................................................................... 63 
3.2.1 Determinants of households’ participation in incentive schemes......................................... 63 
3.2.2 Impact of incentives on welfare and environment ................................................................. 64 
3.3 Theoretical framework .......................................................................................................... 66 
3.3.1 Propensity Score Matching ...................................................................................................... 68 
3.3.2 Quantile Treatment Effects Model.......................................................................................... 70 
3.4 The Survey Design and Data Collection ................................................................................. 75 
3.5 Data ....................................................................................................................................... 76 
3.6 Results and Discussion ........................................................................................................... 79 
3.6.1 Descriptive Statistics ................................................................................................................. 80 
3.6.2 OLS Estimation Results ........................................................................................................... 81 
3.6.3 Propensity Score Matching Estimation Results ..................................................................... 82 
3.6.4 Quantile Treatment Effects Model.......................................................................................... 88 
3.7 Conclusion and Policy Recommendations .............................................................................. 93 
Chapter Four ........................................................................................................................ 95 
4.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................................... 96 
4.1.1 Organization of Community Forests Associations ................................................................ 99 
4.2 Related Literature ......................................................................................................... 103 
4.2.1 Factors influencing households’ level of participation in CFA activities .......................... 103 
4.2.2 Determinants of successful collective action......................................................................... 105 
4.3 Methodology ........................................................................................................................ 109 
4.3.1 Conceptual framework ........................................................................................................... 110 
4.3.2 Analytical framework ............................................................................................................. 113 
4.4 Data collection and sampling method................................................................................... 117 
4.5 Results and Discussions........................................................................................................ 119 
4.5.1 Descriptive statistics ............................................................................................................... 119 
4.5.2 Logistic regression Results ..................................................................................................... 121 
4.5.3 Determinants of successful collective management of forest resources ............................. 124 
xvi 
4.5.4 Robustness Checks ................................................................................................................. 134 
4.5 Conclusion and Policy Recommendations ............................................................................ 136 
Chapter Five ....................................................................................................................... 138 
5.1 General Conclusion.............................................................................................................. 139 
References ......................................................................................................................... 147 
Appendix A: Appendix for Chapter Two .............................................................................. 158 
Appendix B: Appendix for Chapter Three ............................................................................ 159 
Appendix C: Appendix for Chapter Four .............................................................................. 164 
Appendix C1: Chapter Four Model Frameworks .................................................................. 166 
Appendix D: Community Forest Association and Household Questionnaires ....................... 168 
List of Tables 
Table 1: Attributes used in final and Pilot DCE design ............................................................ 29 
Table 2: Description of attribute levels used in the study......................................................... 39 
Table 3: Choice Frequency for Mau forest conservancy households ...................................... 41 
Table 4: Conditional logit, Random Parameter logit model and Random Parameter logit 
model with interactions ........................................................................................................ 42 
Table 5: IIA/IID Hausman Test .................................................................................................. 43 
Table 6: Marginal WTP for forest Ecosystem Services Attributes (Ksh/respondent (1 
US$=Ksh.100)) and 95% C.I ............................................................................................... 48 
Table 7: Description of Variables ............................................................................................... 79 
Table 8: Summary Statistics ........................................................................................................ 80 
xvii 
Table 9: OLS Estimation Results of Impact of PELIS on Forest Cover and Per Capita 
Expenditure ........................................................................................................................... 81 
Table 10: Propensity Score Estimates of PELIS adoption ....................................................... 83 
Table 11: Matching based Treatment Effects on PELIS beneficiaries ................................... 85 
Table 12: Endogenous Quantile Treatment Effects Model Estimation Results ..................... 89 
Table 13: Second Tier variables used in the study .................................................................. 111 
Table 14: Description of variables included in the econometric analysis and expected signs
 .............................................................................................................................................. 115 
Table 15: Summary statistics of variables used ....................................................................... 120 
Table 16: Results for logistic regression for probability of active participation in CFA 
activities ............................................................................................................................... 123 
Table 17: OLS regression results .............................................................................................. 125 
Table A. 1: Summary statistics of the respondents ................................................................. 158 
Table A. 2: Welfare change from hypothetical future scenarios ........................................... 158 
Table B. 1: Descriptive Statistics............................................................................................... 159 
Table B. 2: Performance of Matching estimator ..................................................................... 160 
Table B. 3: Sensitivity Analysis of Matching Estimates.......................................................... 160 
Table B. 4: Per Capita Monthly Expenditure across the quantiles ....................................... 160 
Table B. 5: Distribution of adopters and non-adopters of PELIS by CFAs ......................... 161 
Table B. 6: Heteroscedasticity Based Instrumental Variable Estimation Results ............... 162 
Table B. 7: Re-estimated Endogenous Quantile Treatment Effects Model Estimation Results
 .............................................................................................................................................. 163 
xviii 
Table C. 1: Major sources of Income within CFAs ................................................................. 164 
Table C. 2: Major sources of finance for the CFA .................................................................. 164 
Table C. 3: Mode of communication to CFA members .......................................................... 164 
Table C. 4: Scale of dependence on forest resources............................................................... 164 
Table C. 5: Existence of rules .................................................................................................... 165 
Table C. 6: Summary of forest improvement activities .......................................................... 165 
Table C. 7: Existing incentives within CFAs ........................................................................... 165 
Table C. 8: Principal Components of Collective Action by CFAs ......................................... 166 
Table C. 9: Durbin-Wu-Hausman test for endogeneity .......................................................... 166 
Table C. 10: Performance statistics of IV models ................................................................... 166 
List of Figures 
Figure 1: Mau Forest Complex Map .......................................................................................... 13 
Figure 2: The total economic value framework of forest ecosystems ...................................... 21 
Figure 3: Sample choice card used in the final survey .............................................................. 33 
Figure 4: A Framework for Analyzing a Social-Ecological System ...................................... 110 
Figure B. 1: Kernel density before and after matching .......................................................... 161 
1 
Chapter One 
General Introduction 
1.1 Background 
Forest1 resources are critical natural endowment for humanity providing a range of ecosystem 
services. According to MEA (2005), these services are classified into four classes namely: 
Provisioning services 2 ; Support services 3 ; regulating services 4  and cultural services 5 . Forest-
adjacent communities 6  therefore significantly depend on these services for their livelihoods, 
provision of basic needs, cash resources and safety nets in times of crisis (Shackleton et al., 2007). 
The benefits from these services also accrue at various levels both global, national and local. 
However, the ability of these forests to provide these services for present and future generations 
has been hampered by the increasing demand for various ecosystem services and rising population 
coupled with increasing demand for agricultural land hence the increased cases of environmental 
degradation as people strive to earn a living. Other causes of environmental degradation especially 
1 In Kenya, forest is defined as any land area of more than 0.5 hectares with a tree higher than 5 meters and canopy cover more than 10 percent 
or trees able to reach these thresholds insitu. However, this excludes land and urban and agricultural use (FAO, 2015). 
2 Are products people obtain from the ecosystem they include; timber, food, fruits, fresh water, firewood, medicine and herbs, grass for thatching 
etc. 
3 Are services necessary for production of all other ecosystem services i.e. nutrient cycling, soil formation, primary production and production of 
oxygen among others. 
4 Are benefits people obtain from the regulation of ecosystem process e.g. water purification, climate regulation, erosion control, flood control, 
carbon sequestration etc. 
5  Refers to non-material benefits people obtain from ecosystems through spiritual enrichment, recreation, aesthetic experiences, reflection, 
cognitive experiences etc. 
6 Forest-adjacent communities are defined as communities living closer to the forest and directly or indirectly rely on the forest in some way for 
their daily livelihood. These communities are also eligible to join any forest user group or community forest association. 
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in developing countries include; market failure7, policy failure8, institutional failure9, poverty, 
agricultural market integration, agricultural technological advancement and agricultural subsidies 
(Angelsen and Kaimowitz, 1999). 
Since most forests in developing countries are often surrounded by poor households reliant on 
agriculture where land is the key input for production, conversion of this forests for agricultural 
activity has become the norm rather than exception. Even though agriculture is often considered 
the employer of last resort, the benefits from agriculture may be exaggerated as the externalities 
arising from forestry are not accounted for. It therefore implies that forest conversion decision does 
not reflect the socially optimal land use allocation between agriculture and forestry. Therefore, 
degradation and deforestation 10  of these forests would eventually lead to welfare losses and 
reduction in the supply of these products and services thus having a negative effect on economic 
growth and also limit the insurance value that these forests provide to various key sectors of the 
economy. 
The significance of forest resources in reduction of welfare losses and provision of various 
ecosystem goods and services, led to the search for solutions that could mitigate or reverse the 
decline in forest cover and simultaneously improve the livelihood of locals. Initial efforts aimed at 
management of forest resources were based on the centralized approach in which the state assumed 
full responsibility of natural forests resulting in de-facto open access forestry. This approach was 
however, characterized by high information, monitoring and enforcement costs as well as imperfect 
7 Market failures refers to when markets fail to yield economically efficient investment in natural resource management mainly due to ill-defined 
and poorly enforced property rights (A property right is an enforceable authority to undertake particular actions in specific domains (Ostrom and 
Hess, 2007)), imperfect competition, externalities and public goods. In response to market failure, governments often implement policie s aimed at 
regulating production or creating markets e.g. user fees, fines and penalties to discourage poor practices a possible problem from these actions could 
be low pricing or low levels of user fees. 
8 Sources of policy failures could be other policies not related to forest conservation that could have detrimental impacts on management of forests 
as well as conflict of national regulations. 
9 Institutional failures occur when there are laws and regulations aimed at managing forest resources e.g. forest act supporting various aspects of 
sustainable forest management but nothing happens on the ground it can also be considered as an extension of government failure (Ljungman et al., 
1999). 
10 To a lay man, it is defined as the loss in stock and quality of forest cover. While to economists, it is defined the difference between land use and 
forest use allocation. 
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incentives (Adhikari, 2005). Communities thus considered state managed forests as de-facto open 
access and therefore more incentive for forest-adjacent communities to over exploit the forest 
resources. However, the failure of this top down approach to arrest irretrievable losses of 
biodiversity led to the interest in alternative policy instruments. This gave rise to the concepts of 
Community Based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM). The intention of CBNRM was to 
address economic, environmental and social goals all in one package. CBNRM emphasizes forest 
users’ ability to effectively manage collectively owned natural resources through informal and 
semi-formal institutional arrangements (Wade, 1988; Ostrom, 1990; Baland and Platteau, 1996). 
The invention of CBNRM brought forth concepts such as Joint Forest Management (JFM) and 
Participatory Forest Management (PFM). Different forms of PFM have thus arisen as depicted by 
the global increase in areas under community forest management (Agrawal, 2007). However, 
according to Sterner (2003), the choice of a given policy instrument should be based on the extent 
to which each could be defended in terms of equity, efficiency and effectiveness of the policy 
instrument. 
1.1.1 Forest Conservation and Management in Kenya 
Kenya has a total land area of 582,646 km squared. Although the economy is predominantly 
agriculture based, about 73% of these land area is arid or semi-arid (Matiru, 2002). The country is 
also characterized by a wide diversity of ecosystem, flora and fauna thus support a wide diversity 
of wildlife and most of the country’s protected areas. In terms of property rights, there are mainly 
three types of land tenure system namely; trust (78.5%), private (1.5%) and government (20%) 
tenures (Central Bureau of Statistics 1996 cited in Matiru (2002)). The country is also covered with 
different forest resources and land use types namely, indigenous forests, plantation, woodland, 
bush-land, wooded grassland, mangrove, grassland, desert, farmland and urban development 
4 
owned under the three stated types of ownership (Matiru, 2002). According to GOK (2015), the 
country’s forest cover is estimated to be about 7% of the total land area up from 5.95% in 2000. 
Approximately 80% of the Kenyan population reside in rural areas of which about 3 million live 
next to the forest and relies either directly or indirectly on benefit derived from these forests and 
on rain-fed subsistence agriculture for their livelihoods (WorldBank, 2000; FSK, 2006). The five 
major water towers11remain of significant importance to the economy because they supply a range 
of ecosystem services. In most parts of the country, the sustainability of these services is threatened 
or declining with the rising demand for ecosystem services. 
In Kenya, these forests are not only considered of economic and ecological value as previously 
stated but also of political value. Political value involves illegal acquisition of land by well-
connected individuals and irregular allocation of public land to politically connected rural 
households especially as election period approaches12. This has played a major role in loss of 
forests. Between 2000 and 2010 alone, it is estimated that about 50,000 hectares were lost as a 
result of human-induced deforestation (UNEP, 2012a). However, in recognition of the role of local 
forest-adjacent communities in reduction of forest destruction and degradation, the Kenyan 
government introduced the concept of PFM (MENR, 2005, 2016). This was first entrenched by the 
enactment of the Forest Act (2005) and the subsequent National Forest Act (2016)13 that sought to 
engage forest-adjacent communities through arrangement such as PFM for sustainable forest 
management. 
11 Mau forest complex, Mt Elgon, Cherengani hills, Mt Kenya, and Abardares Ranges. 
12 Due to ethnic heterogeneity in the Mau forest, the success of PFM efforts is really compromised by trust issues. Most communities are from 
different political leanings hence every election year, ethnic conflicts and displacements are common as people who claim to be natives fight to 
reclaim back their lost land. Moreover, during the survey the little intel we gathered was complaints from few members about selective settlement 
of certain ethnic communities who are perceived to be pro the ruling government. Therefore, even if the communities are well organized there is the 
trust element that could compromise the success of such initiatives. 
13 Some of the key features of the Forest Act (2016) are mainstreaming of forest conservation and management into national land use  systems; 
devolution of community forest conservation and management; deepening community participation in forest management by strengthening CFAs; 
implementation of national forest policies and strategies; introduction of benefit sharing arrangements such as Plantation Establishment and 
Livelihood Improvement Schemes (PELIS); and adoption of an ecosystem approach to management of forests. 
5 
Participatory Forest Management in Kenya 
In Kenya, the concept of PFM is being implemented through devolution of forest management to 
forest-adjacent communities (MENR, 2005, 2016). According to the forest Act (2005) and forest 
Act (2016), PFM is part of an initiative towards devolution of power of management and decision 
making from government to local communities, or private sector/Non-Governmental organizations 
(NGOs) in gazetted forest reserves. Communities have therefore been able to self-organize to form 
community based organizations known as CFAs14 in collaboration with the Kenya Forest Service 
(KFS). In the Act, CFAs are recognized as partners in forest management. In return communities 
are entitled to a range of user rights such as collecting firewood, timber, herbal medicine, grass for 
roof thatching, fodder and grazing animals, bee keeping, fish farming, eco-tourism, recreational 
activities, scientific and educational activities among others 15 . As part of benefit sharing 
arrangements, Plantation Establishment and Livelihood Improvement Scheme (PELIS) 16  was 
reintroduced in 2007 after several past failures to promote the livelihood of locals while ensuring 
sustainable management and conservation of forest. This is a departure from prior practice where 
the government assumed full responsibility of gazetted forest reserves. 
However, devolution of forest management to forest-adjacent communities in Kenya has had its 
fair share of problems ranging from, conflicting interests of communities and government, 
overwhelming interests in groups by a large population, unpredictable evolution of groups over 
time e.g., forest user groups, over reliance on forest resources by even larger population and lack 
of adequate incentives to self-organize. Other issues have been the constant displacement of 
14 Households are required to pay a one-off registration fees and annual subscription fees which varies by CFAs. 
15 For members to enjoy these benefits they are required to pay a specific amount of which a proportion goes to Kenya Forest Ser vice some to 
CFAs and the affiliated forest user group. This forms part of the financing mechanism for CFAs and user groups. Members are also free to join any 
user group within a CFA based on their interest in the forest. For instance, some CFAs have bee keeping, grazing, firewood collection or farming 
(PELIS) user groups. 
16 PELIS is an incentive scheme where landless forest-adjacent communities are allowed to grow both plantation trees and food crops on small 
plots (half an acre) during the early stages of reforestation tending the trees and harvesting crops for 3-4 years until tree canopy closes. It was aimed 
at improving forest cover and improving livelihoods of local communities. 
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communities during election periods due to clashes among communities or government executive 
orders, rent seeking behavior of foresters as they collude with loggers to harvest more than the 
licensed amount of trees and in some instances harvesting even indigenous trees that are meant to 
be protected. The situation is further worsened by collusion of foresters with CFA officials 
especially in allocation of PELIS plots and other incentives hence hardworking deserving members 
are often left out. In addition, distribution of benefits is often skewed towards the elite member of 
the society in some CFAs. There is also the conflict of community objective and the industry 
objective as well as few instances of some dictatorial tendencies of elected officials in some CFAs. 
Some communities also felt dissatisfied that even though they get agricultural produce from the 
farms, they invest a lot of their time, effort and resources on plantation forests through PELIS but 
the government benefits more since revenues from timber products are higher and not even a small 
proportion is given back to the community in any form e.g. building schools heath centres etc. 
Despite these challenges, the enactment of the Forests Act (2005) and the subsequent Forest 
Act (2016) has admittedly tried to revitalize the sector by giving local communities a stake in the 
management of state and local authority forests even though there are still instances of forest 
degradation in some CFAs. The myriad of challenges show that devolution of forest management 
need to be context specific, focus on institutional diversity and not uniformly implemented like the 
Kenyan case and other developing countries. However, there is still an ongoing debate on forest 
management cantered on how to conserve forest while simultaneously giving local people the 
opportunity to utilize forest resources through resource access (Casse, 2012). 
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1.2 Motivation 
In recent decades, most developing countries have responded to market, institutional and policy 
failures associated with state controls by devolving the management of natural resources to local 
communities through initiatives such as JFM and PFM. Under these arrangements, exclusion and 
alienation rights remain with the state whereas withdrawal and management rights are bestowed on 
other forest user groups. The adoption of PFM by most developing countries is based on the premise 
that well defined and properly enforced property rights is one possible policy instrument towards 
addressing failures associated with state controls. This is either through community or private 
ownership although this may have significant distributional impacts. According to (Sterner, 2003; 
Ostrom and Nagendra, 2006) common property rights have the advantage of reduced monitoring 
and enforcement costs as well as better distributional consequences. Community conservation also 
has higher likelihood of local acceptance and achieving both welfare and conservation outcomes 
much easily than the state (Ostrom and Nagendra, 2006). It is also important to note that property 
rights vary in terms of scope of the exercising groups that is state or open access, private or 
common. The rights also differ in terms of access, management, withdrawal, exclusion and 
alienation rights (Ostrom and Hess, 2007). However, the debate on the advantage of private 
property and common property in terms of efficiency, equity and sustainability of natural resource 
use patterns is still crowded with a lot of confusion especially within the economics and legal 
literature (Ostrom and Hess, 2007). 
Much of the literature support the notion that through semi-formal and informal institutional 
arrangements, communities can effectively self-organize and sustainably manage collectively 
owned natural resources (see Wade 1988; Ostrom 1990; Baland and Platteau 1996; Varughese and 
Ostrom 2001; Pretty 2003; Pagdee et al. 2006; Ostrom and Nagendra 2006). More recent studies 
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have also shown that local communities can self-organize to manage common pool resources 
through collective action and lead to better environmental outcomes (see Blom et al. 2010; 
Coulibaly-Lingani et al. 2011; Corbera et al. 2011; Stevens et al. 2014; Sunderlin et al. 2014). 
Empowering local communities could also ensure efficiency, accountability, equity and or better 
outcomes (Andersson et al., 2004; Tacconi, 2007). However, some studies have claimed that 
devolution of natural resource management to local communities may not have the potential of 
ensuring equity and better environmental outcomes and that it may be a means of devolving 
management costs by governments, reducing conflict in resource use and management and may 
also trigger elite and institutional capture issues (Songorwa, 1999; Campbell et al., 2001; Hyde, 
2016). For instance, experiences in Kenya reveals that CFAs are responsible for various 
management activities in forest preservation, whereas the actual access to decision making process, 
allocation of benefits and control over natural resources are entrusted to KFS or other actors 
(Ongugo, 2007; Mogoi et al., 2012). This brings the question of the coherence between the official 
intention with the decentralization process and actual practice comprising devolution. According 
to Hajjar et al. (2012) successful community forestry requires a good amount of decentralization of 
authority without reaching extreme of complete decentralization. Even though much of the 
literature support devolution of forest management, a lot of caution needs to be taken pertaining to 
universal applicability of community forest management (Yin, 2016). On the other hand, according 
to Stevens et al. (2014), the objectives of devolution can only be realized under favourable 
conditions in the political, biophysical and socioeconomic realms. A significant observation from 
most of these studies is the failure to take into account context specific factors when devolving 
management of common pool resources (CPRs) and failure to account for local indigenous 
communities’ attitudes and preferences as well as the values they attach to these forests which is 
crucial when considering how to incentivize them and roll out devolution of forest management. 
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Few studies also consider empirically the impact of existing incentives on success of PFM 
especially in terms of welfare and environmental outcomes that is, is there possibility of a “win 
win” situation? Is there possibility of local elites capturing more benefits making the poor worse 
off leading to further degradation of the resource? 
As the human population continues to grow, the demand for forest ecosystem services also rises 
but these services are public goods17 not often traded in the market. The existence of market and 
institutional failure in provision and regulation of these ecosystem services thus implies that the 
depletion of forest resources is often greater than socially optimal while the production of these 
services is less than socially optimal. Accounting for such market failure therefore requires 
economic valuation of these ecosystem services. Moreover, without an understanding of the values 
and preferences for these forests ecosystem services, peasant forest-adjacent communities reliant 
on subsistence agriculture are unlikely to take necessary steps to conserve these forests for 
provision of socially optimal levels of these services. Thus, community ownership may not account 
for such externalities. In addition, to complement PFM efforts most developing countries have 
always introduced incentives to deepen community participation. In Kenya one unique incentive is 
the Plantation Establishment and Livelihood Improvement Scheme (PELIS). PELIS was aimed at 
rehabilitation of degraded forests and reducing pressure on natural forests while at the same time 
improving welfare of forest-adjacent communities. 
However, despite the recent and ongoing forest sector reforms that has led to increased community 
participation through devolution of forest management and provision of incentives, results from 
devolution of forest management has not been encouraging. Even though the number of CFAs has 
increased, mixed results have been reported in terms of environmental and welfare outcomes. 
Empirical evidence on the effects of such efforts in terms of efficiency and equity are also quite 
17 They are non-excludable and non-rival. 
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scant. The values and preferences attached to these resources by forest-adjacent communities are 
also unknown hence most developing countries are implementing devolution of forest management 
with due disregard to the values and preferences of forest-adjacent communities. Little attention is 
also given to the drivers of success of such devolution efforts. On the other hand, there is a dearth 
of literature on whether the existing incentives such as PELIS have the intended impact on the 
environment and welfare of locals. The question that comes to our mind is thus whether devolution 
of forest management to forest-adjacent communities can be implemented as a one size fits all 
solution to forest degradation and poverty alleviation? Is there any guarantee that PFM can 
overcome the social dilemma problems? It is also important to note that the success of PFM tend 
to be more context specific what works in Africa may or may not work in Asia or in other countries 
within Africa too hence the need for adequate consideration in devolving forest management. 
Differences in the literature in terms of the applied definition, methodological approach, socio-
economic and ecological context thus warrants a context specific study. This also calls for 
additional research to improve on our understanding, provide focus areas and give 
recommendations on how to successfully implement PFM from a developing country perspective. 
Above all the study contributes to the academic and policy debate focusing on three key aspects. 
First, there are relatively few studies that have tried to value forest ecosystem services within 
context of local indigenous communities reliant on subsistent agriculture in developing countries. 
We contribute to this literature by employing a state of the art choice experiment valuation method 
using the Bayesian D-efficient design. Further, we assess whether the values attached to these 
ecosystem services are sufficient for design of appropriate PES 18  schemes to incentivize 
communities to conserve them and further inform devolution of forest management through PFM 
18 PES is a voluntary transaction where a well-defined ecosystem service is bought from the ecosystem services provider by a buyer and assures 
service provision for those who are willing to pay for the service (Wunder, 2005). 
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to support ecosystem service provision. There is also the potential to transfer the estimates from 
this valuation exercise to other policy contexts. 
Second, it is worth noting that, PELIS may enhance efficiency in forest resource use but there may 
be inequitable distribution of the benefits across the income groups hence a recipe for tragedy. We 
extend the scant impact evaluation literature within Africa (see Jumbe and Angelsen 2006; Kabubo-
Mariara 2013; Gelo and Koch 2014; Mazunda and Shively 2015; Gelo et al. 2016) by not only 
assessing the average impact of the scheme on forest cover and household welfare but also 
assessing the heterogeneous impact of the scheme to determine whether the scheme can help poor 
household rise up the income ladder while simultaneously leading to improvement in forest cover. 
Policy makers also need to understand the drivers of adoption of PELIS by households within CFAs 
to help understand possible causes of past failures in the scheme and how to roll out the scheme 
through CFAs. 
Thirdly, given the different models of PFM, we contribute to the literature on collective action 
empirically by employing Ostrom’s Social Ecological Systems (SESs) framework to assess the 
socioeconomic and ecological factors influencing success of collective action in management of 
forest resource as well as the link between level of household participation and success of collective 
action using a range of econometric techniques. We extend this literature by employing objective 
measures of success of collective action. In addition, new case studies especially from developing 
countries are also necessary to test the strengths and weaknesses of governance of forests by forest-
adjacent communities. 
1.3 Objectives of the study 
This dissertation is motivated by the identified gaps in the literature. The thesis is organized under 
three themes that each represent a chapter. The global objective of this study is to contribute to the 
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understanding of how PFM can be successfully implemented and make suggestion for more 
inclusive, equitable and sustainable forest management in Kenya using Mau forest conservancy as 
a case study. This study is guided by three general objectives namely: 
(i) To determine the economic value of forest ecosystem services to local communities and the
implication for design of PES and implementation of PFM
(ii) To determine the welfare and environmental impact of incentive based conservation in Kenya
(iii) To identify the determinants of successful collective management of forest resources
1.4 Description of the Study area 
The study was conducted in the Mau forest conservancy. The choice of Mau forest was based on 
the following criteria: high susceptibility to degradation; long history of community forestry and 
participation in PELIS, largest number of CFAs of any forest in Kenya, i.e., 35. The 35 CFAs are 
evenly spread across the entire Mau forest complex, each with different levels of forest cover and 
with high levels of biodiversity. Thus, the site may provide key lessons and best practices for 
promotion of participatory forest management across the country. The Mau forest is one of the 
forests that has often attracted a lot of political interest especially through constant displacement of 
persons due to ethnic conflicts or government intervention through executive orders. The forest 
also presents a good case given the heterogeneity in terms of communities living adjacent to the 
forest. Mau forest is the largest closed canopy forest among the five major Water Towers19 in Kenya 
that has lost over a quarter of its forest resources in the last decade (Force, 2009). It is situated at 
0°30’ South, 35°20’ East within the Rift Valley Province. It originally covered 452,007 ha but after 
the 2001 forest excisions the current estimated size is about 416, 542 ha. The Mau comprise of 22 
19 Mount Kenya, the Abardares ranges, the Mau forest complex, Cherengani Hills and Mount Elgon. 
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forest blocks20, 21 of which are gazetted and managed by Kenya Forest Service (KFS) the other is 
Mau Trust land Forest (46, 278 ha) managed by the Narok County Council (NEMA, 2013). A 
picture of the Mau forest complex is presented in Figure 1. 
Figure 1: Mau Forest Complex Map 
Mau Forest Complex supplies water to over 4 million people residing in 578 locations in Kenya 
and some parts of Northern Tanzania therefore supporting livelihoods and economic development 
of the region. The Mau ecosystem is also upper catchment of numerous rivers21as depicted in Figure 
20 South Molo, Transmara, Eastern Mau, Mt. Londiani, Ol Pusimoru, Maasai Mau, Mau Narok, Western Mau, South West Mau, Eburu and Molo. 
In the northern section are the forests of Tinderet, Timboroa, Northern Tinderet, Kilombe Hill, Nabkoi, Metkei, Lembus, Maji Mazuri, and 
Chemorogok. 
21 Including the Yala, Nzoia, Nyando, Mara, Sondu, Kerio, Ewaso Ngiro, Molo,Njoro, Nderit, Naishi and Makalia rivers.  
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1. These rivers feed into various lakes e.g., Nakuru, Baringo, Natron, Naivasha, Turkana, and
Victoria among others. The rivers and lakes also provide much-needed water by pastoral 
communities and agricultural activity and supply essential ecosystem services such as micro 
climate regulation, water purification, water storage and flood mitigation. In addition, the estimated 
potential hydro power generation in the Mau forest catchment is approximately 535 MW which 
equals about 47 percent of the total installed electricity generation capacity in Kenya (UNEP, 
2008). Apart from provision of local public goods such as food, herbs, wood-fuel, fodder and 
building materials among others, the forest also supplies global public goods and services such as 
wildlife habitat22, carbon sequestration, and biodiversity conservation (Kipkoech et al., 2011). The 
upper catchment of the forest also hosts the last group of indigenous hunter gatherer communities 
like the Ogiek23 (Force, 2009). 
1.5 Thesis Outline 
The thesis consists of five chapters. The first chapter presents the general introduction, motivation, 
the study objectives and description of the study area. The other sections of this dissertation provide 
a more detailed description of each of the preceding discussion points. In chapter two, a choice 
experiment approach is used to estimate the welfare associated with a range of forest ecosystem 
services and their implication for design of incentive schemes such as PES and devolution of forest 
management is considered. Chapter three presents an examination of the environmental and welfare 
impact of incentive based conservation specifically focusing on the PELIS scheme. The fourth 
22 Mau forest hosts over 450 recorded bird species, six key mammals of international concern namely; yellow backed duiker, giant forest hog, 
Bongo, golden cat, African elephant and leopards (Force, 2009). It also hosts numerous monkey and baboon species. 
23 The Ogiek community are hunter gatherer community that have lived for centuries deep inside the Mau forest. Majority grow vegetables and 
keep livestock. They used to hunt wild animals such as antelopes and wild pigs but this is now illegal. Due to the influx of illegal settlers that led to 
serious degradation of the Mau forest, the Kenyan government tried to evict everyone including the Ogiek from the forest. However, the Ogiek 
recently won their land case against the government. 
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chapter presents the determinants of successful collective action. Finally, Chapter five presents the 
general conclusion and policy implication of the thesis. 
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Chapter Two 
Economic Valuation of Forest Ecosystem Services in Kenya: Implication for 
Design of PES Schemes and Participatory Forest Management24 
Abstract 
Forest ecosystem services are critical for human wellbeing as well as functioning and growth of 
economies. However, despite the growing demand for these services, they are hardly given due 
consideration in public policy formulation. The values attached to these services by local 
communities are also generally unknown in developing countries. Using a case study of the Mau 
forest conservancy in Kenya the study applied a choice experiment technique employing the 
efficient design criteria to value salient forest ecosystem services among forest-adjacent 
communities. The values attached to various ecosystem services were estimated using the 
conditional logit, random parameter logit model and random parameter logit model with 
interactions. The results revealed high level of preference heterogeneity across households and that 
communities would prefer conservation programs that would guarantee them improved forest 
cover, reduced flood risk and high water quality and quantity for drinking but would experience a 
loss in welfare for choosing an alternative with medium wildlife population. One significant finding 
from the study is the altruistic nature of forest-adjacent communities as revealed by the high 
willingness to pay for flood mitigation showing that they are not just concerned with the private 
benefits accruing to them but also the welfare of the society. Overall, we found that there is much 
appreciation for the role of forest ecosystem services and that forest-adjacent communities are more 
pro conservation mainly motivated by the direct use and non-use values. In terms of policy, the 
information forms a basis for the design of market based incentives such as PES and the roll out, 
design and implementation of participatory forest management. Policy makers also need to focus 
on policy options with higher mean welfare impacts to deepen community involvement in forest 
conservation while taking into account the heterogeneity in preferences to ensure equity.  
Key words: Choice experiment, Ecosystem services, Incentives, PES 
JEL Classification: Q23, Q28, Q51, Q57 
24 A version of this chapter has been disseminated as ERSA Working Paper 693. 
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2.1 Introduction 
Forest ecosystem services are critical for the functioning and growth of world economies (Ferraro 
et al., 2011). These services play a significant role in contributing to human well-being and have 
been of significant value to rural households of developing countries that have often been faced 
with problem of little physical capital (Costanza et al., 1997). These services are often, although 
not exclusively, public goods that are enjoyed by populations free of charge since they are not 
traded in the market, and their benefits may materialize at different levels from local to global. The 
optimization of ecosystem service provision and protection between the beneficiaries of the 
ecosystem service and those who affects its provision have however been hampered with ill-defined 
property rights, information asymmetry and externalities (see Ferraro and Kiss, 2002) as well as 
market and policy failure. The existence of market and policy failures in provision and regulation 
of ecosystem services thus implies that environmental depletion is often more than the socially 
optimal level, while the provision of ecosystem services is below the socially optimum level 
(Ferraro and Kiss, 2002). In Kenya, just like the rest of the world, market and policy failures are 
some impediments to protection and conservation of important global forest ecosystem (Müller and 
Mburu, 2009). To secure standard levels of forest and environmental quality, there is need to 
increase revenue of benefit providers and improving management from society’s perspective. For 
this to be achieved, policy tools such as Payment for Ecosystem Services (PES) and allocation of 
user rights to communities through Participatory Forest Management (PFM) are essential for 
identification of form of marketing. Therefore, valuation of these ecosystem services is an essential 
step towards the design of such policy tools (MEA, 2005). 
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2.2 Value of Forest Ecosystem Services in Kenya 
The five major water towers in Kenya form the upper catchment of all major rivers in Kenya except 
the Tsavo which originates from Mount Kilimanjaro. These forests are surrounded by mostly 
densely populated areas since they provide sufficient water for intensive agriculture and urban 
settlement (Akotsi et al., 2006). They also provide ecological goods and services including: river 
flow regulation; water storage; water purification25; flood mitigation; recharge of groundwater; 
micro climate regulation; promoting biodiversity; nutrient cycling and soil formation; reduced soil 
erosion and siltation; and timber and non-timber forest products thus providing insurance value to 
other key sectors of the economy and consequently having significant impact on economic 
resilience of the country (UNEP, 2012a). These forests therefore sustain many natural habitats in 
the lower areas of the catchments therefore producing direct economic value to its citizens. 
However, the ability of these forests to supply the various ecosystem services has been hampered 
by increased degradation resulting from human activities, rent seeking behavior of government 
officials26 as well as intrusion by other communities and local politicians in an effort to grab forest 
land for agriculture purposes. According to UNEP (2012a), deforestation in Kenya’s water towers 
between 2000 and 2010 amounted to 50,000 hectares (equivalent to 5000 hectares per year) 
yielding timber and fuel-wood volume of 250m
3
/ha with estimated cash value of USD 13.62 
million (equivalent to USD 2720/ha per year) in 2010 hence the incentive for rampant deforestation. 
Despite the revenue streams, the cost to the economy is quite high especially through losses of 
regulating services (UNEP, 2012a). It is estimated that the cost to the economy as a result of 
25 Water yield in the Mau is approximately 15,800 million cubic meters per year accounting for more than 75% of renewable surface water resources 
of Kenya (UNEP, 2012b) 
26 During the survey, we were informed by some community members that their conservation effort would be in vain given the fact that some 
foresters colluded with loggers to harvest more than the licensed number of trees and even indigenous trees that are meant to be protected. 
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reduction in the provision of regulating services from the effects of degradation was USD 36.52 
million per year more than 2.8 times the revenues from such deforestation activities27. “Due to the 
interdependence of various sectors, the decrease in regulating services due to deforestation caused 
a total impact of USD 0.058 billion in 2010 implying that the cost of limiting regulating ecosystem 
services as a production factor for the economy was all in all 4.2 times higher than the actual cash 
revenue of USD 0.013 billion” (UNEP, 2012a). 
Due to the significance and importance of forest ecosystem services (MEA, 2005), as many other 
countries, Kenya has strengthened measures towards conservation of forests through various 
initiatives. Efforts have been made by the government to integrate forest conservation and rural 
development to incorporate social concerns. Some of these efforts includes enactment of the Forest 
Act (2005) and the subsequent Forest Act (2016) aimed at devolution of forest management to 
forest-adjacent communities with a myriad of incentives aimed at deepening community 
participation (MENR, 2005, 2016). However, despite these efforts, there are still increased cases 
of degradation within CFAs. The values attached to various ecosystem services by forest-adjacent 
communities as well as the extent of the benefits of these forest ecosystem services are also 
unknown. Moreover, even though the benefits to local communities is substantial, the prices of 
these services are non-existent. It is therefore evident that the forestry sector’s contribution to the 
economy28 is based on formal market transactions since the value of most non-marketed forest 
products is unaccounted for29. According to the UNEP the challenge for developing countries facing 
natural resource degradation like Kenya is institutionalization of incentives to internalize the 
27 The effects were namely; reduced agricultural output by USD 22.62 million in 2010, reduced hydro power generation by USD 0.12 million 
(which has reasonable multiplier effect on the other sectors of the economy), decline in inland fishing catches by USD 0.86 million due to siltation 
of rivers and lakes and lastly increased cost of water treatment by USD 1.92 million (UNEP, 2012b). In addition, the forgone above ground carbon 
storage value from deforestation in 2010 was estimated at USD 3.41 million, and malaria incidences was estimated to have cost the government 
USD 3.95 million hence additional health cost to the government through loss of productivity (UNEP, 2012b). 
28 The contribution of primary forests is estimated to be about 1.2% of the GDP (0.7% in the monetary sector and 0.5% is non-monetary sector) 
(GOK, 2015) 
29 This implies that the forestry sector contribution to the Gross Domestic Product is undervalued. 
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positive externalities from sustainable forest management. To protect natural resources like 
Kenya’s water towers, “appropriate and well-funded policies, policy instruments and response 
strategies” are crucial (UNEP, 2012a). This is based on the premise that when provision of 
ecosystem services is not rewarded through suitable mechanism forest-adjacent communities will 
hardly include them in their management objectives unless constrained by command and control 
policies. This implies forest management will rarely achieve the social optimum. 
It is also important to note that all these services have some economic value, but this depends on 
benefits humans derive from them. However, identifying and valuing the various ecosystem 
services requires a coherent analytical framework to ensure comprehensive consideration without 
double counting. This also ensures we arrive at estimates consistent and comparable within and 
across countries (Croitoru, 2007). The Total economic value (TEV) framework provides a 
consistent framework of analysis as it decomposes values into a number of categories. According 
to the TEV framework, these values are classified into use and nonuse values (Pearce and Pretty, 
1993). Use values include direct use, indirect use and option values whereas the non-use value 
includes bequest and existence values. Figure 2 presents the TEV categories from which we identify 
policy relevant attributes for this study. 
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Figure 2: The total economic value framework of forest ecosystems 
Adapted from Croitoru (2007) 
It is evident from Figure 2 that we have all along valued the forest for products like timber and 
wood products that have tangible monetary worth (direct and indirect use values) but what about 
the values of forest ecosystem services that are priceless or hard to measure (i.e., the non-use and 
option values)? The question of concern is thus how can we attach a value on flood mitigation, 
wildlife habitat, clean water, air and climate? What is the scenic value of a pristine grove of pine? 
These services are worth paying for especially since the costs and responsibilities of conserving 
them are not in the public domain. How can providers of the ecosystem service30 be compensated 
by the users? To obtain public support for conservation programs through PFM, an understanding 
of the values, attitudes and preferences towards various environmental services as well as the TEV 
30 Mau forest is a reserve forest under the management of KFS in collaboration with forest-adjacent communities through CFAs. Communities 
are therefore charged with the responsibility of conserving the forest and also deriving benefits from it. It is important to note that they do not reside 
inside the reserve forests. 
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of the forest reserve is necessary. The Ecosystem services trade-offs have also received limited 
attention in terms of management of ecosystems. For policy makers to incorporate public values 
and preferences into forest management and conservation policies, an understanding of the social 
benefits and tradeoffs is critical. Humans are also less likely to take necessary steps to protect 
ecosystem services if they do not understand or appreciate the values these ecosystem services have 
on their quality of life. The goals of devolution of forest management may therefore never be 
realized. Valuation of these services is also expected to help raise awareness of their importance 
and stimulate support for appropriate conservation measures, furthering policy design and 
development of incentive schemes such as PES to incentivize local communities. This is also 
critical for engaging their participation in behavioural change and encouraging adoption of 
ecosystem oriented management practices and therefore informing devolution of forest 
management through PFM. 
Moreover, literature on valuation of local indigenous communities’ preference for ecosystem 
services within developing country context specifically Kenya are anecdotal and scant hence the 
need to contribute to the debate. The most common valuation approach in the available empirical 
studies has been Contigent Valuation Method (CVM) and Participatory Environmental Valuation 
(PEV) (see Carson and Mitchell 1989; Emerton 1996; Emerton and Mogaka 1996), with very few 
using the choice experiment approach (see Diafas et al., 2017) and mostly in other fields. The 
advantage of the Choice Experiment (CE) approach is that it is able to elicit trade-offs between 
different policies and also avoids biases associated with CVM and PEV approaches. Much of the 
CVM literature generally focus on a single attribute of community forest (Carlsson et al., 2003). It 
is therefore difficult to assess preference heterogeneity in the case of valuation of just a single 
attribute like in most CVM studies. Most of the studies on valuation of ecosystem services have 
also been in developed countries (see García-Llorente et al. 2012; Gatto et al. 2013; Shoyama et al. 
23 
2013; Smith and Sullivan 2014; Yao et al. 2014) with very few in developing countries (see Gelo 
and Koch 2012; Dikgang and Muchapondwa 2014, 2016; Diafas et al. 2017). 
In addition, most studies that have used the choice experiment approach have often relied on the 
orthogonal design (see Dikgang and Muchapondwa 2012; Shoyama et al. 2013; Pienaar et al. 2014) 
rather than the efficient design (see Gatto et al. 2013; Czajkowski et al. 2014). The efficient design 
has the advantage of producing more reliable and efficient estimates at smaller sample sizes. Due 
to the significant variation in terms of preferences and values attached to various ecosystem 
services, methodological approaches as well as the context specific factors, a context specific 
analysis is therefore critical. Moreover, attempts to estimate different forest ecosystem services 
especially the non-use values and their trade-offs are still rather scarce on regional scale and 
especially within the African context. This study therefore, seeks to fill these gaps and contribute 
to the debate on valuation of ecosystem services by determining the economic value of a range of 
salient forest ecosystem services in Mau forest conservancy in Kenya and assess whether they are 
sufficient to incentivize local communities to engage in forest conservation through PES schemes 
and the implication on devolution of forest management to local communities through PFM. There 
is also the potential to transfer the estimates from this valuation exercise to other policy contexts. 
The rest of the chapter is structured as follow. Section 2.3 presents a review of some of the related 
literature, section 2.4 presents the methodological approach, including survey design and data 
collection, experimental design and the theoretical framework. Section 2.5 presents the estimation 
results and discussion. The conclusions and policy implications are presented in section 2.6. 
2.3 Related Literature 
The use of CE in environmental economics dates back to the works of (Adamowicz, 1995; Boxall 
et al., 1996). The method is now considered more preferable and superior to other approaches like 
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the CVM and PEV. Unlike CVM and PEV, the CE allows inclusion of multiple attributes and 
allows estimation of the value of each attribute hence can elicit trade-offs between different 
policies. It also avoids biases associated with other methods like CVM. The CE also has some few 
limitations e.g., observed preference may not reflect actual behaviour, respondents may also lie due 
to lack of incentives and there is also incentive for respondents to behave strategically (Garrod et 
al., 1999). However, the advantages of CE outweigh its limitations. 
There is growing literature on the use of CE to value ecosystem services in various contexts. The 
values of ecosystem services therefore vary across countries based on what the society values most. 
Studies have therefore yielded different results for example, Gatto et al. (2013) found that 
respondents had high preference for recreation and carbon sequestration but no other ecosystem 
services. Whereas Qin et al. (2009) in investigating farmers’ preferences for property rights 
attributes found that the major concern of farmers is type of right a contract provides. Dikgang and 
Muchapondwa (2014) also assessed using CE the potential for ecosystem services to improve 
livelihood of Khomani-San through PES and found that visitors preferred more pristine recreational 
opportunities but disapproved granting more access inside the Kgalagadi. They also assessed the 
supply side and found that locals would prefer, collection of bush food and increased grazing 
opportunities (Dikgang and Muchapondwa, 2016). 
García-Llorente et al. (2012) also examined preferences for a range of land use management options 
using Multinomial logit model and the random parameter logit (RPL) model to account for 
preference heterogeneity. They found that respondents would support management plans, focusing 
on river quality and traditional farming. However, Birol et al. (2009) had different findings with 
respondents deriving significant welfare improvement from flood risk reduction over welfare 
improvements from both river accessibility for recreation and conserving high biodiversity level. 
In New Zealand, Yao et al. (2014) estimated the non-market values for a program aimed at 
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enhancement of biodiversity using a two-stage modelling process by first estimating individual 
specific WTP values and then exploring their spatial and socioeconomic determinants. Using RPL 
model in the first stage they found higher WTP for increased quantities of native birds than for non-
bird species. In the second stage, they found WTP for biodiversity enhancement was mainly 
influenced by distance from large planted forests and other socioeconomic characteristics such as 
attitude towards the program. Similarly, Shoyama et al. (2013) found that the public strongly 
preferred biodiversity conservation over climate change mitigation in the form of carbon 
sequestration through increasing area of forest managed. Studies have also shown that farmers 
place high values on ecosystem services, although they consider them moderately manageable since 
they consider the economic costs of maintaining ecosystem service provision as a threat (Smith and 
Sullivan, 2014). 
Communities have also shown that private and quasi development interventions can sufficiently 
incentivize them to engage in anti-poaching enforcement, re-vegetation of wildlife habitat and 
wildlife monitoring (Pienaar et al., 2014). However, most of these CE studies have been biased 
towards developed countries where preference for various forest ecosystem services are 
significantly different given the levels of economic development and variation in social and cultural 
contexts hence the mixed results. Literature on valuation of forest ecosystem services in the Eastern 
Africa and specifically Kenya are quite scant, past studies have used mainly CVM and PEV (see 
Carson and Mitchell 1989; Emerton 1996; Emerton and Mogaka 1996) with few employing the CE 
approach (see Diafas et al., 2017). Most recently Kipkoech et al. (2011) estimated total economic 
value of a section of the Mau forest at approximately KES 17 billion (USD 0.17 billion). 
It is also important to note that most of these past choice experiment studies have relied on 
orthogonal designs (see Dikgang and Muchapondwa 2012; Shoyama et al. 2013; Pienaar et al. 
2014) mainly because it is easy to construct and understand. In orthogonal experimental designs, 
26 
statistical independence of the attributes is achieved by forcing them to be orthogonal (Louviere et 
al., 2000). However, while orthogonality could be an important criterion for determining 
independent effects in linear model, the orthogonality property may run counter to some desirable 
properties of econometric models employed in analyzing stated choice data especially since 
discrete choice models are nonlinear (Petrin and Train, 2003). 
Over time studies have revealed that efficient experimental designs can produce more efficient data 
and that we can still get reliable parameter estimates even with a lower or equal sample size 
(Bliemer and Rose, 2010). However, the use of efficient designs has been mostly applied in 
transport economics and market research while quite scant in environmental or resource economics 
(see Gatto et al. 2013; Czajkowski et al. 2014). Domínguez-Torreiro (2014) compared two 
experimental designs i.e. Optimal Orthogonal in the differences design and the D-efficient design 
and found that OOD design based on no prior knowledge is not inferior in terms of estimation 
efficiency to the efficient designs. He however, noted that the contradiction might have been as a 
result of sufficiently large sample that outweighed the expected loss of efficiency based on zero 
prior estimates. 
An overview of the CE literature also reveals significant differences in applied definition, 
contextual factors and methodological approaches making comparison difficult. Moreover, 
attempts to estimate different forest ecosystem services and their trade-offs are still rather scarce 
on regional scale and especially within the African context. The application of efficient designs in 
CE is also mainly in developing countries with hardly any in Africa and specifically Kenya. As a 
departure from most studies, this study takes a different approach by employing a state of the art 
CE valuation method using the Bayesian D-efficient design. 
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2.4 Methodology 
2.4.1 Survey design and data collection 
Attributes and attribute Level of ecosystem services 
This exercise involved a series of design and testing. Beginning with a qualitative review of 
literature on valuation of forest ecosystem services from both developed and developing countries. 
We then selected attributes that could be relevant and easily understood by local communities and 
sought expert opinions from foresters to identify and define the policy relevant attributes. The 
choice of attributes was therefore based on what the local communities could easily understand and 
what they interacted with most. Forest structure was deemed significant by respondents since over 
78% of the forest-adjacent communities relied on fuel wood as a source of energy, they also relied 
on the forest for grazing hence a degraded forest would be considered to imply limited supply of 
these services. The cover also by extension could easily depict the aesthetic (scenic) and cultural 
values since some communities preserved certain sections of the forest for cultural activities e.g. 
Mt Blacket which Kalenjins have preserved for cultural practices31. 
These forests also act as habitat for various wildlife animals such as elephant, monkeys, leopards’ 
bongo, buffaloes etc. About 99% of the respondents agreed to be aware of the various types of wild 
animals in the forest and could name several. However, due to stringent rules by the Kenya Wildlife 
Service (KWS), about 90% claimed not to be involved in trapping the wild animals. Communities 
also complained of rampant human wildlife conflict. Wildlife population was therefore included as 
an attribute to gauge their preference and perception towards wildlife conservation and whether 
they would consider conserving the forest for other benefits and cope with the increasing wildlife 
31 It is important to note that we did not consider the diversity in tree species. 
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population. This would also show their attitude towards biodiversity conservation and preservation 
of wildlife for future generations i.e., bequest values. We therefore identified elephants since they 
interacted more frequently with the elephants in the farms. 
Most forest-adjacent communities rely on water from the forest (73% of the respondents said they 
relied on water from the forest). Therefore, degradation of these forest would mean a reduction in 
quality and quantity of water for drinking and irrigation as well as siltation of dams responsible for 
provision of various services to downstream users. In addition, forests play a significant role in 
flood mitigation and erosion reduction. This attribute was thus selected based on the fact that the 
continuous degradation would mean high social and economic costs of flooding episodes borne by 
locals, downstream settlers and nearby towns and urban centres. This attribute was therefore 
included to gauge the behavioural aspects of forest-adjacent communities that is, whether they are 
altruist or self-centered. Based on these considerations, we settled on the following attributes of 
forest based ecosystem services: forest structure/cover, wildlife population, water purification and 
supply, flood risk and cost to the household. 
The attribute levels were developed based on the current average forest cover, risk of flooding, 
water quality and quantity and wildlife population as presented to us by the head of Mau forest 
conservancy and other key stakeholders. We then projected the future condition of the forest in the 
next five years and how the various attributes selected would be affected with the proposed policy. 
The levels of the selected attribute were further refined using the additional information collected, 
observations from the Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) and expert judgment. Following past 
studies (see Pearce 1994; Fitzgibbon et al. 1995; Adamowicz et al. 1998; Gatto et al. 2013), and 
expert opinions, the projected levels of each attribute used in the pilot and final survey are shown 
in Table 1. 
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Table 1: Attributes used in final and Pilot DCE design 
Type of Attribute Attribute Definition Attribute Levels 
Wildlife Wildlife population (biodiversity) 753, 1103, 1203 
Forest Structure Tree population/forest cover 56.25%, 82.5%, 95% 
Water purification Water Purification and supply (Level of water Quality and quantity) 11850, 17380, 19960 
Flood Risk of flooding: regulating services Low, Medium, high 
Cost One off payment (ksh) per year for three years 0,1744, 2683, 2951 
The survey questionnaire was divided into three parts, part one collecting information on general 
attitudes and perceptions towards forest ecosystem services, part two involved the choice modelling 
scenario and last part collecting information on socio-economic characteristics and institutional 
variables. 
The choice experiment approach involved households being presented with three different 
alternatives. Option C is the status quo, this option described “as at today” i.e., no change in forest 
conservation and management. This option does not involve any policy intervention and no cost to 
the household meaning the respondents are comfortable with current condition (status quo/low) of 
the forest regardless of the future condition of the forest without any intervention. Option A and B 
involves a combination of new policy interventions that may affect future condition of the forest 
catchment. The impact of the new policy interventions in 5 years’ time are predicted and described 
by the attributes considered to have direct influence on well-being of forest-adjacent communities 
as presented in Table 1. 
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Respondents were informed that any policy intervention aimed at forest management would have 
higher cost implication32. However, the cost would be shared by all people living around the forest 
as a three-year levy on government rates during the year but paid annually for three years. The size 
of the levy also depends on the management option chosen either A or B. 
Households were informed that the levy would be channelled into a special conservation fund set 
up to fund conservation and management of the forest catchment. They were further informed that 
the fund will be managed by officials selected by CFA members and that an independent auditor 
will ensure the money is spent wisely. Due to the subjective nature of valuation of forest ecosystem 
services, a verbal description can be interpreted differently based on variations in education levels 
or individual experiences. Each attribute level was therefore visualized by digital manipulation of 
a “control” picture depicting more or less of the attribute. This approach ensured changes in 
attribute levels are easily identifiable holding other factors of the forest ecosystem service constant. 
However, the status quo alternative was just represented as “As today” instead of pictorially. 
Although without any policy intervention, it is expected that provision of forest ecosystem services 
will be lower, we cannot quantify/predict the exact future condition of the forest. 
Previously, before the government intervention through provision of incentives and devolution of 
forest management, the Mau forest was almost completely degraded through human interference 
and the adverse effects were felt across the rift valley, western regions and other parts of the 
country33. Communities were therefore well aware of the outcome if there is no policy intervention. 
Based on past history, respondents were informed that without any policy intervention the forest 
may be degraded even farther hence the provision of these ecosystem services may be low as 
32 We used the estimated cost of rehabilitation of the Mau forest complex as per the project implemented by the Kenyan government and UNEP 
through the European Union funding. We then divided the cost with total population around the Mau forest conservancy. Due to the poor nature of 
forest-adjacent communities, the amount was distributed into a three-year levy. 
33 Some of the adverse effects were, drying of rivers dams and lakes, power outages, crop failure due to inadequate rainfall and decline in wildlife 
population among others. 
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pictorially presented in other policy presentations or even lower than in the year 2000 when the 
forest was almost completely run down. Respondents were therefore told to imagine the condition 
of the forest in the next five years if they continue with current practices without any intervention 
although it may not have any cost implication on them at the current period34. 
Sampling and data collection 
To ensure understanding and scenario acceptance by respondents, the accompanying text in the 
structured questionnaire and images were tested in FGDs and a pilot to test the validity and 
construct of the survey instrument. The pilot questionnaire was presented to a random sample of 
44 households in Londiani CFA of Kericho county in October 2015. In the pilot 15 choice tasks 
were generated and respondents were presented with 5 choice tasks. From the pilot exercise, we 
estimated Multinomial logit model betas which were used as priors in the final statistical design. 
The survey was conducted in the months of November and December 2015. In the final survey, we 
used a two stage sampling procedure in data collection. In the first stage a sample of 22 out of 35 
CFAs were purposively identified to reflect the entire Mau forest. This was conducted with the help 
of head of Mau forest conservancy35. The CFAs covered five counties of Bomet, Narok, Kericho, 
Nakuru and Uasin Gishu. The CFAs were a representation of the entire Mau forest therefore fully 
representative. The CFA level data were collected through focus group discussions with CFA 
officials and other members at their offices in the forest station. In the second stage, a sample of 
321 households from the 22 CFAs were identified through simple random sampling, in which every 
third household was interviewed, and snowballing was used in instances where the third household 
34 This is one of the limitation of the study since respondents may not have a clear picture of how the provision of ecosystem services may be in 
five years’ time even if the current state is low hence may influence their judgment and also bias the result to some extent. However, we believe that 
we can still get better estimates of the respondents’ preferences. 
35 Although it is possible that the head of conservancy may have referred us to CFAs that were doing well, we can confirm that t his was not the 
case since we also got to visit some CFAs that were in total mess. The choice of CFA was based on total representation of the entire forest and ease 
of accessibility since some areas are very difficult to access due to terrain and lack of motorable roads.  
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was not a CFA member 36 . This was conducted using individual household-level survey 
administered questionnaire to household heads. 
2.4.2 Experimental Design 
To generate different choice tasks, we employed the Bayesian D-efficient design. This was chosen 
due to the uncertainty on the nature of the parameter estimates for each of the attributes. The 
efficient designs are also less restricted and easy to find than the orthogonal and often allows much 
smaller number of choice sets (Greiner et al., 2014). We used the D-error criterion to optimize the 
efficiency of the experimental design. However, to generate an efficient design priors are needed. 
Since using zero priors would be same as using the orthogonal design we used a method proposed 
by Bliemer and Rose in Ngene forums when we have no knowledge of the priors but have an idea 
of the expected signs of the parameters. 
We assumed a uniform distribution of the parameters as the priors to be used to generate a Bayesian 
D-efficient design using Ngene37. The efficient statistical design for the pilot was thus built using
Ngene 1.1.238. We then conducted a pilot/pre-test so as to validate the design in principle. Data 
from the pre-test was then analyzed using multinomial logit (MNL) in Stata 13 and resulting 
parameter estimates used as priors for development of a refined and more efficient design for the 
final survey. Due to complexity of running an efficient design using RPL we opted for the MNL 
despite its weaknesses39. Although these weaknesses may significantly influence the statistical 
36 In some instances, we interviewed CFA members at the farms in the forest or when there were collective activities such as tree planting or 
transportation of tree seedlings 
37 The uniform distribution was employed because it gives equal weight to all possible prior parameter values and because we may not be certain 
about the exact distribution. 
38 Choice Metrics, "Ngene 1.1. 2 User Manual & Reference Guide", Sydney, Australia: Choice Metrics (2014). 
39 First it does not easily accommodate the presence of preference heterogeneity within choice data; secondly it does not allow for the fact that 
with SC data, each decision maker typically responds to multiple choice tasks; and lastly the MNL imposes some constant error variance assumptions 
across all alternatives across the model (Bliemer and Rose, 2010). 
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properties of the design especially with inclusion of sociodemographic factors in the estimation 
model, the design still performs much better than the orthogonal or other designs. 
The choice sets for the full survey were developed based on priors from the pilot. In both pilot and 
full survey, we checked for presence of dominant alternatives, finding limited dominance in the 
estimated design, and a similar distribution in the choice frequencies. The design was generated 
without accounting for covariates. For the final survey, we generated a design with thirty choice 
tasks. To reduce the answering load, each respondent would answer five choice tasks picked 
randomly from the thirty choice tasks generated in Ngene. A sample of the choice card used in the 
final survey is shown in Figure 240. 
Figure 3: Sample choice card used in the final survey 
40 The pictorial presentation was further described to the respondents to avoid any mix up especially to respondents who had trouble identifying 
the differences to avoid any confusion. This was however done only in the first choice since after one illustration the respondent easily picked up in 
the other choice tasks. 
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2.4.3 Theoretical Framework 
Empirical Model 
The choice experiment approach has its roots in two theories namely, the Lancaster’s economic 
theory of value (Lancaster, 1966) and the random utility theory (McFadden, 1974). The random 
utility theory posits that an individual (household head) n, chooses an alternative j, from the choice 
set, s=1,2......S, if the indirect utility of j is greater than that of any other choice i. That is 
(1) 
Thus 
Unsj = Vnsj + εnsj (2) 
Where S is the set of all possible alternatives and systematic component, Vnsj is the deterministic 
component, it is a vector of observable individual and alternative specific attributes. εnsj is the 
unobserved component it includes all unobservable impact and factors affecting the choice 
(Louviere et al., 2000). Assuming the observed component is a linear function of the observed 
attributes levels of each alternative X, and their weights (parameters) β where β0s are unknown 
parameters to be estimated then we have, 
(3)
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In our case, βk appears in the utility function of multiple alternatives j. It is therefore generic over 
these alternatives. Assuming the unobserved components is independent and identically distributed 
(IID), the probability Pnsj that respondent n selects alternative j from a choice situation S is given 
by the Multinomial logit model (McFadden, 1974). 
(4) 
In the first step, equation 4 was estimated by means of conditional logit (CL) regression following 
Hensher and Greene (2003), which assumes that choices are consistent with the Independence of 
Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) property. Implying that the relative probabilities of the two alternatives 
being selected are not affected by removal or introduction of other alternatives (Luce, 2005). The 
model therefore assumes that respondents’ preferences are homogeneous. Given this limitation we 
applied other flexible approaches. The study used the Random Parameter Logit (RPL) model which 
is more flexible, allows for random preference variations between respondents, incorporates 
correlation in the utility between choices, and accounts for heterogeneity among individuals 
(McFadden and Train, 2000). Following Colombo et al. (2009) the RPL model is described in 
equation 5. 
Unsj = βXnsj + φnXnsj + εnsj (5) 
The utility function Unsj is split into three parts: Xnsj is a vector of observable attributes for the good 
in question; β is the vector of coefficients of the observed attributes; φn is a vector of deviation 
parameters (they represent the individual’s taste. Individual tastes are assumed constant across 
choices made but not across the entire sample); and εnsj is a random term and is IID. With the RPL 
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model, we do not have to assume that the IIA property holds. In this model, preference 
heterogeneity is incorporated into the random parameters directly since each respondent has his 
own vector of deviation parameters (Ju and Yoo, 2014). The probability of respondent n’s observed 
sequence of choices is given by the integral in equation 6 assuming homogeneous tastes across all 
choice situation. 
(6) 
Integral (6) is estimated by simulation since it has no analytical solution (Colombo et al., 2009). 
The simulated probability P
ˆ
n is given in equation 7. 
(7) 
P
ˆ
nis unbiased estimate of Pn whose efficiency increases as R increases (Train, 2003). The index nr 
on β implies that for each respondent, the probability is calculated using R different sets of β vectors 
(Ju and Yoo, 2014). However, the RPL does not show the sources of heterogeneity. To account for 
sources of heterogeneity, the RPL was estimated with interaction (i.e. interacting the attributes with 
socioeconomic variables). In addition, although the RPL is better than the CL models in terms of 
welfare estimates and overall fit Dikgang and Muchapondwa (2014), the RPL model has some 
restrictive assumptions based on assumed distribution of the coefficient vector mostly uniform, 
triangular, log-normal and normal distribution. If the distribution is miss-specified the estimated 
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results could be biased (Carlsson et al., 2003). Since most of our attributes were dummy coded the 
uniform distribution was best suited (Hensher and Greene, 2002). 
To determine the best model in terms of overall fit, the study employed the LR test following 
(Hensher et al., 2005). 
− 2(LLBase − LLEstimated) (8) 
which is ∼ X2(difference in the number of estimated parameters between the two models). 
Estimating Marginal WTP 
The marginal WTP measures is given by the ratio of two parameters41 as presented in equation 9 
(Hensher et al., 2005). 
(9) 
Beyond the marginal WTPs for each attribute, we also estimated welfare change or compensating 
surplus in five hypothetical scenarios created using information compiled from the questionnaire. 
The new policy scenarios were projected as follows: Scenario 1: Forest conservation: Wildlife 
population-SQ; Forest Structure-high; Water Quality-High; Flood Risk-medium. Scenario 2: Flood 
mitigation and forest conservation: Wildlife Population-SQ; Forest Structure-High; Water quality-
SQ; Flood Risk-Low. Scenario 3: Water conservation and Flood mitigation: Wildlife Population-
medium; Forest Structure-medium; Water Quality-high; Flood Risk-low. Scenario 4: Water 
conservation and forest conservation: Wildlife Population-medium; Forest Structure-high; Water 
Quality-high; Flood Risk-medium. Scenario 5: Water conservation and wildlife conservation: 
41 Both parameters must be statistically significant 
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Wildlife Population-medium; Forest Structure-medium; Water Quality high; Flood Risk-medium. 
We estimated the cost of each conservation policy option through comparison of the utility of each 
policy intervention to the status quo. Following Bennett and Blamey (2001) and Bergmann et al. 
(2008). 
(10) 
Where V0 is the utility of the status quo option, V1 is the utility of the alternative option and βcost is 
the estimated coefficient of the cost. 
2.5 Results and Discussion 
2.5.1 Descriptive statistics 
A total of 321 households were interviewed. Other than the Choice experiment questions, 
socioeconomic and demographic profiles of the respondents and their households were also 
collected to gain more insight on factors affecting people’s perception about the various forest 
ecosystem services. This information forms a basis for investigating heterogeneity in personal 
preferences. Summary statistics of the profiles of respondents interviewed is shown in Table A.1 
in the appendix. The results show that whereas all respondents considered the forest to be of 
significant value, approximately 73% of the respondents visited the forest to fetch water and 78% 
visited to collect firewood. The summary statistics also show that approximately 61% of the 
respondents own PELIS plots in the forest. About 88% of the respondents are also married and only 
29% employed in off-farm jobs. The average households size is also approximately six members 
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and the average distance from the nearest edge of the forest is about 1.4 kilometres. On the other 
hand the average household monthly income was found to be about Ksh.13,492. 
2.5.2 Model estimation results 
NLOGIT 4.0 and Stata 13 econometric software were used to estimate the models. For each of the 
attributes except the cost, for the ease of analysis and interpretation42, we coded them low, medium 
and high levels. Where low is the status quo i.e., choosing no management option. For the wildlife 
population low represented 753 elephants, medium 1103 elephants and high 1203 elephants43. 
Whereas for the forest structure, low represented 56.25%, medium 82.5% and high 95% forest 
cover. The water purification and supply attributes was reflected in million cubic meters with low 
being 11850, medium 17380 and high being 1996044. Being that quantifying risk of flooding 
required more technical expertise, this was just reflected by low medium and high risk flooding45. 
A description of the attributes levels after coding is presented in Table 2. 
Table 2: Description of attribute levels used in the study 
Variables Description of variable 
Wild_L Low wildlife population 
Wild_M Medium wildlife population 
Wild_H High wildlife population 
Tree_L Low forest cover 
Tree_M Medium Forest cover 
Tree_H High forest cover 
42 This also for the ease of coding and choice designing in Ngene. 
43 Although elephants may be associated with a lot of damages to crops and therefore some negative attitude towards them, we chose elephants 
because they are the wildlife animals that most community interacted with frequently. In some communities, they are also a source of tourist 
attraction. 
44 Because the differences in levels of the attribute may not be large enough, we made it easier for respondents to understand the variation through 
a pictorial presentation of these levels. To avoid confusing the respondents in terms of quality of the water, the pictorial presentation also detailed 
clean and more water to reflect high level of this attribute. 
45 The risk of flooding was expressed in terms of water levels. High risk implying high above ground water level and low risk implying low above 
ground water levels as a result of flooding. 
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Water_L Low quality and quantity water 
Water_H High quality and quantity water 
Flood_L Low risk of flooding 
Flood_M Medium risk of flooding 
Flood_H High risk of flooding 
The last was the monetary attribute that is additional annual cost per household in the form of 
annual levy. The attributes were then effect coded as this provides estimates that are uncorrelated 
to the model intercept (Louviere et al., 2000; Hensher et al., 2005). Effect coding implies one level 
of attributes is dropped as the base category. However, for the water attribute we merged the low 
and medium level and classified it as low since it made more economic and logical sense for a 
respondent to just pay for clean water since both medium and low quality and quantity would have 
same health implications in some way unless treated46. The water attribute therefore had just one 
level high and the reference category. The estimated coefficient for each of the remaining levels 
show the respondent’s preference for change from the reference (omitted) level to greater utility 
level (Bergmann et al., 2006). Each of the attributes levels were therefore denoted as Low (L) i.e., 
the base category, Medium(M) and High(H) levels as shown in Table 2. We also included a dummy 
equal to one for the status quo (SQ) and zero for the other options. This controls for the very 
important difference between SQ and non-SQ alternatives. It also measures some propensity to 
choose 0-cost option, or protest behavior 47 . This information is also more useful for policy 
purposes. Testing for status quo bias is therefore necessary. Table 3 show the frequency with which 
each alternative was chosen (out of 321*3*5 choice sets = 4815 across all respondents). The status 
46 By choosing medium or low quality and quantity water, it may also imply that they do not attach any value to water.  
47 Its inclusion is also important since it reflects some hidden characteristics that the respondent do not see in the choice task. The status quo 
inclusion means respondents are free to select status quo for all attributes hence failing to make any trade-offs. 
Therefore, information on trade-off is lost for every choice of the status quo. 
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quo bias is significantly small (2.55%) implying that forest-adjacent communities within CFAs 
prefer conservation of forests for efficient provision of forest ecosystem services. 
Table 3: Choice Frequency for Mau forest conservancy households 
Choice Frequency Percent 
Option A 762 47.48 
Option B 803 49.97 
Option C (Status Quo) 41 2.55 
Total 1605 100 
Conditional Logit (CL) model 
Column (1) of Table 4 presents the results of the CL model. The overall fit of the model as measured 
by McFadden’s ρ2 is 0.47 which is within the conventional standards48. The coefficients are highly 
significant at 5% and below except for the high level of wildlife biodiversity and population. All 
the attributes have the expected sign. The significance of the attribute and the sign shows that 
ceteris peribus, low and medium flood risk (i.e., low and medium water levels as a result of 
flooding), higher levels of Water quality, and high and medium forest cover increases the likelihood 
of selecting a given management scenario. While medium wildlife population 49  decreases the 
probability of selecting a given management option. The negative and significant coefficient of the 
48 The value of ρ2that is within the range of 0.2 and 0.4 are considered good fit (Hensher and Johnson, 1981) 
49 During the survey, we noted that most households were not concerned about the destructive nature of wildlife animals such as monkeys or 
elephants. They said in case of damage it was often shared since most farms in the forest are in one area. The main worry was if the population 
increases then human wildlife conflict would arise hence tension with Kenya Wildlife officials. However, the main concern was with leopards that 
often attacked their sheep at night yet no compensation from relevant authorities. 
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alternative specific constant (ASC) shows that people want a change from the SQ i.e., they want a 
conservation program aimed at improving forest condition. 
Table 4: Conditional logit, Random Parameter logit model and Random Parameter logit model with interactions 
(1) (2) (3) 
CL Model RPL model RPL Model with interaction 
N = 1605 N =1605 N=1605 
Log-Likelihood= -671.1730 
Variable       Coeff .(s.e) 
Log-Likelihood=-664.0608 
Variable     Coeff(s.e) Coe .Std (s.e) 
Log-Likelihood=-624.6797 
Variable Coeff. (s.e)      Coeff .Std (s.e) 
ASC -1.5073*** 
(0.5746) 
Random Parameters Random Parameters 
Wild_H 0.2398 1.1652** Wild_H 0.1561 1.1071* 
Wild_M -0.3665** (0.2112) (0.6053) (0.4318) (0.5741) 
(0 .1616) Tree_M 1.7923*** 0.9655** Tree_M 3.7825*** 0.8919* 
Wild_H 0.1067 (0.2171) (0.4654) (0.5757) (0.4878) 
(0.1697) Tree_H 4.0959*** 0.9655** Tree_H 6.3764*** 0.8919* 
Tree_M 1.5041*** (0.3811) (0.4654) (0.8157) (0.4878) 
(0.1563) Water_H 0.7877*** 0.1636 Water_H 0.6486*** 0.1612 
Tree_H 3.5216*** (0.1530) (0.7013) (0.1709) (0.6210) 
(0 .2708) Flood_M 1.4927*** 1.6582*** Flood_M 1.2260*** 1.6612*** 
Water_H 0.6411*** (0.1797) (0.3619) (0.2324) (0.3723) 
(0 .1170) Flood_L 2.6174*** 1.6582*** Flood_L 1.8427*** 1.6612*** 
Flood_M 
Flood_L 
1.2429*** 
(0.1101) 
2.1300*** 
(0.2537) (0.3619) (0.2386) (0.3723) 
Non-Random Parameters Non-Random Parameters 
ASC -1.1761* ASC -1.6057**
(0.1503) (0.7008) (0.7246) 
Cost -.00061*** Wild_M -0.3783** Wild_M -0.4764**
(0.0002) (0.1933) (0.2002) 
Cost -0.0006*** Cost -0.0008***
(0.0002) (0.0002) 
WildH*PELIS -0.4933* 
(0.2773) 
WildH*Dist -0.2313**
(0.1056) 
WildH*HHsize 0.1057** 
(0.0520) 
TreeM*Dist -0.2912** 
(0.1236) 
TreeM*HHsize -0.2750*** 
(0.0626) 
TreeM*Empl 1.0030** 
(0.4331) 
TreeH*Dist -0.4311***
(0.1648) 
TreeH*HHsize -0.2931***
(0.0814) 
TreeH*Empl 2.0138*** 
(0.6321) 
WaterH*Empl 0.7974** 
(0.3166) 
FloodM*PELIS 0.6420** 
(0.2673) 
FloodH*PELIS 0.8020** 
(0.3223) 
FloodH*Dist 0.3535*** 
(0.1258) 
ρ2 0.4733 0.6234 0.6457 
Standard errors in Parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
The results therefore indicate that forest-adjacent communities would prefer forest management 
options which would guarantee low levels of wildlife population and diversity, clean and abundant 
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water, low or medium flood risk and higher or medium forest cover as indicated by the significant 
coefficients. We also found considerable consistency with economic theory. Specifically, that the 
cost of a conservation program reduce demand for a given conservation program. Our results 
therefore suggest the existence of significant values and preferences for the stated forest ecosystem 
attributes. However, if the IIA assumption does not hold then CL model would yield biased 
estimates. We employed the Hausman and McFadden test under the null hypothesis of no violation 
to test the IIA assumption (Hausman and McFadden, 1984). The results are shown in Table 5. 
Violation of IIA assumption is thus evident from the results. Hence the CL model is not appropriate 
model. This test has however been contested for giving inconsistent results (see Vijverberg, 2011). 
Table 5: IIA/IID Hausman Test 
Alternative dropped Chi Square Degrees of freedom Comment 
A 14.35 8 Violation at 10% 
B 5.66 8 No violation 
C (Status Quo) -0.758 8 No violation 
Due to violation of the IIA property, we considered alternative models namely the Random 
Parameter Logit (RPL) model and RPL model with interactions to identify the sources of 
heterogeneity. 
Random Parameter Logit Model 
Despite the violation of the IIA assumption, the CL model further assumes homogeneity across 
individual preferences. Since preferences are heterogeneous, we need to account for this 
heterogeneity in order to obtain unbiased estimates of individual preferences. In addition, for 
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prescription of policies that takes into account equity concerns, accounting for preference 
heterogeneity is critical (Birol et al., 2006). We therefore used the RPL model by Train (1998). 
According to Hoyos (2010) three considerations need to be made in implementing an RPL model 
that is: which coefficients are assumed random; type of distribution for the random parameters; and 
the economic interpretation for those coefficients. To determine which variables are actually 
random, we used the Lagrange Multiplier test by McFadden and Train (2000) to test the presence 
of random components50.  
Based on this test, Wild_H, Tree_M, Tree_H, Water_H and Flood_M were found to be random 
parameters. Some studies that have used this test are (Brey et al., 2007; Liljenstolpe, 2008; Hoyos 
et al., 2009). But according to Brownstone (2001), the test is not good for identification of random 
factors for inclusion in a general RPL specification. For robustness checks, we employed the t-test 
on the standard deviations assuming all parameters are random to test if they give same results. The 
test showed that Tree_M, Tree_H, Flood_M and Flood_L are random based on the significant t-
values of the standard deviations. This test has been applied by (Carlsson et al., 2003; Colombo et 
al., 2005; Wang et al., 2007). Based on these two tests we decided to treat all attributes as random 
except Wild_M and cost since both tests showed Wild_M to be non-random. The cost attribute was 
treated as fixed so that distribution of marginal WTP is just the distribution of the attribute 
coefficient. This also places a non-positive restriction on the cost variable. 
50 The test works as follows; we first compute the artificial variable ztnj given by 
, with 
where t denotes the component of xnj suspected to be random, C is the set of alternatives being offered and Pnk is the CL choice probability. The CL 
model is then re-estimated including these artificial variables ztnj, and the null hypothesis of non-random coefficient of attribute x is rejected if the 
coefficients of the artificial variables are significantly different from zero (McFadden and Train, 2000). 
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In terms of the distributional functions, since the random parameters were all dummies, we settled 
for the uniform distribution as suggested by Hensher and Greene (2002). The results for the random 
parameter logit model based on 500 Halton draws are presented in Column (2) of Table 4. 
The model is statistically significant (chi square value of 2198.424 with 7 degrees of freedom). The 
overall model fit as shown by the pseudo R squared is 0.62339, which is statistically acceptable for 
this class of models. The RPL estimates in column 2 reveals significant and large derived standard 
deviation for Wild_H, Tree_M, Tree_H, Flood_M and Flood_L an indication that our data supports 
choice specific unobserved heterogeneity for these attributes. The null hypothesis of equality of the 
regression parameters is rejected at 5% based on the LR test (
 where l refers to the 
estimated log likelihood function. There is also a structural advantage in RPL over the CL as shown 
by the significant standard deviations of the random parameters. However, according to Boxall and 
Adamowicz (2002), the RPL model does not show the sources of heterogeneity. To identify the 
sources of heterogeneity, we used an RPL model with interactions. 
Random Parameter Logit Model with Interactions 
To estimate the RPL model with interaction, we included interactions of individual specific socio-
demographic and attitudinal characteristics with attributes in the utility function. The interaction 
terms obtained by interacting random parameters with other socio-demographic characteristics 
decomposes any heterogeneity observed with the random parameters therefore showing sources of 
heterogeneity (Hensher et al., 2005). 
Based on literature and economic theory, we tested various interactions of the various forest 
ecosystem services attributes with respondents socioeconomic and demographic characteristics 
collected during the survey. We found, household size, employment status of household head, 
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distance to nearest edge of the forest and whether a household owns a PELIS plot or not fits the 
data best. Column (3) of Table 4 presents these results. The model is statistically significant (chi 
square 2277.19 with 26 degrees of freedom). The overall model fit shown by the pseudo R squared 
is ρ2=0.6457 a better fit than the RPL model without interaction. The null hypothesis of equality 
between regression parameters for RPL model and RPL model with interactions is further rejected 
at 0.5% significance level using the LR test 
. 
This implies that the inclusion of demographic and socio-economic characteristics as interaction 
improves the model fit. We then fixed out interaction terms that had insignificant heterogeneity 
around the mean parameter estimates following Hensher et al. (2005). This does not however affect 
the results in any way but just reduces the number of variables by eliminating the insignificant 
interactions (treating them as fixed). The significant interaction terms are of the expected sign 
except for the interaction between household size and high wildlife population attribute. However, 
all the random parameters except Water_H had high and significant standard deviations. 
The RPL model with interactions therefore decomposes any observed heterogeneity within the 
random parameters hence providing an explanation for existence of any heterogeneity. For 
instance, the interaction between ownership of PELIS plot in the forest and attribute of high wildlife 
population is negative and significant showing that those who own PELIS plots are less likely to 
choose alternative with high population of wildlife. This is expected since high population of 
wildlife would mean higher likelihood of destruction of crops in the PELIS plots. For local 
communities’ dependent on subsistent agriculture, wildlife is not always a priority since they are 
more concerned with immediate gains. Moreover, the benefits from wildlife conservation may not 
trickle back directly to these communities and neither are they compensated in case of any crop 
destruction. This is a major observation especially among developing countries in Africa. Similarly, 
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those who own PELIS plots are also more likely to select alternatives that have low or medium risk 
of flooding. This shows that differences in marginal utilities for low/medium flood risk and high 
wildlife population may in part be explained by whether a household owns a PELIS plot or not in 
the forest. Household size was also found to partly explain differences in marginal utilities for high 
wildlife population and high/medium forest cover. The results suggest that the higher the household 
size the less likely the household is to select an alternative with high/medium forest cover. This is 
expected since most populated households may consider forest as occupying alternative land that 
they could use for agriculture purposes. There are also chances of these households choosing low 
forest cover, with the hope that they will get plots through PELIS in an effort to reclaim the forest. 
This is also supported by the fact that the more the scarcity of the resource the higher the incentive 
for collective action and vice versa51. However, the results suggest that the higher the household 
size, the more likely a household is to choose an alternative with high wildlife population. This is 
unexpected given that high wildlife population could mean destruction of food crops that the 
household depends on and constant human wildlife conflict. A possible explanation for this choice 
could be just the love for wildlife or more wildlife would mean more food if they are hunters or 
just “warm glow” associated with being pro wildlife. 
Finally, the results revealed that the employment status of household head could also partially 
explain differences in marginal utilities for high quality and quantity water attribute and 
high/medium forest cover. The results indicate that household heads who are employed in off farm 
jobs are more likely to select alternative with high/medium forest cover and high quantity and 
quality water for drinking. Moreover, the higher the distance a household is from the nearest edge 
of the forest, the less likely the household is to choose alternative with medium/high forest cover 
51 It is important to note that, this may not hold for members involved in other forest user groups activities like bee keeping which need more forest 
cover. 
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or high wildlife population. This is expected given that households further away from the forest 
may find it costly to enjoy forest resources directly and may not view the forest cover to be of 
significance. This shows that opportunity cost with respect to distance matters. 
2.5.3 Estimation of Willingness to Pay 
There is ongoing debate regarding the appropriateness of calculating WTP estimates from RPL 
models of CE data. Key concern is the RPL assumption regarding distribution of cost variable. By 
specifying the cost variable as fixed as in our case, the assumption is that all respondents have same 
preference for cost which is quite unreasonable. It may also be equally unreasonable to assume that 
the distribution of preferences for cost is normally distributed. However, no “gold standard” has 
been established. Since the cost is not modelled as random, we do not require non-parametric 
bootstrapping. 
The Marginal WTP was estimated by computation of the marginal rate of substitution between 
change in forest ecosystem service attribute and the marginal utility of income represented by 
coefficient of the cost attribute. The WTP estimates are computed per household and are to be paid 
as annual levy for three years. The WTP estimates for CL, RPL and RPL with interactions estimated 
using the Wald (Delta method) procedure in NLOGIT 4.0 are presented in Table 6. 
Table 6: Marginal WTP for forest Ecosystem Services Attributes (Ksh/respondent (1 US$=Ksh.100)) and 95% 
C.I
Attributes CL Model RPL Model RPL Model Interactions 
WTP C.I. WTP C.I. WTP C.I. 
Wild_M -604.76 (-589.67 - -619.85) -627.92 (-612.25 - -643.59) -601.61 (-586.59 - -616.62) 
Tree_M 2481.99 (2420.04 - 2543.93) 2974.55 (2900.32 - 3048.78) 4776.73 (4657.50 - 4895.96) 
Tree_H 5811.19 (5666.13 - 5956.25) 6797.80 (6628.12 - 6967.48) 8052.41 (7851.42 - 8253.39) 
Water_H 1057.94 (1031.53 - 1084.34) 1307.37 (1274.74 - 1340.01) 819.13 (798.68 - 839.57) 
Flood_M 2051.04 (1999.84 - 2102.24) 2477.44 (2415.61 - 2539.27) 1548.24 (1509.59 - 1586.89) 
Flood_L 3514.77 (3427.03 - 3602.51) 4343.99 (4235.58 - 4452.41) 2326.98 (2268.90 - 2385.07) 
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The t-test of WTP estimates from the three models differ significantly at alpha=0.05 significance 
level or less. Positive (negative) marginal values for an attribute is an indication that the average 
respondent would experience an improvement in welfare with an increase (decrease) in the level of 
the attribute and would therefore choose an intervention that maximizes his/her utility. The positive 
WTP values for both high and medium forest cover and high water quality and quantity may depict 
use values whereas the positive WTP estimates for medium and low flood risk may depict both use 
and non-use values. However, the negative WTP values for wildlife indicate that individuals would 
experience a loss in welfare for choosing an intervention with medium population of wildlife 
(approximately ksh 605 (USD 6.05) loss in welfare). The negative WTP suggests that people do 
not have positive preference for this attribute but in absolute terms they would be willing to accept 
the amount as compensation to accept the policy that would guarantee them medium wildlife 
population52. 
During the survey communities expressed a lot of concern especially with destruction of crops and 
killing of their sheep by wild animals. Elephants, baboons, Warthogs, wild pigs and leopards were 
the most notorious as reported by most CFAs53. This explains why communities would develop 
negative attitude towards wildlife animals. The high wildlife population was however insignificant 
although we expected that the high wildlife population would lead to even a larger loss in welfare 
than medium wildlife population. These results suggest that devolution of forest management 
through PFM to CFAs will be more successful where human-wildlife conflict is lesser. 
52 People would not be willing to choose an intervention with this attribute due to the destructive nature of wildlife and this is further supported by 
the fact that most forest-adjacent communities are farmers some even own plots right inside the forest under the PELIS scheme hence prone to attacks 
by wild animals. 
53 During the pilot in Londiani we found the community having a meeting with Kenya Wildlife Service, Kenya Forest Service and other government 
department over an attack on over 50 herds of sheep by rogue leopards the previous night. 
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Our results are in tandem with findings from various studies on valuation of ecosystem services 
including those conducted in developed world. For example, García-Llorente et al. (2012) found 
that people had higher WTP for river quality which essentially implies water quality and quantity. 
Our results are also consistent with Hanley et al. (2006) who found positive and significant effect 
of river ecology attribute on river improvement project. Gatto et al. (2013) also found that 
respondents had no significant WTP for biodiversity conservation similar to our findings that 
increased wildlife population leads to loss in welfare. However, our results differ from findings by 
Carlsson et al. (2003), Shoyama et al. (2013) and Yao et al. (2014) who found high preference for 
biodiversity conservation. The results are also consistent with Birol et al. (2009) who found 
significant preference for flood reduction relative to use and non-use values from recreation or 
biodiversity. 
2.5.4 Welfare Estimates 
The marginal WTP estimates show that in general the average respondent in the Mau forest 
conservancy is willing to pay for forest conservation. However, they do not provide welfare 
estimates for alternative policy scenarios. From policy perspective, welfare estimate derivation is 
the most useful aspect of the CE exercise especially for assessment of cost benefit analysis. We 
therefore need to compare utility between status quo and a series of alternatives or policy 
interventions each described by attribute levels employed in the experiment. The utility is then 
transformed into impacts that different policy interventions have on respondent’s welfare. The 
welfare measure for each household is then given by the overall WTP for a change from the status 
quo based on RPL model with interactions estimates. 
The welfare estimates for the various policy scenarios are presented in Table A.2 in the appendix. 
The compensating surplus for a change from the status quo to the alternative policy scenarios 
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increases with improved social, ecological and economic conditions as expected. The mean WTP 
for the forest conservation policy of USD 104.19 is highest followed by flood mitigation and forest 
conservation policy. This means that an average household would be willing to make an annual 
payment of USD 104.19 for the next three years to avoid any environmental damage as described 
by the forest conservation policy scenario1. This also implies that forest conservation policy and a 
combination of forest conservation policy and flood mitigation policy are perceived to provide 
higher welfare gains to the households. 
Implication for design of PES schemes and Participatory Forest Management 
The Mau forest conservancy, is one of the reserve forests managed through PFM. Under the PFM 
arrangement, the government retains ownership of the forest while forest-adjacent communities, 
organized in the form of Community Forest Associations (CFAs), obtain user rights. Communities 
are also provided with incentives such as PELIS where they grow appropriate crops during early 
stages of reforestation as they protect and conserve the trees up to a certain stage when tree canopy 
forms. It is important to note that forest-adjacent communities are mainly poor with no alternative 
land and almost fully reliant on these forests for their livelihoods54 and are the same people charged 
with conserving these forests through CFAs in collaboration with KFS 55 . This implies local 
communities are more of demanders of these services than suppliers of these services to some 
extent mainly because they also pay user fees through the CFAs to enjoy the various forest 
resources. Although willingness to accept (WTA) would also be an ideal measure for the supply 
side, given the socio-economic status of forest-adjacent communities, we may not get reliable 
estimates on their values and preferences since their preferences may only be driven by the 
54 The forests provide firewood, grazing land, drinking water, and food crops, grass for thatching as well as herbs and medicines. enjoy any of the 
resources, they pay user-fees a percentage of which goes to KFS and a percentage to CFA and associated forest user group (FUG). 
55 However, the major beneficiaries of these forests are the tea factories, energy, and water companies as well as the tourism industries among other 
companies downstream. 
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compensation from a given policy scenario. Moreover, since the forest is a reserve forest where 
they only have limited user rights through CFAs (members only), estimating WTA becomes a 
challenge. We therefore preferred to assess their WTP for the various ecosystem services to 
determine how the forest-adjacent communities can be incentivized to sustainably manage these 
forest resources through CFAs. Our estimates therefore provide a good entry point for informing 
the designing of incentive schemes such as PES. 
However, PFM and PELIS alone is not adequate to incentivize communities to conserve these 
forests. If public and private partners can come together, policy instruments like PES can ensure 
socially optimal supply of ecosystem services through improving resource management, creating 
income and sustainable livelihoods for rural and urban populations. For example, the commercial 
value of water is relatively easy to calculate compared to protection of key wildlife habitat or 
protection of soil type or flood mitigation which does not easily translate to cash value. The Kenya 
Power and Lighting Company that relies on Sondu river that has its origins in the Mau forest for 
hydro power, Rift Valley water services board which supplies water to major towns in the Rift 
Valley and water companies such as Keringet mineral water company in Molo as well as the Coca 
cola company which need pure drinking water could therefore work in partnership with KFS and 
CFAs to explore the possibility of using a water fund as a possible financing mechanism. This 
could be funded by the public through increased water fees aimed at protection of the quality and 
quantity of water to surrounding towns and municipalities. Surrounding counties could also come 
up to establish voluntary conservation funds for biodiversity conservation and related ecosystem 
services making use of the estimated marginal WTP values. 
Finally, given that forest-adjacent communities consider forest to be of significant value to them, 
there should be more effort towards devolution of forest management to forest-adjacent 
communities especially in areas where communities have been reluctant in taking up PFM. 
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Incentive schemes like PES can therefore incentivize communities to conserve forest resources 
through CFAs. However, an assessment of the contextual factors, historical and expected trends in 
demand and supply is vital especially if we are to target payments to those CFAs that can actually 
deliver the desired service. 
2.6 Conclusion and Policy Implications 
The main aim of the study was to determine the economic value of forest ecosystem services to 
forest-adjacent communities and its implication for design of PES schemes and PFM. The study 
found that there are positive and significant benefits associated with the various forest ecosystem 
services within the Mau forest conservancy that need to be considered when designing PFM 
programs and PES schemes with the aim of maximizing social welfare and raising acceptance 
within communities. There is also considerable preference heterogeneity which to a large extent 
was determined by employment status of household head, ownership of PELIS plot, household 
size, and distance to the nearest edge of the forest. 
Specifically, we found high WTP values for improvement in forest structure (between USD47.76 
and USD80.52)56, flood risk reduction (between USD15.48 and USD23.26) and high water quality 
and quantity (at USD 8.19) respectively. The results thus show that there is much appreciation by 
the average respondent for the role of forest ecosystem services and that forest-adjacent communities 
are more pro conservation mainly motivated by the direct and few indirect benefits they derive from 
these forest ecosystems. Forest-adjacent communities are also more concerned with use values but 
also some non-use values contrary to findings from previous studies in developed countries (see 
Carlsson et al. 2003; Gatto et al. 2013; Shoyama et al. 2013; Yao et al. 2014). In terms of welfare, 
56 This was supported by finding from the local interactions with the locals. Most said they would pay more for the forest conservation, they 
compared the highest cost shown of USD30, with what they pay monthly per cow or sheep to graze in the forest and the number of cows and sheep 
they had and considered that as a very small amount to them. 
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respondents revealed that forest conservation policy and a combination of flood mitigation and forest 
conservation policy would have high welfare impacts on livelihoods of locals. 
We also found considerable consistency with economic theory. Specifically, the cost of a 
conservation program reduces demand for a given conservation program. Whereas increase in 
forest cover, water quality and reduction of flood risk increases demand for a given conservation 
program. Contrary to findings from developed countries, we found that respondents would 
experience a loss in welfare for choosing an alternative with medium wildlife population as 
opposed to one with low wildlife population. A significant finding from the study was the high 
WTP values for reduction in flood risk, showing that forest-adjacent communities were more 
concerned with reduction in flood risk as a result of forest destruction. This indicates that 
respondents are more altruist and not only concerned with direct use values but also non-use values 
for the welfare of other members of the society. This aspect of the society thus motivates the design 
of an incentive schemes such as PES and roll out of PFM programmes. 
A number of policy recommendations can be highlighted from the study. First, the WTP estimates 
lays foundation for the design of market based instrument such as PES which can significantly 
incentivize communities and enhance the roll out, design and implementation of PFM. However, 
more research on the demand and supply side is needed as well as consideration of issues as to 
what private partners may consider worth involving in PES schemes. Bundling different ecosystem 
services together may also help in diminishing transaction costs. A cost benefit analysis and 
assessment of political climate in cases where communities have strong attachment to their forests 
either for cultural values or other ecosystem services may also be important in designing the PES 
schemes. 
In addition, a demonstration of the significance of ecosystem services attributes as input in the 
production process can play a role in increasing environmental awareness and motivating forest-
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adjacent communities to conserve forest resources through PFM. This can also encourage shifts 
from socially unacceptable land management activities towards ecosystem oriented approaches. 
Incentive schemes like PELIS may also play a significant role in promoting PFM as revealed by 
the fact that PELIS plot owners have more willingness to pay for improvement in forest cover57. 
The government should therefore increase roll out and incentivize communities that have been 
hesitant at adopting PFM to adopt the programme taking into account the heterogeneity in 
preferences to address equity concerns as well. 
Lastly, policy makers need to focus on policy options with higher mean welfare impacts to increase 
community involvement in forest conservation through PFM. A comparison of the different 
marginal WTP for the various forest ecosystem attributes may also help policy makers in 
understanding the values attached to these services by respondents and how to devolve forest 
management through PFM. Policy makers could also make use of the WTP and welfare estimates 
for estimation of the TEV of the Mau forest conservancy. There is also potential for benefit transfer 
of the estimates to other policy contexts. In summary, the study provides an entry point for 
designing future forest management policies in Kenya and provides valuable comparison for 
studies in other countries. 
57 It is important to note that communities felt that despite benefiting significantly from PELIS, the government benefited a lot from the revenue 
from timber sales hence there was need to dedicate a proportion of this revenues to CFAs as managers of the forests for the communities fully own 
the scheme. Some felt a proportion of revenue from PELIS could be channeled to construction of social amenities within the society e.g. school and 
health facilities. 
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Chapter Three 
Welfare and Environmental Impact of Incentive Based Conservation: 
Evidence from Kenyan Community Forest Associations58 
Abstract 
This paper focuses on whether the provision of landless forest-adjacent communities with options 
to grow appropriate food crops inside forest reserves during early stages of reforestation 
programmes enable vertical transition of low income households and conserves forests. We 
consider the welfare and environmental impact of a unique incentive scheme known as the 
Plantation Establishment and Livelihood Improvement Scheme (PELIS) in Kenya. PELIS was 
aimed at deepening community participation in forestry, and improving the economic livelihoods 
of adjacent communities. Using data collected from 22 Community Forest Associations and 406 
households, we evaluated the mean impact of the scheme on forest cover and household welfare 
using matching methods and further assessed the heterogeneous impact of the scheme on household 
welfare using the endogenous quantile treatment effects model. The study revealed that on average, 
PELIS had a significant and positive impact on overall household welfare (estimated between 
15.09% and 28.14%) and on the environment (between 5.53% and 7.94%). However, in terms of 
welfare, the scheme cannot be defended on equity grounds as it has inequitable distributional 
impacts on household welfare. The scheme raises welfare of the least poor than the poorest and 
marginalizes sections of the community through elite capture and lack of market linkages. In terms 
of policy implications, the scheme should be redesigned to ensure equitable distribution of the 
benefits to avoid further marginalization of some income groups in order to ensure sustainability 
of the scheme. There is also need to explore ways of improving market linkages for non-timber 
harvests to address the ensuing market failures and for greater impact on welfare of low income 
households and the environment. 
Key words: Household Welfare. Heterogeneity, Selection, Matching, QTE JEL 
Classification: D02, Q23, Q28 
58 A version of this chapter has been disseminated as ERSA Working Paper 706. 
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3.1 Introduction 
Conservation manifests itself today in various forms in different parts of the world. From state 
controlled such as reserve forests and exclusionary parks to community forests managed by local 
communities. Initial conservation efforts involved indigenous resource management based on 
subsistence necessity, spiritual beliefs, experience and traditions (Gbadegesin and Ayileka, 2000). 
Until the early 80s conservation efforts by governments in developing countries were mainly based 
on the protectionist approach also referred to as the classic approach to conservation (Blaikie and 
Jeanrenaud, 1997). 
In developing countries, these forms of conservation have not yielded the best results in terms of 
conservation outcomes and welfare of local forest-adjacent communities. This is because in 
developing countries, natural forests are most often surrounded by high population of the poor 
basically reliant on extraction of natural resources for their daily subsistence. Forest-adjacent 
communities are also often the poor without access to other sources of income such as land, human 
and physical capital hence depend on income derived from the forests either directly or indirectly. 
Such dependence coupled with their high rate of time preference often leads to degradation of the 
resource thus contributing to further impoverishment of the dependent forest users. Therefore, the 
poor are considered to be agents and victims of environmental degradation as well (Wunder, 2001; 
Fisher, 2004). 
The failure of the classic approach in many countries led policymakers and donors to conclude that 
the only solution is devolution of natural forest management to forest-adjacent communities 
through arrangements such as PFM and provision of incentives in order to enhance community 
support, conserve forest and offer positive welfare benefits among the forest poor. Incentive based 
conservation has therefore been considered as a remedy to failures associated with state control of 
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natural resources such as, information asymmetry, incentive incompatibility or imperfect 
incentives, high monitoring and enforcement costs among others (Sterner, 2003; Adhikari, 2005). 
However, incentive based conservation has been marred with uncertainties since PFM places 
significant restrictions on extraction of forest resources. For example, in certain instances 
communities are required to pay user fees to access certain resources e.g., grazing, firewood 
collection etc. (Jumbe and Angelsen, 2006). Certain benefits are also restricted to membership to 
CFAs. These practices have previously contributed to forest degradation in a way. The approach 
has also not realized their full potential due to the design, implementation and management 
problems (Songorwa, 1999; Hutton and Leader-Williams, 2003). A number of countries have 
experimented with different programs that include the participation of locals with the main policy 
objective of power decentralization and have yielded mixed results (Bull and White, 2002; Gilmour 
et al., 2004). Results on the potential of CPRs to have positive impacts on very poor and 
marginalized sections of the communities have also been mixed (Campbell et al., 2001). 
Distributional problems have also been experienced with structured attempts at management of 
CPRs (Kumar, 2002). In addition, as much as forests play a critical role in prevention or reduction 
of poverty through provision of safety nets, over reliance on forest may also perpetuate poverty 
(Pattanayak and Sills, 2001). 
Attempts have therefore been made in support of incentive based conservation in a number of 
developing countries in recent years. In Kenya, these attempts have focused on deepening 
community participation in forest management to aid in conservation of forest and improvement of 
welfare of forest-adjacent communities through CFAs and incentive schemes. This is based on the 
premise that other than devolution of forest management to local communities, provision of 
alternative incentive to landless forest-adjacent communities may help them to avoid activities that 
may offer short term gains in favor of activities with long term payoffs. We consider one unique 
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incentive in Kenya known as Plantation Establishment and Livelihood Improvement Scheme 
(PELIS) under the realm of PFM. PELIS is a unique incentive scheme since it provides local 
landless communities with alternative forest land for their livelihoods as they take care of trees up 
to a given stage when they move to other areas targeted for reforestation. It is also one of the 
schemes that has been in force for long but has been faced with a lot of challenges leading to 
occasional government bans over the years. 
PELIS was first introduced in Kenya in 1910 by the colonial government as non-residential 
cultivation to promote livelihood of locals economically while ensuring sustainable management 
and conservation of forests through provision of raw materials for expanding timber industry and 
reduce pressure on natural forests (Kagombe and Gitonga, 2005). Since forests in Kenya are 
surrounded by mostly poor households’ dependent on agriculture but constrained by inadequate 
agricultural land and alternative sources of income, these scheme presents an opportunity for locals 
to derive livelihood by planting appropriate food crops. The dominant food crops are normally 
peas, potatoes, vegetables, beans and maize among other short-term crops59. Depending on the 
amount of harvest, this produce can be sold to other members of the communities at the market 
centres hence a source of income to the households. Income from the sale of agricultural produce 
could be used to meet their daily household demands leading to improved welfare. There is also 
the nutritional value from consumption of these produce and therefore higher productivity due to 
improved health. This provides PELIS beneficiary members with incentive to conserve the forest 
reserve60 hence the double dividend. Under the system farmers are allowed to grow both plantation 
59 Although there is no restriction on crops to grow, since most households are poor, they mostly resort to growing crops that are ready for harvest 
within 2-4 months so that they can make quick cash too and maximize within the given period. However, growing of long term crops such as tea, 
coffee or sugarcane is not allowed. The focus is mostly on crops than cannot interfere with younger tree seedlings in anyway.  
60 Once one becomes a participant in PELIS, the benefits will depend on, one’s hard work and the kind of crops grown as well as, how well they 
market their produce to fetch better prices. 
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trees61 and food crops on small plots (half an acre) tending the trees and harvesting crops for 3-4 
years until tree canopy closes then they move to another degraded area as identified by the forester 
for reforestation an arrangement where both parties benefit. It was later banned after several 
attempts in 1986, 1994, and 2003 due to failure and mismanagement. The scheme was however 
reintroduced in 2007 with enactment of Forest Act (2005) through CFAs. Members are required to 
pay between Ksh. 400(4USD) and Ksh.750(7.5USD) per half an acre. The rules of allocation of 
plots also varies, with almost all CFAs purporting to use balloting. But this is just on paper as the 
process is marred with a lot of irregularities62. However, in some organized CFAs, first preference 
is given to disadvantaged groups, mostly the elderly and physically challenged. 
PELIS was first rolled out in 24 forest stations in Mau, North Rift, Eastern and Central 
conservancies. According to the Kenya Forest Research Institute (KEFRI) the area under PELIS 
increased from 2933 ha in 2010/2011 financial year to 9939 ha in 2012/2013. The reintroduction 
of PELIS was meant to deepen community participation through CFAs in conservation as they 
improve their livelihoods. Despite the existence of this incentive and its increased adoption, 
degradation and deforestation has even increased under some CFAs and there is continuous loss of 
indigenous forests that were meant to be protected. As communities tends to their crops in the forest 
they are expected to monitor any illegal activities hence instances of forests infractions should be 
minimal. It is also important to note that devolution of forest management to local communities 
and the roll out of PELIS has had its fair share of challenges especially due to the rent seeking 
behavior of foresters who should be the government overseer at the devolved level coupled with a 
lot of political interest due to the fertile nature of forest lands. Some foresters also collude with 
61 Farmers are usually provided with tree seedlings by the KFS and each is tasked with nurturing the trees planted in their plots. In case any tree 
gets destroyed one is answerable to the CFA officials and the forester. In certain instances, a penalty is applied. In addition, CFAs may also construct 
their own nurseries in the forest and sell tree seedlings to members for setting up their private woodlots.  
62 During the survey, we noted that some CFA officials and members had more than one plot in the forest while some deserving members had 
none. Some rich established non-members also acquired plots in the forest by bribing the foresters or CFA officials. Some members therefore felt 
short changed because only the well-connected members or elites tend to get the plots. Hence an incentive for them to just sit back and watch as the 
forest gets destroyed. 
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loggers to harvest more than the licensed number of plantation trees and at times harvest even the 
indigenous trees that should be protected thus negating community conservation efforts. In some 
instances, the foresters influence decisions on who should receive the PELIS plots. Communities 
therefore most often feel their efforts are in vain. Communities also felt shortchanged since the 
revenues from timber product are too much and none is invested back to the community by the 
government for development purposes. As noted by Ostrom (1990) the problem of incentive based 
approach is the inequitable distribution of benefits hence a recipe for the tragedy of the commons. 
However, the debate on forest management centred on how to conserve forest while simultaneously 
giving local people the opportunity to utilize forest resources through resource access is still 
ongoing (Casse, 2012). 
However, even though PELIS may enhance efficiency in forest resource use, there may be 
inequitable distribution of the benefits across the income groups and therefore a recipe for tragedy. 
It is therefore inherent to gauge PELIS impact not just with reference to its efficiency and 
effectiveness but also by sustainability of the benefits in promoting equity and improvement of 
environment. There is also limited understanding of the drivers of adoption of the scheme by 
households within CFAs which could shed light on reasons for past failures in the scheme and 
identify possible factors to consider in rolling out the scheme. In addition, since the opportunity 
cost of restriction of forest access and use is higher among the poor, there is uncertainty whether 
participation in PELIS can enable poor households to move up the income ladder. There is also 
high likelihood of those high up the ladder capturing the scheme therefore having a disproportionate 
impact on the distribution of program benefits. Empirical evidence on the impact of PELIS on 
environmental conservation and welfare implication is also not clear despite its significance for 
sustainability of PFM. 
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Moreover, studies that have analyzed various forms of forest management activities are more biased 
towards Asia mostly Nepal and India. There are relatively few studies in Africa (see Jumbe and 
Angelsen 2006; Kabubo-Mariara 2013; Gelo and Koch 2014; Mazunda and Shively 2015; Gelo et 
al. 2016). Empirical studies that have tried to evaluate the welfare effects of various incentives have 
mainly been focused on mean impacts assuming constant treatment effects across the income 
distribution (see Gelo and Koch, 2014; Ali et al., 2015; Mazunda and Shively, 2015), with very 
few on the heterogeneous impacts of such schemes (see Adhikari, 2005; Jumbe and Angelsen, 
2006; Cooper, 2007, 2008; Moktan et al., 2016; Gelo et al., 2016). For the few that have estimated 
the impact of various incentive schemes in other countries, the methodological approaches have 
been varied ranging from treatment effects models, PSM to instrumental variable approach among 
others and have yielded mixed results and inconclusive evidence thus making comparison difficult. 
On the other hand, the measurement of outcomes employed in these studies are also significantly 
different and prone to measurement errors. For instance, some studies use household income which 
is prone to under reporting especially among poor rural communities. As a departure from past 
studies that have always classified households in terms of low, middle and high income households, 
and given the fact that measures of mean impact may not provide a clear picture of the impact of 
the scheme, we estimate the heterogeneous impact across the entire income distribution. 
The overall impact on forest cover and household welfare and the heterogeneous impact of the 
scheme on household welfare therefore, motivates this study. The study therefore, seeks to fill these 
gaps by addressing the following research questions: What determines households’ decision to 
participate in PELIS? What is the joint overall impact of PELIS on forest cover and household 
welfare? What is the distributional impact of PELIS on welfare of locals? 
This study contributes to the growing body of literature on impact evaluation of environmental 
policies by providing a comprehensive empirical evidence from a micro perspective of the 
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distributional impact of PELIS on household welfare and its simultaneous overall effect on the 
environment and household welfare. From a policy perspective, an understanding of the overall 
and distributional impact of the scheme across the income distribution has the potential to inform 
design, implementation and roll out of PELIS to other CFAs. Lessons from this scheme can also 
be used to inform formulation of other market based incentives that can help in optimizing welfare 
gains and improving environmental conditions. 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 3.2 presents a review of related literature; 
section 3.3 outlines the methodological framework; section 3.4 presents the survey design and data 
collection; section 3.5 gives a description of the data; section 3.6 presents the results and 
discussions; and the conclusion and policy recommendation are presented in section 3.7. 
3.2 Related Literature 
3.2.1 Determinants of households’ participation in incentive schemes 
Households participation in various incentive schemes such as joint forest management has been 
found to be mostly influenced by household socio-economic profile and contextual factors 
(Adhikari, 2005; Kabubo-Mariara, 2013). In Kenya Kabubo-Mariara (2013) found that both poor 
and rich households rely on forest resources and that their participation in forest user group 
activities is based on monetary values rather than asset income. On the other hand, according to 
Adhikari et al. (2004) reliance on forest resources by forest-adjacent households is mainly 
influenced by households’ socio-economic profiles specifically, education of family members, land 
and livestock holdings, caste, and household economic status. However, Agrawal and Gupta (2005) 
noted that the likelihood of household participation in communal activities increases when they are 
economically and socially better off and when they have access to government offices that deals 
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with devolution of the CPR management. He however, found education and household level of 
participation to have a negative correlation. The educated, young and wealthier households are also 
more likely to participate in community forest management (Ali et al., 2015). 
The effect of education on household participation has however been inconclusive for example, 
Uberhuaga et al. (2012) and Angelsen and Wunder (2003) found that the more educated are less 
dependent on forest due to increased opportunity cost of labor hence less likely to participate in 
incentive schemes whereas Adhikari (2005) found that more education may increase capacity to 
over exploit environmental resources. In Malawi, Jumbe and Angelsen (2007) found that higher 
levels of dependence on forests increases rates of participation whereas in areas with more 
heterogeneous social context and more commercial forest uses, the incentive for participation 
decreases with increase in level of dependence. Ownership of private woodlots is also an indication 
of personal interest in forest conservation hence a motivation for household participation in 
incentive schemes (Jumbe and Angelsen, 2007). According to Lise (2000), social indicators is the 
first consideration followed by economic indicators and that voluntary household participation is 
enhanced by good forest quality and high dependence on the forest resource. Overall, it is clear that 
most factors influencing household participation in incentive programmes are context specific 
hence vary significantly by location. 
3.2.2 Impact of incentives on welfare and environment 
Most CPR literature support the notion that due to over dependence on natural resources coupled 
with their high rate of time preference, poor people tend to harvest more resources from the 
commons while optimally ignoring the future environmental effects of current resource uses 
(Adhikari, 2005; Kabubo-Mariara, 2013). A number of studies have found that most incentives 
towards forest management have led to worse welfare outcomes for the poor. For example, Cooper 
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(2007), using CGE found welfare losses for all segments of the population but worse outcomes for 
the poor. However, Cooper (2008) found increases in welfare but greater inequality supporting 
findings by Jumbe and Angelsen (2006) who found contrasting welfare outcomes in Malawi but 
worse outcomes for the poor. Adhikari (2005) also posit that in absolute terms, poor households 
derive lesser benefit than less poor households from community forestry. According to Adhikari 
(2005), poor households may seek to minimize risks by using forest resources for consumption 
smoothing whereas the less poor may be driven by selfish interest of accumulating wealth by selling 
forest resources especially when there are greater market opportunities. These results are in tandem 
with Gelo et al. (2016) who found the impact of joint forest management with market linkages in 
Ethiopia to be biased upwards in favour of the upper end households in the income distribution. 
Moktan et al. (2016) also found worse welfare outcomes for poor households. 
On the overall program impact studies such as Gelo and Koch (2014) using the inverse probability 
weighting approach to evaluate impact of the common property forestry program in Ethiopia found 
significant economic effects at household level but reduced livestock holdings. Ali et al. (2015) 
also found that on average participation in community forest management raises household welfare 
whereas, Mazunda and Shively (2015) found that participation in Malawi’s Forest Co-management 
program had significant positive impact on conservation and household welfare. Blomley et al. 
(2007); Thoms (2008) and Takahashi and Todo (2012) have also shown that PFM arrangements 
contribute more to forest conservation. 
A general overview of these studies reveals significant differences in applied definition, contextual 
factors and methodological approaches hence making comparison difficult. Although a reasonable 
body of literature has shown that community involvement in forest conservation has the potential 
of improving forest condition and welfare of forest-adjacent households (e.g. Mazunda and Shively 
2015), there is limited evidence on whether the effect is as a result of existing incentives or just as 
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a result of level of organization and management at the community level. Similarly, the 
measurement of outcomes employed in these studies are also significantly different hence prone to 
measurement errors for instance some use household income which is prone to under reporting. 
Empirical evidence on the impact of PELIS on environmental conservation and welfare implication 
is also not clear despite its significance for sustainability of PFM. We therefore contribute to this 
literature by assessing the mean and heterogeneous impact of PELIS from a developing country 
perspective using Kenya as a case study. We take a different approach by first assessing the mean 
impact of the scheme on forest cover and welfare then assessing the impact of the scheme across 
the entire income distribution to assess the sustainability of the scheme in terms of equity from a 
micro perspective using household and community level data. 
3.3 Theoretical framework 
The framework is grounded in Roy (1951) occupational choice model. We assume that households 
decide whether to participate in PELIS or not based on option that maximizes their utility. If 
households expect to benefit from participating in the scheme, then we assume they will join the 
scheme. Treatment assignment is therefore non-random. In particular, we define Vij the utility of 
household i =1...N in treatment regime j ={0,1}, with 1 representing participation in PELIS and 0 
otherwise. Therefore, Di=1 if Vi1 > Vi0. Similarly define Yij as a vector of potential outcome 
variable. Where Yi1 is per capita expenditure and percentage forest cover for PELIS beneficiary 
households and CFAs respectively and Yi0 is per capita expenditure and percentage forest cover for 
non PELIS beneficiaries. The difference between Yi1and Yi0 can therefore be used to measure the 
differential impact on forest cover and household welfare. 
In this study, we measure success in terms of household outcome and community level outcome 
that is per capita expenditure and forest cover (We define forest cover as the percentage of forested 
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area both plantation and indigenous of the total forest area under each CFA jurisdiction) 
respectively and measurement depends on counterfactual. According to Rubin (1973), we define 
program impact as the difference between the observed and the counterfactual outcome. The 
challenge is that the counterfactual is not observable and an individual or CFA cannot be in both 
states at the same time. To identify the counterfactual, we apply a quasi-experimental approach 
given that participation in PELIS is non-random. It is therefore essential to control for participation 
decision to identify the impact of the scheme. To examine the impact of this incentive, the study 
takes account of the fact that differences in per capita expenditure or forest cover for participant 
households or CFAs and non-participants could be due to unobserved heterogeneity. Failure to 
distinguish between the causal effects of participation in PELIS and effect of unobserved 
heterogeneity may therefore lead to misleading conclusion and policy implication. 
PELIS has two possible levels of selection. In one level, households are deemed to be eligible only 
if they are members of CFAs and actively involved in CFA activities63. In another level eligible 
households are left to decide whether they want to participate in PELIS64 by participating in a 
balloting exercise or first come first serve basis in some instances. Households are likely to 
participate if they expect the potential gains to exceed the costs. In addition, Poor households may 
be eligible but unable to raise the fee whereas richer households may capture the scheme and obtain 
more plots at the expense of active eligible but poor households. On the other hand, richer 
households may find the opportunity costs of participating in the scheme to be higher hence may 
consider other alternatives. Participation in PELIS is also potentially endogenous to per capita 
monthly expenditure. Some unobservable characteristics that influence the participation in PELIS 
could also influence per capita monthly expenditure e.g. household income or access to 
63 In some CFAs, there are also non-members who have PELIS plots we consider these as contamination and avoid them in the study. 
64 However, based on their interest, they can decide to join other forest user groups for example bee keeping, tree nursery, grazing or firewood 
collection groups. 
68 
information. Therefore, neglecting these selectivity effects is likely to give a false picture of the 
relative per capita monthly expenditure for beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries of PELIS. Hence 
the estimated causal effect may reflect not only the treatment effect but also differences generated 
by the selection process. 
On the other hand, the decision as to which CFAs get to benefit from PELIS is solely at the 
discretion of KFS. The study therefore adopts a combination of econometric methods namely; the 
PSM and ordinary least square regression to determine the average treatment effect of participation 
in PELIS on per capita monthly expenditure and forest cover. However, OLS and PSM would yield 
biased estimates if there are unobservable determinants of participation. Control function methods 
or Instrumental Variable methods becomes essential in such instances (see Wooldridge, 2010). In 
addition, since PSM and OLS models focuses more on the mean outcomes, we employed the QTE 
model under endogenous assumption following Abadie et al. (2002) to implicitly explore the 
distributional impact of the scheme on household welfare while addressing the potential 
endogeneity to assess the sustainability of the scheme. 
3.3.1 Propensity Score Matching 
Theoretical and analytical framework. 
The theoretical foundations follow Roy (1951) and Rubin (1974). Accordingly, households’ or 
CFAs’ decision to participate in PELIS is assumed to depend on expected benefits, as measured by 
per capita expenditure and forest cover (The better the forest cover the more the benefits) in 
adjacent forest resource, associated with either participating in the scheme or maintaining the status 
quo. The main interest is the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT). That is how benefiting 
from PELIS affect conservation and welfare of forest-adjacent communities. Since it is not possible 
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to observe what the results would have been in the absence of the incentive. To handle the missing 
data on counterfactual, we identified households, which are non-beneficiaries of the incentives and 
used them as counterfactual. Similarly, for forest cover we identified CFAs that were non-
beneficiaries of PELIS and used them as counterfactual. Since assignment to PELIS is non-random 
there is high possibility of selection bias. To address these issues, we first employed the PSM 
technique to measure the mean impact on both forest cover and household welfare. 
Identification strategy 
Assuming a set of observable covariates X, which are unaffected by the treatment (Participation in 
PELIS), potential outcomes are independent of treatment assignment i.e., Conditional 
Independence Assumption (CIA)65. A further requirement is a sizable common support or overlap 
condition 66 . This condition ensures that households with the same X values have positive 
probability of being both participants and non-participants (Heckman et al., 1999). 
If the CIA holds and there is sizable overlap (Heckman et al., 1999), then the next step is to find 
the PSM estimator. PSM was undertaken in two steps. The first step was generation of propensity 
scores from probit model using the household socio-economic and demographic characteristics, 
community level characteristics and other controls. The score indicates the probabilities of 
respective households/CFAs participating in the scheme. From the scores, we constructed a control 
group by matching the beneficiaries to non-beneficiaries according to their propensity scores by 
comparing various methods of matching. The second stage involved computation of the ATT of 
65 This assumption is rather strong and needs to be justified by the data quality at hand. 
66 This rule out the phenomenon of perfect predictability of T given X: (Overlap): 0 < P(T = 
1|X) < 1 
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households and CFAs benefiting from incentives on household welfare and forest cover 
respectively using the matched observations. 
Model specification 
The PSM estimator for the ATT is specified as the mean difference in Y (per capita household 
expenditure and forest cover as a percentage of total forest area under each CFA) over common 
support, weighting the comparison units by the propensity score distribution of participants. The 
cross-section estimator is specified as: 
𝜏𝑃𝑆𝑀
𝐴𝑇𝑇  = E(P(X)|T = 1) {E [Y (1) |T = 1, P(X)] − E [Y (0) |T = 0, P(X)]} (11) 
Where Y (1) and Y (0) represents per capita household expenditure and forest cover for beneficiary 
and non-beneficiary households/CFAs respectively. T=1 indicates treated/beneficiary households 
or CFAs while T=0 indicates control/non-beneficiary households or CFAs. The PSM estimator is 
thus given by the mean difference in outcomes over the common support weighted by the 
propensity score distribution of participants67 (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008). To determine the 
heterogeneous effect of the scheme on household welfare, and due to the restrictive identification 
condition, selection issues and potential endogeneity, the study also employed the use of the 
conditional QTE model under endogenous assumption described in the next section. 
3.3.2 Quantile Treatment Effects Model 
Measures of mean impact may not provide the true picture of the effect of the scheme, it is therefore 
essential to determine the heterogeneous impact of the scheme to assess the sustainability of the 
67 According to Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008), inclusion of non-significant variables cannot lead to inconsistent or biased results. We thus used all 
the variables in the PSM probit in the outcome analysis. 
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scheme in providing the double dividend68. To determine the distributional impact of the scheme 
on household welfare, the study employed the parametric conditional QTE model under 
endogenous assumption following Abadie et al. (2002) and Chernozhukov and Hansen (2008). 
Analytical Framework 
Given a continuous outcome variable Y, we consider the effect of a binary treatment variable D 
(participation in PELIS or not). Let Yi1and Yi0 be the potential outcomes of household i that is per 
capita monthly expenditure. Hence, Yi1would be realized if household i participated in PELIS and 
Yi0would be realized otherwise. Define Yi as the observed outcome, which is Yi = Yi1Di +Yi0(1−Di). 
We estimate the entire distribution functions of Y 1 and Y 0 (Frölich and Melly, 2010). 
We then define QTE conditionally on covariates as we deal with the endogenous treatment choice 
since in our case, selection is unobservable meaning that treatment assignment is non-ignorable. 
Participation in PELIS is also potentially endogenous to per capita expenditure69. The traditional 
quantile regression may therefore be biased hence the need for an instrumental variable (IV) to 
recover the true effects. Key concerns with respect to instrumental variables are, weak instruments 
and over identification 70 . In addition, if the instruments affect participants in different ways 
interpreting the resulting treatment effects may be complicated that is treatment effects 
heterogeneity (Frölich and Melly, 2010). The exclusion restriction is however difficult to test as in 
all IV applications. 
68 That is, improving household welfare and forest cover. 
69 Participation in PELIS is mostly influenced by household income which also directly influences per capita expenditure for both participants 
and non-participants. This implies that, systematic differences in the distribution of per capita expenditure between participants and non-participants 
may reflect both differences generated by the selection process and the effect of treatment. 
70 A 2SLS that contains weak instruments is not identified hence instruments treatment effect not valid (Stock and Yogo, 2005). 
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Assuming we observe a binary instrument Z, we define two potential treatments denoted Dz. We 
then make use of several assumptions71 underlying the potential outcome framework for IV with 
probability one as in Abadie et al. (2002). In addition to these assumptions, “individuals with D1>D0
are referred to as compliers. Treatment can be identified only for this group, since the always and 
never participants cannot be induced to change treatment status by hypothetical movement of the 
instrument” (Frölich and Melly, 2010). Following Abadie et al. (2002), the conditional QTE δτ for 
the compliers is estimated by the weighted quantile regression: 
(12) 
To implement the estimator, we first need to estimate Pr(Z=1|Xi). ρτ(u) is the check function, where 
ρτ(u) = u×{τ − 1(u < 0)}. This is estimated using the ivqte command in stata since it produces 
analytical standard errors that are consistent even in case of heteroscedasticity (Frölich and Melly, 
2010). Given that some weights may be negative or positive, the ivqte stata command uses the local 
logit estimator and implements the AAI estimator with positive weights. An alternative provided 
by Abadie et al. (2002) shows that the following weights can be used as an alternative to WiAAI. 
Where WiAAI+ = E[WAAI|Yi,Di,Xi]. Which are always positive. ivqte uses the local linear regression 
to estimate WiAAI. 
71 Namely, (i) Independence: Y 0,Y 1,D0,D1is jointly independent of Z given X: implies that conditioned on a set of covariates, the instrumental 
variable should not affect the outcome of individual except through the treatment channel, (ii) Exclusion: Pr(Y 1 = Y 0|X) = 1, (iii) Non Trivial 
Assignment: 0 < Pr(Z = 1|X) < 1: Requires existence of propensity score of the instrument, (iv) First Stage: and E[D1|X]≠E[D0|X] and (v) 
Monotonicity: Pr(D1 ≥ D0|X) = 1: Requires that the treatment variable D either weakly increases or decreases with the instrument Z for all i(Abadie 
et al., 2002). 
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Identification Strategy 
To determine QTE in equation 3, we used one binary variable as an instrument that is, being born 
in the village or not. This is used to show the households intention to participate in PELIS or not. 
Being born in a given village is assumed to determine participation in PELIS but cannot affect 
household per capita expenditure directly except through participation in PELIS. The motivation 
for the choice of instruments is based on Maslow’s “self-actualization” theory (see Maslow, 1943). 
According to Maslow (1943), once an individual’s psychological needs72 are satisfied, their safety 
needs takes precedence and dominates behavior. Therefore, in the absence of economic security, 
due to say, economic crisis, and lack of job opportunities, these safety needs manifests themselves 
in the form of preference for job security. Therefore, we posit that when one is born in a given 
village, with the urge for a sense of belonging and acceptance by their peers, desire for respect (i.e., 
need for self-esteem and self-respect) and to be valued by others, people tend to venture into 
different professions or hobbies to gain recognition. Such activities give people a sense of 
contribution and value in a society. Individuals therefore, tend to achieve the “self-actualization” 
in attaining some higher goals outside one-self in altruism and spiritually (Maslow, 1991). In that 
endeavor, they are less likely to participate in schemes such as PELIS. Moreover, at community 
level when one is born in a given place, the routine often becomes monotonous (you have been 
born and bred around the forest you therefore see nothing new in it. Rarely will you appreciate the 
resource compared to someone who was not born in that community), you have always grazed in 
the forest, fetch firewood etc. The urge to do better in society pushes people to venture into new 
fields outside the normal activities within the community hence will often rarely participate in 
forest conservation activities like PELIS73. Farming may also be considered low life by peers and 
72 These needs are the physical requirements for human survival e.g., air, water, food etc. 
73 A similar argument can be based on the fact that unless constrained by say inadequate income, one would rarely want to attend a high school 
next to his home if he has been born and has attended say primary education in the same village. People would tend to go to areas far away from 
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hence a drive to seek their own identity and stand out in society. Incentives such as PELIS may 
therefore be unattractive hence indirectly affects household welfare. 
The Mau forest area is very agriculturally productive and surrounded by different ethnic 
communities consisting of natives and immigrants hence often a hot spot of post-election violence 
as the real natives’ clash with the non-natives whom they feel have encroached into their ancestral 
lands in case the election results are not in favor of the natives. There are also squatters from other 
areas who live in the market centers around the forest with the aim of joining the CFAs so that they 
can get access to agricultural land in the forest, most of them normally have no alternative homes 
elsewhere. However, it is important to note that, within the African setting, one may have been 
born in a given village but is actually an immigrant from another province based on where their 
parents or great grand parents came from74. Therefore, one born within the Mau forest area who 
has always enjoyed the benefit from the forest will not see any difference compared to a person 
born in a different area where they had no productive agricultural land but the presence of the forest 
provides a better source of livelihood. A Potential criticism of the instrument could also be due to 
unobservables. To minimize the bias, we considered conditioning this instrumental variable on 
distance to the nearest edge of the forest75 and other set of covariates76 to authenticate the validity 
of the instrument. We also conditioned the instrumental variable on household income due to the 
fact that one may be born in a given village, but the household income may or may not enable them 
to participate in PELIS therefore influencing their per capita expenditure this also enables the 
where they were born for a change because they may not appreciate the school neighboring them or would just prefer a change to attract some 
admiration from the society as a show of achievement. 
74 Within the African context, natives are considered those whose ancestors were the original occupants and were buried in that area. Therefore, 
they cannot marry from the same clan since they are considered one family because they are from the same ancestral descendant. They can however 
marry immigrants from other areas who have settled in their villages but not the natives of that area. There are also natives who have intermarried 
with immigrants. For female headed households, if never married we noted the residential status and whether was born in the area or not. However, 
if a widow we noted the residential status as well as place of birth of the spouse. 
75 It is important to note that, one may be born or not in a given village but the cost of extraction of the resource may be higher for households far 
away from nearest edge of the forest than closer households hence this may influence their participation in PELIS as well as per capita expenditure 
and household income. 
76 Distance to main road, distance to nearest market, years of education household land size, household size, household wealth, number of children, 
household income, age and sex of household head, employment status of household head, residential status, membership to other environmental 
organizations and institutional variables like level of participation in CFA activities.  
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authentication of the instrument’s validity. Due to the fact that few households would be willing to 
provide their exact household income, we gave a range of incomes to select from after which we 
computed the median monthly household income. 
3.4 The Survey Design and Data Collection 
A pilot study involving 44 households was first conducted in October 2015 in Londiani CFA of 
Kericho County. Information gathered was used to refine the instrument that was eventually used 
in the final survey. The survey was conducted in the months of November and December 2015. In 
the final survey, we used a two-stage sampling procedure in data collection. In the first stage a 
sample of 22 out of 35 CFAs were purposively identified to reflect the entire Mau forest and also 
to identify CFAs that do not participate in PELIS. This was conducted with the help of head of Mau 
forest conservancy77. The CFAs covered five counties of Bomet, Narok, Kericho, Nakuru and Uasin 
Gishu. The CFAs were a representation of the entire Mau forest. They also provide the variation 
by regions especially in terms of geographical and climatic variables. 
All the CFAs sampled were well established, and the duration of existence varied thus giving a 
better understanding of the impact of this incentive. The 22 CFAs covers about 164,645 hectares 
of the Mau forest. The CFAs are constituted of CBOs or FUGs with membership drawn from 
residents of forest-adjacent communities (own survey from pilot). Table B.5 in the appendix shows 
the distribution of PELIS adopters and non-adopters. From Table B.5 it is clear that some CFAs 
had as low as four or five households sampled this was attributed to lack of cooperation from CFA 
officials and inaccessibility of some areas due to the terrain and bad weather conditions. However, 
some CFAs do not totally participate in PELIS e.g., Likia, Sururu, Nyangores, Baraget, Nairotia 
77 Although it is possible that the head of conservancy may have referred us to CFAs that were doing well, we can confirm that t his was not the 
case since we also got to visit some CFAs that were in total mess. The choice of CFA was based on total representation of the entire forest and ease 
of accessibility since some areas are very difficult to access due to terrain and lack of motorable roads.  
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Olenguruone and Manengai this was basically due to their reluctance to adopt the scheme and 
dominance of pastoral activities in areas such as Likia and Nairotia that were mainly inhabited by 
the Maasai community. Some do not benefit from the scheme because they are not part of the KFS 
plan for PELIS roll out. The CFA level data were collected through focus group discussion with 
CFA officials and other members at their offices in the forest station. 
Second step, was to select a sample of households within the selected CFAs. Since we were only 
interested in CFA members, this exercise was conducted using simple random sampling where 
every third household was interviewed and in cases where the membership was small snow balling 
approach was adopted especially where the third household was a non-member. Trained 
enumerators were guided by village elders or representatives selected by the CFA officials during 
the focus group discussion. Each group was prepared in advance. 
3.5 Data 
A total of 406 households were sampled (178 non-PELIS beneficiary households and 228 PELIS 
beneficiary households)78. Household heads provided information on household socioeconomic 
characteristics, such as income, age, gender, consumption expenditure, education, size of 
households, household land size, distance to nearest, market, road and edge of forest etc. At the 
CFA level, additional information relating to forest cover under each CFA, geographic and climate 
variables, participation and attendance of CFA meetings and other CFA level variables were also 
gathered through focus group discussion with CFA officials at the CFA offices based at each forest 
station. Forest cover is secondary data available in each forest station and regularly updated by the 
78 To identify the impact of the scheme at the household level, we considered households that had benefited from the scheme for at least two years 
and above. We considered the fact that two years was enough for the incentive to make a change in household welfare and forest cover as well. 
77 
foresters. It is important to note however, that this is measured at CFA level and not household 
level. 
To assess the impact of PELIS on forest cover, we identified CFAs that did not totally participate 
in PELIS as controls of which seven were identified namely, Likia, Sururu, Nyangores, Nairotia, 
Baraget Olenguruone and Manengai constituting a sample of 130 households. We also identified 
CFAs that were beneficiaries of PELIS as our treatment. We considered CFAs in our sample that 
had fifteen households and above as beneficiaries. Six CFAs were further identified namely, Bahati, 
Koibatek, Esageri, Malagat, Kericho and Makutano constituting a sample of 137 households (where 
128 households benefited from PELIS and 9 did not). We posit that the more PELIS beneficiaries 
a CFA has the higher the likelihood of improved forest cover hence the motivation for selecting 
CFAs with more beneficiaries of the scheme in our sample79. 
Households that participate in PELIS get to sell their agricultural produce in the local markets 
therefore earning income. With a rise in income the household expenditure is expected to rise due 
to increased purchasing power. We therefore expect an improvement in welfare with an increase in 
per capita expenditure. We therefore measured household welfare using per capita monthly 
expenditure to proxy for household monthly income. We acknowledge the fact that PELIS only 
influence revenues from harvested agricultural produce apart from other indirect effects like 
increase in livestock values. Some studies have used income from non-timber forest products (e.g. 
Adhikari 2005; Jumbe and Angelsen 2006; Kabubo-Mariara 2013) as opposed to per capita 
expenditure as a measure of household welfare. Since forest-adjacent communities are often poor 
(some without alternative agricultural land) and almost fully reliant on forest for their livelihood 
either directly or indirectly, use of per capita expenditure would still provide a good proxy for their 
79 Some CFAs did not have higher numbers in PELIS due to low uptake or differences in preferences. Most households joined user groups that they 
felt they would benefit most e.g., firewood, bee keeping, grazing etc. Hence in swampy areas, even if the CFA has PELIS, few households would 
hope for the scheme since it involves a lot of work reclaiming the land. 
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welfare80. Therefore, using per capita expenditure would still provide a better picture on the impact 
of the scheme than just considering income from forest harvests alone81. 
The choice of consumption expenditure is also based on the fact that households are prone to under 
reporting their monthly income. Secondly, per capita expenditure is also easily interpreted and 
widely used (see Skoufias and Katayama 2011; Gelo and Koch 2014; Gelo et al. 2016). 
Consumption expenditure also provides information over the consumption bundle that fits within 
the household’s budget although this may be affected by different micro finance institutions that 
are enabling easy access to credit facilities among village households or even smaller women 
groups “chamas”. We aggregated household expenditure on food supplies, education, farming and 
livestock, clothing and apparels, medical and other miscellaneous expenses incurred by the 
household. This was reported on annual basis since some expenses like education82 were paid on 
annual basis. A total of the expenses was used to calculate the per capita monthly expenditure 
(Monthly expenditure was preferred due to ease of recall of most monthly expenses by 
respondents). Annual average rainfall and temperature values for the various forests were collected 
from the website (http://en.climate-data.org/country/124/). This data was available for most forest 
stations and for the ones that had no data we used the nearest weather station recorded climate data. 
We considered the climate variables due to the fact that the CFAs are large in sizes hence the 
climate variables vary significantly. A description of the variables is presented in Table 7. 
80 Moreover, in some instances even if a household does or does not benefit from PELIS, they could still be employed as casual laborers by the 
wealthier households that own plots in the forest to tend to their farms for some wages which they can expend on other requirements.  
81 During the survey, we noted that some very rich households, owning big shops at the shopping centres also had plots in the forest yet they were 
not registered members, but just used their influence to buy their way into the forest. We did not consider such cases as beneficiaries. The study 
only focused on registered CFA members. There are also CFA members who lease out their plots to non-members who are willing to pay higher 
amounts to farm in the forest. We avoided such beneficiaries in the study. 
82 We included expenses on items like education because during the survey most households attributed the benefit of PELIS as for  them having 
been able to educate their children with ease using the income from sale of agricultural produce from PELIS plots.  
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Table 7: Description of Variables 
3.6 Results and Discussion 
This section present results from the different empirical approaches employed in the study. The 
first section presents the descriptive statistics of the household and CFA level variables employed 
Variable Definition 
Dependent variables 
PCMonthlyExp Per capita Monthly Expenditure 
Forestcover Forest Cover expressed as a percentage of total forest size under each CFA 
Explanatory variables 
HHWealth Total value of household asserts (land, farm animals, agricultural implements, farm produce etc) 
PELIS Dummy=1 if household owns a PELIS plot and 0 otherwise 
HHsex Dummy=1 if Male and 0 if female 
Numbchild Number of children 
BornVil Dummy=1 if born in the village, 0 otherwise 
MedAge Age of the household head (Median age calculated from the categorical variables) 
hhsize Number of people in the household including household head 
MaritSta Dummy=1 if married, 0 not married 
Education Dummy=1 if household head has post primary education and 
0 if household head has up to primary education 
ResidStatus Dummy=1 if household head is a native, 0 if household head is an immigrant/settler 
HHEducyrs Years of education 
Multilingual Dummy=1 if speaks more than two languages, 0 if speak two or less languages 
Employment Status Dummy=1 if employed in off farm, 0 if self-employed i.e farming 
LandTitle Dummy=1 if Own title for household land, 0 otherwise 
MedIncome Median monthly income for the household in the last month 
Woodlots Dummy=1 If the household owns a woodlot, 0 otherwise 
CFAMeeting Dummy=1 If father represents the household in CFA meetings, 
0 if Mother represents the Household 
CFAParticipation Dummy=1 If the household is active in participation in CFA activities, 0 if passive 
Hsepartic Dummy=1 if household participates in CFA activities, 0 otherwise 
Hlandsize Size of household land 
Hownership Dummy=1 if the household head owns the house, 0 otherwise 
DistMroad Distance from household to the nearest motorable road in km 
DistMarket Distance from household to the nearest market using in km 
DistForest Distance from household to the nearest edge of the forest in km 
Membership Dummy=1 if a member of other environmental organizations (e.g. CBOs), 0 otherwise 
Temperature Annual average temperature in degrees Celsius 
Precipitation Average Annual precipitation (mm) 
Elevation Level of Elevation in each forest (meters) 
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in the study. The next sections present the results of the ordinary least squares, PSM technique and 
the QTE model respectively. 
3.6.1 Descriptive Statistics 
The summary statistics are presented in Table 8. From Table 8, as expected, mean monthly per 
capita expenditure for PELIS beneficiaries was higher than non-beneficiaries. The percentage 
forest cover under CFAs with PELIS beneficiary household was also found to be higher than the 
non PELIS beneficiaries. The summary statistics of other variables used in the study are also 
presented. 
Table 8: Summary Statistics 
Total Sample PELIS Beneficiaries Non PELIS Beneficiaries 
variable N Mean sd N Mean sd N Mean sd 
Dependent 
PCMonthlyExp 406 2186 1615 228 2405 1939 178 1905 1003 
Forestcover 267 77.64 14.23 137 79.54 10.47 130 75.64 17.15 
Explanatory 
HHWealth 406 1.269e+06 1.759e+06 228 1.257e+06 2.043e+06 178 1.284e+06 1.311e+06 
HHsex 405 0.780 0.415 227 0.767 0.424 178 0.798 0.403 
Numbchild 406 4.865 2.701 228 5.171 2.729 178 4.472 2.619 
BornVil 405 0.585 0.493 228 0.531 0.500 177 0.655 0.477 
MedAge 406 48.14 13.73 228 49.29 12.70 178 46.67 14.85 
hhsize 406 5.798 2.631 228 6.110 2.729 178 5.399 2.450 
MaritSta 406 0.869 0.337 228 0.895 0.308 178 0.837 0.370 
Education 406 0.360 0.480 228 0.351 0.478 178 0.371 0.484 
ResidStatus 406 0.574 0.495 228 0.570 0.496 178 0.579 0.495 
Hsepartic 406 0.904 0.295 228 0.908 0.290 178 0.899 0.302 
Employment 406 0.241 0.428 228 0.167 0.373 178 0.337 0.474 
LandTitle 406 0.522 0.500 228 0.513 0.501 178 0.534 0.500 
MedIncome 406 15788 20503 228 17862 25993 178 13132 9097 
HHEducyrs 406 8.404 3.639 228 8.329 3.556 178 8.500 3.751 
Woodlots 406 0.850 0.358 228 0.912 0.284 178 0.770 0.422 
CFAParticipation 406 0.623 0.485 228 0.697 0.460 178 0.528 0.501 
Hownership 406 0.904 0.295 228 0.917 0.277 178 0.888 0.317 
DistMroad 406 1.926 2.696 228 2.485 2.983 178 1.211 2.073 
DistMarket 406 3.368 3.537 228 3.885 3.504 178 2.707 3.478 
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DistForest 406 1.481 1.478 228 1.406 1.408 178 1.578 1.561 
Hlandsize 406 2.519 5.682 228 2.473 7.020 178 2.578 3.263 
Membership 406 0.0690 0.254 228 0.0702 0.256 178 0.0674 0.251 
Temperature 406 15.05 1.776 228 15.51 1.726 178 14.46 1.667 
Precipitation 406 1164 181.4 228 1197 183.2 178 1122 170.7 
Elevation1 406 2444 233.4 228 2402 254.8 178 2499 189.9 
3.6.2 OLS Estimation Results 
Before we proceeded to estimate the PSM and QTE models, we considered a simple approach to 
tease out the impact of adoption of PELIS on household welfare and forest cover using the OLS 
model of per capita monthly household expenditure and forest cover that includes PELIS as a 
dummy variable equal to 1 if household or CFA participated in PELIS and 0 otherwise. The OLS 
regression results are presented in Table 9 Columns (1) and (2) for per capita monthly expenditure 
and forest cover respectively. We can conclude from the results that participation in PELIS 
increases per capita monthly household expenditure by approximately ksh. 555.30 (USD5.553) and 
forest cover by approximately 9.4% for beneficiary CFAs all factors constant (the coefficient of 
PELIS dummy is significant at 1%). 
Table 9: OLS Estimation Results of Impact of PELIS on Forest Cover and Per Capita Expenditure 
(1) (2) 
VARIABLES PCMonthlyEXP s.e Forestcover s.e
PELIS 555.3*** (151.8) 9.380*** (1.937) 
HHsex 165.0 (205.4) 2.448 (2.494) 
MedAge 35.22 (31.46) -0.245 (0.368) 
MedAgesq -0.348 (0.281) 0.00195 (0.00323) 
hhsize -270.1*** (33.55) 0.549 (0.404) 
MaritSta -573.2** (257.9) -4.193 (3.044) 
Education 711.6*** (151.0) -1.230 (2.126) 
ResidStatus -263.0* (146.8) -5.119*** (1.770) 
EmploymentStat -295.9 (180.1) 5.532*** (2.027) 
Numbchild 30.80 (37.30) 0.420 (0.452) 
Woodlots -128.1 (207.4) 1.932 (2.632) 
Hownership -85.75 (254.9) 2.395 (3.125) 
Membership 349.8 (278.1) 0.126 (2.935) 
DistMarket -16.12 (24.64) -0.126 (0.300) 
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DistForest -137.1*** (48.57) -1.718*** (0.616) 
DistMroad 84.53** (33.87) -0.195 (0.429) 
Hsepartic -213.9 (239.9) -2.315 (3.468) 
Multilingual 2.331 (2.109) 
Temperature -3.033*** (0.627) 
Precipitation 0.00500 (0.00537) 
Constant 3,255*** (803.4) 119.4*** (12.24) 
Observations 405 267 
R-squared 0.292 0.236 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
However, participation in PELIS is voluntary and may be based on self-selection. CFAs or 
households that participate in PELIS may also have systematically different characteristics from 
non-participants since their participation may be based on anticipated benefits. Unobservable 
characteristics of households or CFAs may also affect both participation decision and household 
per capita monthly expenditure and forest cover under CFA. Ignoring all these factors may result 
in biased and inconsistent estimates of the impact of the incentive83. Since participation in PELIS 
was not purely random, we considered the PSM technique to estimate the mean impact on forest 
cover and household welfare and the endogenous QTE model to assess the distributional impact of 
the scheme on household welfare as we address the selectivity and endogeneity issues. 
3.6.3 Propensity Score Matching Estimation Results 
For PSM the key assumption of unconfoundedness and overlap must be met hence the need for an 
initial balance test. Our descriptive statistics in Table B.1 suggests wide differences between 
participants and non-participants of PELIS. To match and balance the data we estimated a probit 
regression of participation or non-participation in PELIS. There is no consensus in published 
literature whether to include the significant variables or all prior variables as predictors of 
83 Another major drawback of OLS is that, it does not account for potential structural differences between the per capita monthly expenditure and 
forest cover for households and CFAs that participated in PELIS and those that did not. 
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propensity scores 84  (Rubin, 1979; Austin et al., 2007). The propensity score estimates at the 
household level and CFA levels are presented in Table 1085. 
Table 10: Propensity Score Estimates of PELIS adoption 
Household Level CFA Level 
VARIABLES Coefficients s.e Marginal Effects s.e Coefficients s.e Marginal Effects s.e
MaritSta 0.152 (0.219) 0.0469 (0.0673) 0.207 (0.306) 0.0526 (0.0776) 
Numbchild -0.00508 (0.0292) -0.00156 (0.00899) -0.0260 (0.0417) -0.00660 (0.0106) 
BornVil -0.610*** (0.152) -0.188*** (0.0442) -0.701*** (0.205) -0.178*** (0.0491) 
hhsize 0.0178 (0.0313) 0.00550 (0.00964) -0.00366 (0.0439) -0.000929 (0.0111) 
EmploymentStat -0.622*** (0.182) -0.192*** (0.0534) -0.880*** (0.256) -0.223*** (0.0604) 
MedIncome 1.85e-05*** (6.29e-06) 5.68e-06*** (1.88e-06) 3.46e-05*** (1.11e-05) 8.77e-06*** (2.67e-06) 
Woodlots 0.450** (0.206) 0.138** (0.0625) 0.364 (0.337) 0.0923 (0.0850) 
CFAParticipation 0.209 (0.151) 0.0643 (0.0462) 0.207 (0.207) 0.0524 (0.0524) 
DistMroad 0.109*** (0.0367) 0.0337*** (0.0110) 0.257*** (0.0591) 0.0653*** (0.0136) 
DistMarket 0.0126 (0.0271) 0.00388 (0.00833) -0.00228 (0.0382) -0.000578 (0.00970) 
DistForest -0.0722 (0.0478) -0.0222 (0.0146) -0.0671 (0.0696) -0.0170 (0.0176) 
Temperature 0.151*** (0.0578) 0.0464*** (0.0174) 0.210** (0.105) 0.0533** (0.0260) 
Elevation1 -0.000720* (0.000422) -0.000222* (0.000128) -0.00232*** (0.000864) -0.000588*** (0.000210) 
Precipitation 0.00106** (0.000460) 0.000326** (0.000140)  
Constant -2.164 (1.729) 1.698 (3.437) 
Observations 405 405 266 266 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The probit estimation results at household and CFA levels show that holding other factors constant, 
those born in a given village are less likely to participate in PELIS and that household heads 
employed in off farm jobs are also less likely to participate in PELIS given that with alternative 
sources of income protecting them from fluctuations in agricultural productivity, households may 
be less dependent on forests hence, less likely to participate in PELIS. However, the higher the 
84 However, we identified appropriate covariates from the collected socioeconomic and institutional variables taking into account economic theory 
and the condition that covariates should influence the household decision to adopt PELIS and the outcome variables simultaneously but at the same 
time unaffected by the treatment (see Heckman et al. 1998). 
85 At the household level, we consider all the 406 households but one household was dropped due to incomplete observation on Bornvil variable 
hence the sample of 405 households. At the CFA level, we considered 7 CFAs that did not benefit from PELIS (the controls) that is Menengai, 
Likia, Sururu, Nyangores, Nairotia, Baraget and Olenguruone constituting 130 households and 6 CFAs that benefited from PELIS (the treated) and 
had fifteen or more households benefiting they are namely; Bahati, Koibatek, Esageri, Malagat, Kericho and Makutano constituting 137 households. 
The household that had missing information on BornVil variable from Likia was also dropped from the analysis hence leading to a total sample of 
266 households (138 controls and 128 treated). 
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income the more likely a household is to participate in PELIS supporting findings by Agrawal and 
Gupta (2005). In addition, the farther the distance from the main road the household is, the higher 
the likelihood of participation in PELIS. This suggests that opportunity cost associated with 
distance matters. Thus, contradicting findings by Agrawal and Gupta (2005) that household 
likelihood of participation increases if households can easily access government offices concerned 
with the CPR. In terms of climate and geographical variables, a rise in average temperature 
increases the likelihood of participation in PELIS whereas the higher the elevation the lower the 
likelihood of participation in the scheme. The negative influence of elevation could be due to 
inaccessibility of most forest areas. However, at household level, the higher the precipitation the 
higher the likelihood of participation in the scheme. This is due to the fact that with higher 
precipitation, the anticipated benefits from farming are also higher. The results also suggest that at 
the household level, those who own private woodlots are more likely to participate in the scheme 
supporting findings by Jumbe and Angelsen (2007) that participation of most households owning 
woodlots is motivated by personal interests. Precipitation was however not included at the CFA 
level due to lack of convergence86. These results also correlate to the mean differences reported in 
Table B.1. We therefore need to correct for these characteristics. These factors therefore 
significantly influence household decision to participate in the scheme. From the p scores, the 
estimated probability of participating in the scheme was estimated to be 55.9%. 
Performance of Matching Estimators 
We considered a range of matches namely the nearest neighbor matching, radius matching, and 
kernel matching87. However, we selected the matches that resulted in highest number of balanced 
covariates and large sample size within the common support as presented in Table B.2. The kernel 
86 We tried to tease out the determinants of households’ participation in PELIS at both CFA and household levels to assess the robustness of our 
household level determinants which was the main interest. 
87 It is important to note that, the choice of matching algorithm often involves a trade-off in terms of bias and efficiency. 
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density showing the common support before and after matching is shown in Figure B.1 in the 
appendix. The figure shows a considerable magnitude of overlap after matching. Table B.2 presents 
the quality and performance of the matches selected out of the different matches used. The Columns 
of interest are labelled (1) & (2) and (6) & (7). Fourteen and thirteen explanatory variables were 
used at the household level and CFA level analysis respectively88. 
Matching Based treatment effects on PELIS beneficiaries 
We present the estimated ATT in Table 11. The ATT were estimated for household welfare and 
CFA forest cover using psmatch2 command in stata (Leuven et al., 2015). The Columns of interest 
are labelled ATT and t-stat. 
Table 11: Matching based Treatment Effects on PELIS beneficiaries 
Per Capita Monthly Expenditure Forest cover 
Estimator ATT S.Dev t-stat ATT S.Dev t-stat
NN (4) 597.02 192.32 3.10*** 5.71 3.33 1.71* 
NN (5) 589.65 197.55 2.98*** 5.53 3.31 1.67* 
Radius (0.0025) 363.48 204.68 1.78* 7.73 4.10 1.88* 
Radius (0.005) 678.36 211.28 3.21*** 7.94 3.30 2.40** 
***<0.01, **<0.05, *<0.1 
The results show that PELIS has significant (both economically and statistically) positive impact 
on household welfare and forest cover. The average impact of the scheme on PELIS beneficiaries’ 
per capita monthly expenditure was estimated at between ksh. 363 (USD 3.63) and ksh. 678 (USD 
88 A balance test of fourteen and thirteen variables in Column (1) and (6) suggests complete balance in matching. Whereas, the pseudo R squared 
in Column (2) and (7) shows the explanatory power for the re-estimated propensity score model after matching. From literature, a number of criteria 
have been suggested to gauge the performance of matching estimators. The criteria include: checking if after matching the significant mean 
difference across covariates remains. An alternative involves re-estimating the probit regression using the matched sample (see Sianesi, 2004). There 
should be no systematic differences between the covariates after matching hence the pseudo R squared should be low (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 
2008). A likelihood ratio test of joint significance should also be rejected before matching but not after. 
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6.78). Based on the average per capita monthly expenditure for households benefiting from PELIS 
which is Ksh. 2,409 (USD 24.09), this accounts for between 15.09% and 28.14%. The impact of 
the scheme on forest cover was estimated at between 5.53% and 7.94%. However, since we 
included even the covariates that remained significantly different even after matching (i.e., distance 
to market, precipitation and temperature) in the outcome analysis, to assess the robustness of the 
PSM estimates, we also run a matched regression with controls (We find impact on per capita 
expenditure to be between Ksh. 436 (USD 4.36) and Ksh. 525 (USD 5.25) whereas, on forest cover 
it was estimated between 4.67% and 7.27%)89. It is also important to note that, matching is based 
on the unconfoundedness assumption which is not testable. We therefore conducted a sensitivity 
analysis of the matching estimates. 
Sensitivity Analysis of the Matching Estimates 
PSM is based on the assumption that the researcher should be able to observe all variables 
simultaneously influencing decision to participate in PELIS and the outcome variable 
(unconfoundedness or the conditional independence assumption) otherwise, the matching 
estimators may not be robust due to the hidden bias (Rosenbaum, 2002). Estimating the extent of 
selection bias is quite complex especially due to the fact that we used non-experimental data. We 
therefore employed Rosenbaum (2005) bounding approach to test for robustness of the matching 
estimates to unobserved variables. Following Rosenbaum (2005) bounding method we examined 
the sensitivity of the match based treatment effects estimates with respect to potential deviations 
from conditional independence. The sensitivity analysis results are presented in Table B.390. 
89 We find that the results for the matched regression and the PSM are not any different. These results are however not presented in this paper since 
they were used to assess the robustness of our PSM estimates. 
90 The first column contains the log odds of differential assignment due to unobserved heterogeneity, the second to fifth columns, contains the 
upper and lower bound significance levels respectively for the key outcome variables namely per capita monthly expenditure and percentage forest 
cover. The second to fifth columns examines the match based treatment effect for each measure of unobservable potential selection bias. The lower 
bounds are of no interests since they hold under the assumption that the true ATT is underestimated but our ATT estimates are positive (Becker and 
Caliendo, 2007). 
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Looking at our sensitivity analysis results in Table B.3, for per capita expenditure, at Γ=1.2 and 1.3 
the results will not be significant at 1% and at Γ=1.4 the result is also not significant at 10% with 
p-value of 0.150. Whereas for forest cover, at Γ=1.1 the result will not be significant at 10% with
a p-value of 0.158. This suggests that unobserved covariates would cause the odds ratio of treatment 
assignment to differ between the participants and nonparticipants once we reach a specific Γ level. 
From these results, we can infer that the results to some extent reveals some levels of selectivity 
bias91. 
Due to possibility of selection bias, to ascertain the robustness of our PSM estimates, we also 
employed instrumental variables estimation technique following Lewbel’s heteroscedasticity-
based instrumental variable technique (see Lewbel (2012)) to test and address the potential 
endogeneity of participation in PELIS on per capita household expenditure and forest cover 92. 
Based on this approach, our results in Table B.6 revealed that, PELIS has significant positive 
impact on household per capita monthly expenditure estimated at Ksh. 1270 (USD 12.70) hence 
raising welfare for the average household by about 58%. On the other hand, the estimated impact 
of PELIS on forest cover was approximately 4.23% holding other factors constant93. These findings 
therefore resonate well with the results from our PSM estimates although the impact on household 
welfare was found to be slightly higher compared to the PSM estimates94. 
91 According to Becker and Caliendo (2007), the critical of say Γ= 1.4 for per capita expenditure and 1.1 for forest cover is not an indication that 
unobserved heterogeneity exists and that there is no effect of the treatment on the outcome variable. The unconfoundedness assumption therefore 
cannot be justified using this test hence we cannot state whether the CIA assumption holds or not. The result just indicates that if any unobserved 
variable caused the odds ratio of treatment assignment to differ between treatment and comparison groups by say Γ=1.4 for per capita expenditure, 
then the confidence interval for the treatment effect would include zero (see Becker and Caliendo 2007). 
92 The main advantage of this approach is that, it provides options for generating instruments and allows the identification of structural parameters 
in models with endogeneity or mis-measured regressors when we do not have external instruments. The approach is also capable of supplementing 
weak instruments. Identification is consequently achieved by having explanatory variables that are uncorrelated with the product of heteroscedastic 
errors (see Lewbel (2012)). 
93 In the two models, we first tested for endogeneity using the Durbin-Wu-Hausman tests for endogeneity and control function approach under 
the null hypothesis that the variables are exogenous. The test rejects the null hypothesis of exogeneity at 1% significance level for the two models. 
We also carried out performance statistics for the IV models. We tested for, underidentifcation based on Kleibergen-Paap rk Lm statistics, weak 
identification using the Donald Wald F statistics, and the Hansen J statistics under the null hypothesis that the instruments are valid. The models 
passed all the tests hence proving that the heteroskedasticity-based IV estimates would yield reliable estimates. 
94 It is also important to note that we also arrive at similar conclusion when we used the endogenous switching regression model. 
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3.6.4 Quantile Treatment Effects Model 
To examine the impact of the scheme across the income distribution, the study adopted the 
endogenous QTE model. Since participation in PELIS is potentially endogenous to per capita 
expenditure, we first tested for endogeneity of participation in PELIS (our treatment variable). The 
control function approach was used to test for endogeneity. The approach is conducted in two 
stages. In the first stage, the endogenous variable which in our case is PELIS was regressed on the 
instrumental variable BornVil (i.e a dummy variable whether the household head is born in a given 
village or not) and other explanatory variables and the predicted residuals saved95. In the second 
step, the outcome variable (per capita expenditure) was regressed on the endogenous variable, other 
explanatory variables and the residuals96(Wooldridge, 2010). Using this test, the null hypothesis of 
exogeneity is rejected with a pvalue of 0.05597. In light of evidence of endogeneity of participation 
in PELIS, we proceeded to estimate an endogenous QTE model to handle selection bias and solve 
the endogeneity problems. The results of the endogenous QTE model following Abadie et al. 
(2002) are presented in Table 12. 
95 We computed the proportion of the predicted probabilities outside the unit interval. Finding only 6.4% fell outside the unit interval we chose 
the LPM over the probit or logit model since the LPM would still produce unbiased and consistent estimates (?). The F value for the LPM model 
was also found to be 11.15 with a p value of 0.000 showing the significance of the LPM model. 
96 The approach is same as the 2SLS approach but the only difference is that it allows for testing for endogeneity of PELIS participation. It however 
hinges on assumption of exogeneity of the instrument. 
97 The null hypothesis of exogeneity is also rejected when we use the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test of endogeneity at 1% significance level. 
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Table 12: Endogenous Quantile Treatment Effects Model Estimation Results 
VARIABLES QT_1 QT_2 QT_3 QT_4 QT_5 QT_6 QT_7 QT_8 QT_9
PELIS -75.21 167.2 410.6 497.6* 532.8** 565.7** 842.7*** 1,227*** 2,155*** 
(194.2) (382.0) (328.1) (288.5) (246.8) (258.9) (269.8) (411.2) (787.1) 
DistForest -105.3** 0.379 -68.29 -78.10* -44.18 -48.76 -176.6*** -278.4*** -256.2***
(44.52) (53.86) (51.67) (43.28) (36.85) (52.45) (41.57) (54.36) (81.45) 
DistMroad 44.76 -37.09 -46.65 39.06 71.89** 60.14 -30.60 -74.81 -109.9
(40.70) (33.26) (43.54) (41.68) (31.16) (49.19) (41.81) (55.22) (201.7) 
DistMarket -96.78*** -32.88 -24.18 -60.19*** -44.54*** -44.82*** -24.29 -28.87 -13.12
(17.33) (20.12) (19.77) (12.21) (12.27) (15.03) (20.85) (24.27) (34.17) 
HHEducyrs -18.78 -7.228 -24.11** -17.48* -11.81 -7.174 -3.824 1.239 -11.10
(12.23) (12.31) (10.18) (9.067) (7.749) (10.88) (9.992) (12.23) (24.31) 
Hlandsize 40.53 54.70*** 44.86* -2.354 -22.62* -38.10*** -50.85*** -59.33*** -65.26
(32.85) (19.62) (24.00) (17.38) (12.21) (13.01) (14.53) (15.60) (43.60) 
hhsize -234.7*** -182.9*** -146.0*** -177.7*** -190.8*** -188.7*** -205.6*** -238.5*** -176.3***
(22.71) (41.35) (40.11) (26.38) (25.00) (34.31) (29.02) (42.79) (67.18) 
HHWealth 0.000139 0.000206 0.000296* 0.000523**
* 
0.000549**
* 
0.000566**
* 
0.000562**
*
0.000698**
* 
0.000560**
* 
(0.000247
) 
(0.000142
) 
(0.000169
) 
(8.65e-05) (6.84e-05) (6.59e-05) (7.17e-05) (7.39e-05) (0.000160) 
Numbchild -20.56 -8.951 -56.16*** -37.01*** -21.85 -7.822 39.44 -31.97 -7.319
(24.37) (16.36) (13.27) (14.22) (15.07) (30.68) (37.93) (41.56) (110.5) 
MedAge 45.19*** 29.17 1.164 -27.36 -64.09*** -55.01* -58.92* 7.636 -58.54
(17.36) (27.95) (35.95) (28.08) (20.01) (28.24) (32.84) (52.46) (77.39) 
MedAgesq -0.305* -0.186 0.0919 0.466 0.742*** 0.650** 0.469 -0.0834 0.517 
(0.181) (0.305) (0.364) (0.288) (0.201) (0.292) (0.335) (0.556) (0.813) 
MedIncome 0.0156*** 0.0151*** 0.0134*** 0.0111*** 0.0110*** 0.0200 0.0225*** 0.0257** 0.0416 
(0.00462) (0.00358) (0.00447) (0.00350) (0.00425) (0.0198) (0.00606) (0.0112) (0.0465) 
Temperature 72.20*** 58.22*** -2.278 -8.517 -24.80 25.56 34.19 35.31 43.11 
(24.37) (13.73) (17.73) (15.73) (16.62) (55.72) (38.63) (35.60) (115.6) 
Precipitation -1.084*** -1.142*** -1.217*** -1.270*** -1.248*** -1.773*** -1.780*** -2.663*** -2.560***
(0.241) (0.167) (0.133) (0.139) (0.139) (0.289) (0.240) (0.381) (0.714) 
HHsex 578.2** 443.8*** 331.5* 494.8*** 325.2 -81.67 -327.6 -694.6* -1,029*
(274.7) (170.5) (191.5) (160.9) (201.7) (265.1) (310.8) (388.3) (530.3) 
EmploymentStat -178.5*** 203.6** 58.19 171.7* 86.88 -147.0 -395.8*** -364.4** -385.8**
(64.71) (85.42) (92.32) (88.03) (88.08) (188.7) (117.0) (171.6) (156.5) 
LandTitle -291.0 -378.4*** -285.1** -315.1*** -279.8*** -187.5* 159.5 608.8*** 893.4***
(190.1) (137.0) (115.3) (68.39) (58.40) (103.6) (111.2) (172.6) (270.0) 
Woodlots 132.2 8.014 65.88 164.9*** 136.1** 16.68 114.8 138.3 372.9 
(199.8) (110.4) (102.2) (54.66) (63.22) (124.2) (108.0) (144.3) (544.7) 
Membership 94.31 10.91 -100.3 -273.2 -156.5 -59.05 -356.1* -325.6 -233.0
(132.4) (150.5) (183.4) (177.6) (156.1) (189.1) (204.3) (220.6) (280.5) 
ResidStatus -195.7** -223.7** 35.68 154.4* 140.0* -4.487 -34.03 -358.2*** -396.1
(97.44) (103.8) (112.4) (84.54) (81.65) (143.8) (140.9) (104.5) (320.6) 
CFAParticipatio
n 
224.0** 312.6*** 375.5*** 606.7*** 453.3*** 593.6*** 364.5*** 392.9*** 507.4***
(92.38) (68.11) (81.77) (79.54) (90.47) (190.3) (137.6) (147.4) (145.5) 
Hsepartic 435.2*** 345.6*** 433.1*** 409.6*** 477.1*** 398.9* 257.1* 411.1** 278.4 
(86.66) (55.30) (76.57) (69.12) (66.35) (239.9) (135.3) (185.7) (554.3) 
Constant 325.3 678.1 2,553*** 2,783*** 4,269*** 4,456*** 5,686*** 5,777*** 7,085*** 
(457.2) (604.1) (790.3) (497.4) (410.5) (640.2) (809.7) (1,308) (1,609) 
Observations 404 404 404 404 404 404 404 404 404 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The results show that holding other factors constant, for some quantiles, the further a household is 
from the nearest edge of the forest and nearest market the lower the per capita expenditure. 
Households may be less active in CFA activities if they find the forest to be too far from them hence 
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may not derive direct benefits from the forest. The opportunity cost of participating in PELIS is 
also higher when households are far from the forest. Whereas the further a household is from the 
nearest market the lower the likelihood of selling their produce or participating in any trading 
activities aimed at raising their welfare. This implies opportunity costs with respect to distance 
matters. Households that actively participate in CFA activities were also found to have higher per 
capita expenditure. This can be attributed to the fact that to derive benefits (e.g. getting a PELIS 
plot) from the forest a key requirement is to be actively involved in CFA activities. We also found 
that households that participate in CFA activities (regardless of the level of participation) tend to 
have higher per capita monthly expenditure compared to non-participants. This implies that if 
access to benefits from the forest is pegged on participation then the existing incentives can be 
effective if implemented through CFAs hence the level of institutional cooperation or organization 
also matters. Household wealth and income were also found to be positively related to per capita 
expenditure as highly expected. As expected, the higher the household size and the higher the 
number of children the lower the per capita expenditure. 
The results also show that native of a given area tend to have lower per capita expenditure compared 
to settlers or immigrants. This could be attributed to the fact that most immigrants tend be driven 
by the motive to benefit from the forest resource hence will often maximize given any slight 
opportunity compared to natives who feel they will always have the resource at their disposal. At 
the village level within African settings immigrants often tend to be hardworking than the natives. 
In addition, the study results suggest that the higher the precipitation levels the lower the per capita 
expenditure, although we expected higher agricultural productivity with higher rainfall hence 
improved welfare, it could be that higher rainfall hinder activities such as transportation of goods 
aimed at generating income e.g. selling agricultural harvest or interfering with preservation of 
agricultural produce or even transporting farm inputs. In terms of property rights, we found that 
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households that own land titles tend to have lower per capita expenditure. This can be attributed to 
the fact with land ownership people tend to be lazy, while those who do not have land title tends to 
work hard to maximize from the farming activities for fear that they can be displaced anytime or 
for them to accumulate enough to get land elsewhere. Contrary to our expectation, the results 
suggest that for most quantiles, those employed in off farm jobs tend to have lower per capita 
expenditure. This may be partly explained by the kind of off-farm job. For instance, if you are a 
government employed teacher in rural areas, the remuneration package often tend to be lower 
especially allowances due to the low cost of living in rural areas compared to urban areas. 
Agricultural activities may therefore be more profitable hence the negative influence of being 
employed in off farm jobs on per capita expenditure. Agriculture also requires a lot of hard labor 
which some may not be ready for hence opt for employment. The results also suggest that male 
headed households tend to have higher per capita expenditure compared to female headed 
households. This is expected given that males tend to have more physical energy for income 
generating activities such as farming and construction works among others. 
On the heterogeneous impact of the scheme, we found that conditioned on a set of covariates98, the 
endogenous QTE model revealed that the scheme had significant positive impact on household 
welfare from the fourth to the ninth quantiles only showing the distributional inequity of the 
scheme99. A major observation during the survey was the fact that, most forest-adjacent households 
participating in PELIS were mainly involved in growing the same kind of crops i.e., peas, cabbages 
or potatoes which they complained that since they all harvested at almost the same time, this 
98 Namely, level of households’ participation in CFA activities, ownership of land titles, employment status, sex of household head and whether 
the household head is a native or not, climate and geographical variables and distance to the nearest; market, main road, and the nearest edge of the 
forest, among other factors. 
99 To assess the consistency and robustness of our estimates, we re-estimated the model by omitting some variables like household income 
membership and CFA participation which could also be potentially endogenous (although we tested for their endogeneity and found them to be 
exogenous). We found that even with omission of these variables from the model we still arrive at the same conclusion just that the scheme tends 
to benefit households from the sixth quantile and above the results are shown in table B.7. We therefore, limit our discussion to our model with all 
these variables since we included them to authenticate the validity of our instrument. 
92 
resulted in excess supply hence lower prices coupled with lack of market for the agricultural 
produce. Moreover, most forest-adjacent communities are poor hence have very limited 
alternatives in terms of exploring market opportunities for their produce, and even if the harvest is 
good, very few can afford to transport their produce to other areas to fetch better prices for their 
produce. Another possible reason could be due to elite capture issues where richer elite households 
take over the scheme and other CFA activities in general and therefore set to benefit more than the 
poor households. On the other hand, the initial conditions of households at the time of adopting the 
scheme and duration of participation in PELIS may also have an implication on the impact of the 
scheme. These factors could therefore explain the inequitable distributional nature of the scheme. 
We therefore reject the null hypothesis of constant impact of the scheme on household welfare 
because the benefits are more skewed towards the middle and upper quantile households. However, 
according to the Kenya Integrated Household Budget Survey (2005), the per capita monthly 
expenditure for rural households in the Rift valley province in which the Mau forest is located is 
approximately Ksh 2251(USD 22.51). Comparing this with our average per capita monthly 
expenditure for the sampled households which is about Ksh. 2185(USD 21.85), we find that the 
study population is on average slightly below the poverty line. This shows that most households 
living around the Mau forest are relatively poor as has been shown by most studies that, the rural 
poor are the most forest dependent. However, the poverty datum line lies between the sixth (average 
of Ksh 2082.26(USD20.82)) and 7th (average of ksh 2375.71(USD23.76)) quantiles see Table B.4. 
Those below the poverty datum line are thus considered poor i.e. first to sixth quantile. It is 
therefore, evident that the scheme raised welfare of the poor but the least poor (fourth to sixth 
quantile households) and the richer quantile households benefit more from the scheme than the 
poorest. 
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3.7 Conclusion and Policy Recommendations 
The study aimed at identifying the determinants of household decision to participate in/adopt 
PELIS, and to determine the overall and distributional impact of PELIS on welfare of forestadjacent 
households as well as the mean impact on forest cover. The PSM method estimated the impact of 
PELIS on household per capita monthly expenditure at between ksh. 363 (USD 3.63) and ksh. 678 
(USD 6.78) hence raising welfare by between 15.09% and 28.14% whereas the overall impact of 
the scheme on forest cover was estimated at between 5.53% and 7.94% slightly lower than the OLS 
estimate of 9.45%. We can thus conclude that on average PELIS meets the dual objective of raising 
household welfare and improving forest cover. This shows that devolution of forest management 
and provision of incentives to well organized communities can lead to better welfare and 
environmental outcomes on average. On the other hand, in terms of welfare, the QTE model under 
endogenous assumption, revealed that the scheme had positive impact on household welfare from 
the fourth quantile households and above only. We can therefore, infer that there is some 
distributional inequity on the impact of the scheme that needs to be addressed for the sustainability 
and success of the scheme and for it to be able to make low income household rise up the income 
ladder and also lead to improvement in forest cover at the same time. 
However, we cannot conclude that the scheme is less pro poor since the scheme raises welfare of 
the least poor as well even though the poorest and marginalized sections of the community are left 
out. These results support findings by Angelsen and Wunder (2003), Sunderlin et al. (2005), 
Mazunda and Shively (2015), and Ali et al. (2015). Our findings also lend support to findings by 
Malla et al. (2000), Jumbe and Angelsen (2006) and Cooper (2008) (Gelo and Koch, 2014; Gelo et 
al., 2016) and Moktan et al. (2016) who found joint forest programs to improve welfare of the high 
income households more than poor households. On the determinants of households’ adoption of or 
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participation in PELIS, we found that, being born in a village or not, employment status of 
household head (i.e. employed in off farm jobs or not), household income, owning woodlots or not, 
distance to nearest motorable road in kilometres, precipitation, temperature and elevation levels of 
nearest forest are the major factors influencing household decision to participate in the scheme. 
These results support some findings by (Lise, 2000; Adhikari et al., 2004; Adhikari, 2005; Agrawal 
and Gupta, 2005; Jumbe and Angelsen, 2007; Kabubo-Mariara, 2013). These factors therefore, 
needs adequate consideration in allocation of PELIS plots to forest-adjacent communities. 
A number of policy implications may be drawn from the study. First, the findings call for a balanced 
and all-inclusive approach (involving the participation of all members regardless of economic 
status) to forest management to ensure equitable distribution of PELIS plots and benefits across the 
income groups. To avoid further marginalization of any income group, policy makers need to give 
much consideration to equity in access and management of the resource especially with respect to 
forest resources and existing incentives. The design and implementation of the scheme with much 
emphasis on method of plots distribution should also be given due consideration if it is not to 
discriminate the very group that it is meant to benefit and to ensure sustainability of the scheme. 
Secondly, a mix of market based incentives and regulated command and control mechanisms based 
on policy makers understanding of the drivers of household participation in PELIS and by extension 
CFA activities may also create more positive impact on forest cover and household welfare. For 
the scheme to have significant impact on forest conservation, there is also need for increased 
awareness and roll out of the incentive to other CFAs that have been reluctant to adopt the scheme 
taking cognizant of the views and expectations of local communities especially low income 
households. Lastly, since the main concern is normally fetching better prices from farm produce in 
PELIS plots, there is need to explore ways of training forest-adjacent communities on modern 
farming techniques, product diversification and improving market opportunities and linkages for 
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various non-timber harvests from the PELIS farms by households in order to address the ensuing 
market failures. This objective can only be achieved through collaboration with relevant 
government bodies and non-governmental organizations or through formation of forest user 
cooperatives to provide market linkages. 
Chapter Four 
Determinants of Successful Collective Management of Forest Resources: 
Evidence from Kenyan Community Forest Associations100 
Abstract 
Participation of local communities in management and utilization of forest resources through 
collective action has become widely accepted as a possible solution to failure of centralized, top-
down approaches to forest conservation. Developing countries have thus resorted to devolution of 
forest management through initiatives such as Participatory Forest Management (PFM) and Joint 
100 A version of this chapter has been disseminated as ERSA Working Paper 698. 
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Forest Management (JFM). In Kenya, under such initiatives, communities have been able to self-
organize into community forest associations (CFAs). However, despite these efforts and an 
increased number of CFAs, the results in terms of ecological outcomes have been mixed, with some 
CFAs failing and others thriving. Little is known about the factors influencing success of these 
initiatives. Using household-level data from 518 households and community-level data from 22 
CFAs from the Mau forest conservancy, the study employed logistic regression, OLS and 
heteroscedasticity-based instrumental variable techniques to analyze factors influencing household 
participation levels in CFA activities and to further identify the determinants of successful 
collective management of forest resources, as well as the link between participation level and the 
success of collective action. The results show that the success of collective action is associated with 
the level of household participation in CFA activities, distance to the forest resource, institutional 
quality, group size, and salience of the resource, among other factors. We also found that collective 
action is more successful when CFAs are formed through users’ self-motivation with frequent 
interaction with government institutions and when the forest cover is low. Factors influencing the 
level of household participation are also identified. The study findings point to the need for: a robust 
diagnostic approach in devolution of forest management to local communities, considering diverse 
socio-economic and ecological settings; government intervention in reviving and re-
institutionalizing existing and infant CFAs in an effort to promote PFM within the Mau forest and 
other parts of the country; and intense effort towards design of a mix of incentive schemes to 
encourage active and equal household participation in CFA activities.  
Key words: PFM, collective action, participation, CFAs 
JEL Classification: D02, Q23, Q28 
4.1 Introduction 
Forests resources are critical for the provision of ecosystem and environmental services, such as 
biodiversity conservation, provisioning of fresh air, carbon sequestration, maintenance of 
hydrological flows, and renewal of soil fertility (Nagendra et al., 2011). Rural communities around 
the world therefore rely on forests, as they significantly contribute to their livelihoods (Shackleton 
et al., 2007). Over the years, there has been an alarming decline in forest cover in many developing 
countries due to advances in technology, rising human population, poverty, and other social 
hardships, leading to over-reliance on forest resources, coupled with increased demand for forest 
ecosystem services. This situation fueled the search for new strategies to stem the trend and place 
remaining forests under secure and effective management. 
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Initial efforts aimed at taming the rising degradation of natural resources involved centralized 
administration of common pool natural resources such as forests through restrictions on levels of 
resource extraction. These efforts were mainly characterized by distrust of locals’ ability to manage 
forest resources on which they depend; hence, governments almost fully assumed the role of 
managing the forests (Heltberg, 2001). However, high information, enforcement and monitoring 
costs reduced the effectiveness of such administrative structures. It is such policy, market and 
institutional failures in management of natural resources that led to a policy shift focusing on how 
local communities can self-organize and manage natural resources (Gopalakrishnan, 2005). 
However, there is still no consensus on the ability of local communities to self-organize (Ostrom, 
2009). Neoclassical theory maintains that communities can only self-organize in the presence of 
coercion or external force. The gloomy prediction of Hardin (1968) that, unless there is government 
intervention or privatization, all commonly managed resources would inevitably end in tragedy 
fueled trends encouraging privatization and discouraging collaborative resource management and 
had disastrous consequences on welfare and ecological outcomes. Hardin’s prediction also led to 
an increase in interest in cooperation as a means to manage the commons (Wade, 1988; Ostrom, 
1990; Tang, 1992). Over time, evidence from case studies in Asian countries have shown that 
communities can self-organize and develop robust natural resource management institutions 
adapted to local conditions. This motivated scholars to challenge neoclassical economics and 
Hardin’s tragedy of the commons theory e.g., Ostrom (2010) through the theory of collective 
action. The theory is based on the premise that participants have a stake in the final outcome. 
Therefore, agreed norms and customary rules in rural communities are a recipe for successful 
98 
collective action that can lead to well preserved and utilized Common Pool Resources101 (CPRs) 
(Muchara et al., 2014). 
According to Ostrom and Nagendra (2006), community conservation when effective has a better 
likelihood of being more locally accepted, providing greater social and economic benefits to 
communities and achieving conservation goals easily than the strict government approaches that 
are economically costly and fraught with social conflict. Therefore, local community participation 
in utilization and management of forest resources through collective action has become widely 
accepted as a possible solution to the failure of the centralized, top-down approaches to forest 
conservation (Wade, 1988; Ostrom, 1990). Due to the shortcomings of the traditional top down 
approaches to arrest losses of biodiversity, developing countries are increasingly devolving forest 
management to local communities through approaches such as PFM (Wily, 2001; Agrawal, 2007). 
The main aim of PFM is to promote active involvement of locals in management of forest resources, 
while addressing environmental and socio-economic goals all in one package. PFM emphasizes on 
user communities’ ability to effectively manage common pool resources through informal and 
semi-formal institutional arrangements (Wade, 1988; Kiss, 1990; Ostrom, 1990; Baland and 
Platteau, 1996). It also involves inclusion, equity and democratic governance of forest resources 
(Agrawal and Gupta, 2005). In Kenya, under PFM, communities have been able to self organize 
into community-based organizations known as CFAs in collaboration with the Kenya Forest 
Service (KFS). 
101 According to Ostrom et al. (1994), a CPR is a defined as a resource from which it is relatively costly to exclude others but the use of the resource 
is rivalrous or subtractable in consumption. 
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4.1.1 Organization of Community Forests Associations 
The Forest Act requires forest-adjacent-community members to enter into partnership with KFS 
through registered CFAs. The partnership applies both to forests owned by local authorities and 
those owned by the state (i.e. gazetted, forests). CFAs are registered based on approval by KFS. 
Local communities may apply for certain rights in utilization and management of forest resources 
through the CFAs so long as the rights are not in conflict with forest conservation objectives (Mogoi 
et al., 2012). In the Act, CFAs are recognized as partners in management of forests and are formed 
by several Community Based Organizations (CBOs) or Forest User Groups (FUGs) 102 . To 
supplement efforts, commercial plantations are also open to lease arrangements. In return, 
communities are entitled to a range of user rights, such as collecting firewood, grass for roof 
thatching and grazing animals, herbal medicine, timber and scientific and educational activities, as 
well as recreational activities. This is a departure from prior practice, where gazetted forest reserves 
were fully managed by the government. As part of benefit sharing arrangements, PELIS was 
reintroduced in 2007 through CFAs to promote the livelihood of locals while ensuring sustainable 
management and conservation of forests. However, community members are required to pay some 
user fees in order to benefit from these resources. A percentage of these fees goes to the FUGs and 
CFA, while a bigger percentage goes to KFS. Paid up members are given a receipt to show they 
have user rights. Violators may be prosecuted, depending on the magnitude of the offense; 
otherwise, smaller offenses are handled at the CFA level. 
As of 2009, there was at least one forest association in each forest in Kenya. The number has 
increased and by 2011 there was a total of 325 CFAs countrywide, with Mau having 35 CFAs. The 
governing structures are the KFS board at the national level and a Forest Conservation Committee 
102 A FUG is a group of people with shared rights and duties to access and use products from the forest. FUG members register with different groups 
based on their interest, e.g., PELIS, bee-keeping, grazing etc. 
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under each forest conservancy in Kenya103, which represents CFAs at the national level, the county 
forest board at the county level, and lastly the CFA executive committee or general representative 
body. The National Alliance for Community Forests Associations (NACOFA) also represents the 
rights of CFAs at the national level. 
However, these CFAs have had their fair share of challenges, e.g., mismanagement, disintegration, 
varying interests and heterogeneity among members causing more conflicts (Ongugo et al., 2008). 
In addition to these challenges, the Mau forest attracts a lot of political interest and is very prone to 
ethnic tensions, hence the CFAs may often be destabilized during election periods. During the 
fieldwork for this study, a number of CFA officials complained of the rent-seeking behavior of 
most foresters. The main complaint was that the foresters who should be the representative of the 
government at the devolved level were the main agents of forest degradation, as they colluded with 
loggers or CFA officials to harvest more than the licensed number of trees or even indigenous trees 
that are to be preserved, despite intense efforts by CFAs to conserve the forest resource. This 
implies that in certain instances the CFA may be well organized but unsuccessful in forest 
conservation due to the forester’s activities. In some instances, the foresters collude with CFA 
officials to over harvest the forest resource for selfish gains hence worse environmental outcomes 
as the resource degenerates in to an open access once members feel disgruntled. Most counties are 
therefore pushing for complete devolution of forest management to local communities to make 
CFAs have greater say in forest management. 
Moreover, forest degradation has continued despite the existing incentives aimed at deepening 
community participation and conserving forests and despite the increased number of CFAs 
countrywide. Most of the CFAs have also remained disorganized and some are driven by selfish 
103 The forest conservancies in Kenya are Central Highlands, Nairobi, Eastern, North Eastern, Ewaso North, Coast, Mau, North Rift , Western, and 
Nyanza. 
101 
interests without conservation objectives (Ongugo et al., 2008). The existing CFAs have also 
yielded varying levels of success in terms of ecological outcomes. The mixed levels of success 
from the CFAs is a clear indication that PFM cannot be assumed as a blueprint for successful 
collective action or be treated as a one size fits all solution. A point of concern is why some CFAs 
succeed while others fail. There could be other context-specific factors influencing people’s 
participation levels that are worth considering in analyzing the success or failure of collective action 
in managing CPRs. There is also little understanding of the factors behind the varying levels of 
success of these CFAs. In addition, policy makers need to understand how to incentivize household 
participation and roll out devolution of forest management to local communities. 
In light of socio-economic and demographic pressure, the sustainability of forest management 
requires successful coordination and cooperation among users, thus requiring an understanding of 
the determinants of successful collective action (Poteete and Ostrom, 2004). For instance, what 
factors influence households’ level of participation in CFA activities? Does the level of household 
participation in CFA activities matter for the success of collective action? To the best of our 
knowledge, no empirical study has tried to determine the drivers of successful collective action 
within the Mau forest, especially within the context of indigenous communities reliant on 
agriculture and with a history of constant displacement from their land due to ethnic conflicts and 
government actions. In light of the constant displacement of communities the level of cooperation 
in collective action is generally expected to be lower given the mistrust of the true intention of 
government in an effort towards devolution of forest management. Moreover, studies that have 
tried to identify the drivers of successful collective action in other countries have mainly used 
measures of wealth, no of wildlife, reduction in land degradation/soil erosion, investment in forest 
and forest experts or individual perception of the forest cover as measures of success (see Gibson 
et al., 2005; Hayes and Ostrom, 2005; Ostrom and Nagendra, 2006; Andersson and Agrawal, 2011; 
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Coleman and Fleischman, 2012). This approach is subjective and may not yield efficient results for 
policy formulation. The different methodological approaches applied in these studies also make 
comparison of results difficult. A common practice in these studies is the small sample size 
problem, especially at the institutional level. The different models of PFM also warrant a context 
specific study. This study therefore seeks to fill this gaps by identifying the factors influencing 
household level of participation in CFA activities and also to identify the determinants of successful 
collective management of forest resources by CFAs as we examine the link between successful 
collective action and level of household participation in CFA activities using the Mau forest 
conservancy in Kenya as a case study. 
The study contributes to literature on collective action and the ongoing debate on the universal 
applicability of devolution of forest management as a solution to environmental degradation under 
different socio-economic, cultural and ecological settings, through empirical validation of the 
theoretical views in the commons literature. We contribute to this literature in a number of ways: 
first, we do not rely on subjective assessment of forest condition as a measure of outcomes of 
collective action, as employed by most studies, but instead use two objective outcome measures 
namely, percentage forest cover within each CFA and reported cases of vandalism104 within each 
CFA in a year. Second, we conduct analysis at the CFA level but factor in all households sampled 
in these CFAs to handle the potential sample size problem. Third, we include potential intervening 
institutional and household-level variables that have not been employed in other studies as we try 
to tease out the drivers of successful collective action. To assess the consistency of our estimates 
and ascertain the reliability of our results, we compare the results with a composite index of 
collective action that has been employed in past studies. With the rising trend in devolution of 
104 We define forest vandalism as any illegal activity that is aimed at destroying existing forest resources e.g., fires, illegal  logging and logging of 
indigenous trees that should be protected, illegal harvesting of firewood, etc. 
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management of natural resources thus affecting livelihoods of millions of people as well as the 
natural resource itself, identifying factors that incentivize household participation is critical for 
efficient policy formulation and devolution policy implementation. Policy makers also need to 
understand the factors necessary for success of PFM and how to roll out devolution of forest 
management under different socio-economic, cultural and ecological contexts. 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 4.2 we present a review of related literature; 
section 4.3 outlines the methodological framework; section 4.4 presents data collection and 
sampling method; section 4.5 presents the results and discussions; and the conclusion and policy 
recommendations are presented in section 4.6. 
4.2 Related Literature 
4.2.1 Factors influencing households’ level of participation in CFA activities 
PFM entails equity, inclusion and democratic governance of forest resources as well as involvement 
of locals in the management and conservation of forests (Agrawal, 1999; Agrawal and Gupta, 
2005). Communities therefore have greater say and increased participation in decision making 
(Andersson et al., 2004). However, most studies that have assessed factors influencing households’ 
participation in community forest management activities have largely shown that, socio-economic 
profile, derived benefits, property rights and collective action determine household participation in 
community forest management (Malla, 1997; Maskey et al., 2006; Coulibaly-Lingani et al., 2011). 
The economic status of households has also been shown to have a negative influence on household 
participation in collective action. For example, Bhattarai and Ojha (2001) and Adhikari (2004) 
found that richer households are the greatest beneficiaries of community forestry programs relative 
to poor households mainly due to the fact that product distribution decisions are made by elite and 
influential groups in the community. Moreover, poor households are often thought to have higher 
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opportunity cost of participation hence often express disinterest in participating in collective action 
activities and may also not have the family size or resources to utilize the forest products (Agrawal, 
2000; Bhattarai and Ojha, 2001). All members of a community thus need to be actively and equally 
involved in management and decision making in order for the economically disadvantaged groups 
to enjoy the benefits (Knox et al., 2000). 
In terms of education levels, Agrawal and Gupta (2005) found that household participation levels 
in collective action activities are negatively correlated with the education levels. These findings 
were also supported by Ali et al. (2015) who concluded that young, richer and educated households 
tend to participate more in community forestry. Distance to the nearest market has also been found 
to have an influence in household participation in collective action activities although there is no 
consensus on the direction of effect. Fujiie et al. (2005), posit that markets access often decreases 
interdependence thus may allow some members to opt out hence reducing likelihood of active 
participation in collective action. The cost of integrating with government for say registration of an 
association and airing out their demands also decreases the closer the proximity to markets. 
However, the limited the exposure to urban activities the higher the incentive for members to 
cooperate since with limited market access members are expected to interact indefinitely (Fujiie et 
al., 2005). 
According to Jana et al. (2014), other factors influencing household participation levels include; 
frequency of committee meetings, household size, household religion, and household’s willingness 
to pay for protection and size of land holding. On the other hand, Jumbe and Angelsen (2007) found 
that the higher the rate of dependence on forest resources the higher the rates of participation, and 
that with more heterogeneous social context, more commercial forest uses and higher levels of 
forest dependence, the incentive to participate reduces. Baral (1993) also highlights that political 
ideology, ethnic composition, and cultural factors within communities could also create problem at 
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the user group level. Therefore, the level of participation and decision making should be equal for 
successful institutions otherwise if there is a significant number of free riders whose values for the 
resource conflicts the community’s values for the resource then collective action is doomed to fail 
(Hyde, 2016). On the other hand, when communities have strong attachment to the environment, 
the high level of ownership proves effective in managing resources thus surviving many challenges 
faced by other institutions (Measham and Lumbasi, 2013). 
4.2.2 Determinants of successful collective action 
In the last few decades, a number of theoretical and empirical literature pointing out the link 
between sustainable management of natural resources and successful collective action have 
emerged (Ostrom, 1990; Bardhan, 1993; Maloney et al., 1994; Baland and Platteau, 1996). These 
scholars have used various methods to identify and examine determinants of collective action. 
Some studies have been based on socio-anthropological case studies (e.g. Wade, 1988; Ostrom, 
1990; Ostrom et al., 1994). While some have employed game theory models (see Baland and 
Platteau 1996; Lise 2005). Based on a number of case studies, Wade (1988), Ostrom (1990), Baland 
and Platteau (1996), Agrawal (2001) and Gautam and Shivakoti (2005) works are some of the 
significant analysis that develop conditions necessary for successful collective action. More recent 
literature in support of these scholars include Cox (2014), Frey and Rusch (2014), Rasch et al. 
(2016a), Rasch et al. (2016b) and Behnke et al. (2016). Ostrom’s works are some of the significant 
analysis that have investigated how communities succeed or fail in managing CPRs such as forest 
and developed a framework for organizing variables identified as affecting the interaction patterns 
and observed outcomes in empirical studies of Social Ecological Systems (SESs). The framework 
analyzes how resource attributes, resource system, users of the system and system of governance 
jointly affect and are affected indirectly by resulting outcomes and interactions achieved at a 
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particular time and place (Ostrom, 2009, 2010). The framework has also been applied in other 
spheres e.g. communal livestock production (see Rasch et al. 2016a,b). 
However, studies analyzing the determinants of successful collective action are mostly based on 
intensive case studies of individual CPRs (Fujiie et al., 2005). Hyde (2016) conducted a review of 
past studies on determinants of successful collective management of natural resources. Three key 
factors were identified i.e., participants have shared value of the resource, limited incentive for free 
riding and where the cost of adding new participant to the group decision makers diminishes. Using 
a case study of 35 villages in India, Dash and Behera (2015) found a positive association between 
forest growth with a function of local management institution, distance to the forest department and 
nearest market, and caste homogeneity. Some studies have also found that better conservation 
outcomes are associated with better institutional cooperation (see Baland and Platteau 1996; 
Heltberg et al. 2000; Heltberg 2001; Alló and Loureiro 2016). According to Morrow and Hull 
(1996) and Agrawal (2001) the level of market integration can also have adverse effect on collective 
action when distant resource systems are linked with their users, other users and markets. On the 
other hand, Akamani and Hall (2015) found that community location, past connection with 
institutions, and past bonding social capital were the strongest predictors of outcome of community 
forest management. Whereas, Pagdee et al. (2006) found that successful community forest 
management is associated with effective enforcement, strong leadership, monitoring and 
experience or skill of members. 
Literature on effect of group size on collective action suggests that difficulty of collective action 
increases with group size although there is no agreement on what is large or small group size. 
According to Olson (1965), rational individuals will rarely act to achieve group or common interest 
without some form of force or coercion. This is based on the premise that as the group size 
increases, their marginal contribution will not affect the likelihood of provision of the good and 
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would therefore not make any contribution. Tang (1992), Fujiie et al. (2005) and Hyde (2016) also 
posit that collective action is hardly successful with large groups. On the other hand, Agrawal and 
Goyal (2001) takes a middle ground that compared to large or small groups, medium size groups 
are more likely to be successful by providing third party monitoring. In other works, Agrawal and 
Gibson (1999) found that the prospects for development of trust among participants are more likely 
to be affected by group size and group heterogeneity hence lowering the likelihood of success of 
collective action since it affects on divergent interests. Ostrom et al. (1993) also asserts that the size 
of regime, level of dependence on forest resources and an understanding of the resource value by 
the users are critical for successful collective action. Some of these past findings have also been 
confirmed by Tesfaye et al. (2012) who found level of dependence on the forest, heterogeneity, and 
geographical variables such as distance to town and altitude may greatly affect performance of user 
groups. 
Moreover, if institutions have higher proportion of college graduates and influential persons in 
leadership positions, the likelihood of success of collective action is higher since they have more 
influence in lobbying and also have outside connection critical for joint interaction (Meinzen-Dick 
et al., 2002). Gebremedhin et al. (2004) has also shown that compared to organizations initiated by 
government agencies, self-organized associations have higher likelihood of successful collective 
action due to the stronger sense of ownership hence higher likelihood of cooperation among 
households. Effective interactions and higher level of engagement between local communities and 
the government also increases likelihood of successful collective action (Liu and Ravenscroft, 
2016). 
Some studies such as Szell et al. (2013) have also shown that incentives increase social support for 
conservation. However, the effectiveness of incentives such as PES may be different under different 
policy scenarios and may therefore be unsustainable due to uncertainties in human response to 
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policies and dynamic human nature interactions (Chen et al., 2014). Moreover, provision of direct 
incentives may not distribute benefits equitably within communities and poor marginalized 
households may lose out hence tragedy of the commons (Ostrom, 1990; Spiteri and Nepalz, 2006). 
Harnessing participatory approaches thus requires improving on factors associated with success or 
failure of these institutions (Hutton et al., 2005). 
An overview of these literature suggests that there is still no consensus on what determines the 
success or failure of local institutions in management of CPRs and there is no universal set of 
conditions. For instance, Agrawal (2001) using Indian case studies identified 35 such criteria. 
However, identifying the determinants of successful collective action needs a move beyond pilot 
projects and case studies that have formed the basis of most studies on determinants of successful 
collective action to date. There are also considerable differences in applied definition especially 
considering the variation in variables employed and their measurement, contextual factors and 
methodological approaches hence making comparison difficult. These studies have also been more 
biased towards Asian case studies. Most of these studies also tend to incorrectly specify nature of 
collective action problems (Poteete and Ostrom, 2004) hence measurement error problems, for 
example an index of collective action is constructed to capture community involvement in 
collective action. Others have also measured forest condition using an index of respondents ranking 
of the forest condition or subjective assessment by foresters or experts and local communities 
whereas others use number of wildlife, reduction in land degradation, time to collect firewood, 
measures of wealth, investment in forest and perception of forest condition (see Heltberg et al., 
2000; Gibson et al., 2005; Hayes and Ostrom, 2005; Agrawal and Chhatre, 2006; Ostrom and 
Nagendra, 2006; Behera, 2009; Andersson and Agrawal, 2011; Coleman and Fleischman, 2012; 
Dash and Behera, 2012). This approach is rather subjective. Once communities have collectively 
organized so what? 
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The main interest is outcome of such collective action i.e. increase in forest cover that can guarantee 
efficient and sustainable provision of ecosystem services as per the government key policy goal. 
As a departure from most studies on collective action and motivated by the fact that success of 
collective action is gauged on the ecological or environmental outcomes, the study used two 
objective measures of outcome of collective action that is frequency of vandalism (number of 
vandalism cases reported in a year or forest infractions reported per year), and percentage forest 
cover per hectare under each CFA while also comparing the results with a composite index of 
collective action that has been employed in the past to assess the consistency of our estimates and 
ascertain reliability of our results. We further condition factors in terms of socio-economic, physical 
and policy environment how they affect level of participation and collective action which in turn 
affects outcome of collective action. This is based on the fact that the environment can either 
constrain or facilitate organization and also create incentive or disincentives for people to work 
together. In recognition of the roles played by various actors’ such as resource user groups and 
local authorities, this study focuses on various CFAs within the Mau forest but facing different 
social, economic and ecological environments and how they interact with various governance 
structures as it applies Ostrom’s framework for analyzing Social Ecological Systems (SESs). 
4.3 Methodology 
This section highlights the conceptual framework of the study, definitions and measurement of 
variables, the analytical framework and the estimation model. 
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4.3.1 Conceptual framework 
In this study, we employ the framework of Ostrom (2009) for analyzing Social-Ecological Systems 
(SESs), depicted in Figure 2. In the framework, eight broad variables that affect the sustainability 
of SES and ability to self-organize are identified. The framework analyses how attributes of 
resource units, the resource system, users of the system and the governance system jointly affect 
and are indirectly affected by interactions and resulting outcomes achieved at a particular time and 
place. We also make use of structural variables that may affect the likelihood of collective action 
as identified in Ostrom (2010). 
Figure 4: A Framework for Analyzing a Social-Ecological System 
Adapted from Elinor Ostrom (2009) 
Figure 4 shows the relationship among the first four level of core subsystems of a SES, which affect 
each other and the linked economic, political and social systems and related ecosystems. The four 
core subsystems consist of the resource system (specified forest reserve), resource unit (trees, plants 
and shrubs, in the forest), governance system (KFS, CFAs, county and other NGOs) and users 
(individual households or communities who use the forest). Our task is therefore to empirically 
explore which factors are important for successful collective action in forest management. The SES 
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framework is also decomposable, i.e., each of the highest tier conceptual variables in Figure 4 can 
be decomposed into several tiers depending on the research problem. A detailed exposition of the 
second-tier variables in Figure 4, as per Ostrom’s framework, is found in Ostrom (2009). From the 
literature, including the SES framework, a long list of potential determinants of successful 
collective action have been suggested by different authors (see Wade 1988; Ostrom 1990; Baland 
and Platteau 1996; Agrawal 2001; Tesfaye et al. 2012; Akamani and Hall 2015; Hyde 2016). 
However, due to sample size and insufficient variation across CFAs, we cannot include all the 
variables in the regression. We therefore concentrate on some of the key variables whose 
significance has been highlighted in most recent theoretical and empirical literature, as well as some 
intervening variables at household and community level. The second-tire variables from the SES 
framework employed in the study are presented in Table 13. The table presents the grouping of the 
variables we employed in the empirical models. 
Table 13: Second Tier variables used in the study 
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In addition to some of the variables identified in the literature, we factored in an index of 
institutional quality, capturing the level of implementation of Ostrom’s design principles 105 ; 
because the design principles are orthogonal to each other, a simple summation is sufficient to 
generate a sufficient index of institutional quality. Other indices captured are an incentive index 
capturing the number of incentives from which CFAs benefit, an index of dependence on the forest 
and an index of forest improvement, capturing the level of forest maintenance activities or 
collective action activities. Because face-to-face bargaining between communities and the regional 
or national government is important for the success of collective action, we considered factors such 
105 The design principles are namely: Clearly and well defined boundaries and membership; proportional equivalence between benefits and costs 
i.e., appropriation rules for availability of resources; collective choice arrangements i.e. those affected by the operational rules are included in the
group and can modify these rules; monitoring and enforcement mechanisms; scale of graduated sanctions i.e., those who violate rules receive
graduated sanctions; conflict resolution mechanisms; minimal recognition of rights to organize i.e., the rights of users are not challenged by external
authorities; and organization in the form of nested enterprises (?).
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the number of meetings between CFA and county/local authorities, to capture horizontal 
interaction, and number of meetings between CFA and KFS headquarters, for vertical interaction. 
4.3.2 Analytical framework 
Econometric modelling techniques are applied to investigate factors influencing households’ level 
of participation in CFA activities and the determinants of successful collective management of 
forest resources. Two estimation models are used. In the first stage, we estimate a standard logit 
model (see Wooldridge, 2010) for the level of participation (active participation=1 and 0 otherwise) 
to identify factors influencing households’ level of participation in CFA activities. We then 
compute the predicted probability of active participation and denote this by CFAPartHt, for use in 
the second stage regressions as one of the explanatory variables in identifying the determinants of 
successful collective action. 
Determinants of successful collective management of forest resources 
In the second stage, we employed multiple OLS regression models to estimate the determinants of 
successful collective action, factoring in the predicted probability of active participation in CFA 
activities (CFAPartHt). We measure success of collective action within each CFA using percentage 
forest cover and annual number of reported cases of vandalism. The study is based on the premise 
that the expected percentage forest cover and reported cases of vandalism under each CFA can be 
associated with household characteristics and CFA level characteristics (including the resource 
characteristics, system of governance, group characteristics and interactions, etc.). For the reported 
cases of vandalism, despite the count nature of the data, we used the OLS regression instead of the 
Tobit model because the Tobit model may not yield small standard errors compared to the OLS 
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model with robust standard errors. The Tobit model106 is also more vulnerable to violation of the 
assumptions of the error distribution, and, hence, may produce seriously biased coefficients 
(Madigan (2007) cited in Araral (2009)). We define the OLS regression model as 
Yj = β0 + β1CFAPartHtij + β2Xij + β3Zj + εij (13) 
where Yj is a vector of two dependent variables, namely percentage forest cover and reported cases 
of vandalism in CFA j, CFAPartHtij is the predicted probability of a household i actively 
participating in CFA j activities, Xij is a vector of household i in CFA j characteristics, Zj is a vector 
of CFA j characteristics and εijis a random disturbance term. A description of the CFA and 
household-level variables and the expected signs are as shown in Table 14. 
106 Some studies have also used the Poisson regression or the negative binomial regression in cases of count data like the reported cases of vandalism. 
We do not apply these methods because there is no serious problem of over-dispersion. 
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Table 14: Description of variables included in the econometric analysis and expected signs 
Expected signs 
variable Definition Forest 
cover 
Vandalism 
Numbhsehlds Number of households in CFA jurisdiction (Group Size) - +
CFAParticipation Dummy equal 1 if household active in CFA and 0 otherwise + -
GrpStructure Dummy equal 1 if the group structure is same as it was constituted 
and 0 otherwise 
+ -
Natives Percentage of CFA members who are locals/natives +/- +/- 
FBudget Total CFA financial budget per year + -
ECMale No of males in the executive committee or general representative 
body in the CFA 
+/- +/- 
VertInt Number of Meetings between CFA members and KFS national 
office 
+ -
HorInt Number of meetings between CFA and regional government i.e. 
county/local authority 
+ -
GradChair Dummy=1 if chair of CFA has post-secondary 
education(graduate) 0 otherwise 
+ -
Competition1 Dummy=1 if there has been competition for any position and 0 
otherwise 
+ -
SocInt Household density per hectare of the CFA jurisdiction-proxy for 
social interaction 
+ -
MaritSta Dummy =1 if household head is married and 0 otherwise 
MedAge Age of household head +/- +/- 
Education dummy =1 if household head has post primary education and 0 
otherwise 
hhsize Household size +/- +/- 
LivesVal Total value of household livestock - +
Employment Dummy =1 if household head is employed in off-farm jobs and 0 
otherwise 
Woodlots dummy=1 if household owns private woodlot and zero otherwise 
Hlandsize Household land size in acres 
LandTitle Dummy=1 If household owns land title for the land it occupies 
and 0 otherwise 
+ -
DistForest Distance in kilometres from household to the nearest edge of the 
forest 
- +
DistMroad Distance in kilometres from household to the nearest main road 
DistMarket Distance in kilometres from household to the nearest 
market/urban centre 
ResidStatus Dummy =1 if household head is a native and 0 if immigrant/settler + - 
MedIncome Household income from all sources +/- +/- 
IncentIndex Index of incentives household benefit from within CFA (ranging 
from 0 to 11) 
InstIndex Index of level of implementation of Ostrom design principles 
(ranging from 0 to 10) 
+ -
ImprIndex Index of forest improvement activities (e.g., silviculture, pruning 
etc) (0-6) 
+ +/-
DepIndex Index of level of dependence on forest resources within CFA - +
Precipitation Average annual precipitation (mm) + +/-
Temperature Annual average temperature in degrees celsius - +
Elevation1 Level of elevation in each forest (metres) - +
However, although we do not expect our data to exhibit endogeneity, we posit that the quality of 
institutions, as measured by the level of implementation of Ostrom design principles, could be 
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potentially endogenous to our two measures of success of collective action, i.e., percentage forest 
cover and reported cases of vandalism. There is some reverse causality, with the possibility that, 
the more CFAs become organized, i.e., as the index of institutional quality increases, the higher the 
forest cover and the fewer cases of vandalism; conversely, as the forest cover increases and there 
are fewer reported cases of vandalism, there is less incentive for enforcing the design principles 
due to the abundant supply of the resource. This is also supported by the theory that resource 
scarcity translates into more self-organization of institutions (Ostrom, 1990). We therefore proceed 
by first estimating an OLS model, assuming absence of endogeneity, then enrich the empirical 
analysis by employing instrumental variables estimation with heteroscedasticity-based instruments 
following Lewbel (2012) to test and address the potential endogeneity (See appendix C1 for the 
model framework). The main advantage of this approach is that it provides options for generating 
instruments and allows the identification of structural parameters in models with endogeneity or 
mis-measured regressors when we do not have external instruments. The approach is also capable 
of supplementing weak instruments. Identification is consequently achieved by having explanatory 
variables that are uncorrelated with the product of heteroscedastic errors (see Lewbel (2012)). 
For robustness checks, we used Principal Component Analysis (PCA) to construct a composite 
index of success or failure in organizing collective action. The PC score was constructed using one 
dominant collective action activity reported by CFAs: forest management/improvement activities. 
The activities under forest management/improvement involved pruning, enrichment planting, 
reseeding, weeding, silviculture activities, thinning and watering. Household participation in each 
collective action activity is recorded as one and nonparticipation as zero. The PC score was then 
employed in an OLS regression model to assess the robustness of our results for the determinants 
of successful collective management of forest resources under OLS and IV estimation models. The 
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use of the PC score also helps us determine whether there is any variation (i.e., in terms of statistical 
significance and consistency of effects in both models) when we use measures of outcome or just 
a measure of collective action, as in past studies. 
4.4 Data collection and sampling method 
The survey was conducted in two phases. First, a pilot survey was conducted in Londiani CFA of 
Kericho county to test the validity and construction of the survey instrument. The survey instrument 
was then modified based on preliminary findings. In the final survey, a two-stage sampling 
procedure was employed in data collection. In the first stage, a sample of 22 out of 35 CFAs were 
purposively identified to reflect the entire Mau forest, with the help of the head of the Mau forest 
conservancy107. The CFAs were a representation of the entire Mau forest and covering five counties 
of Bomet, Narok, Kericho, Nakuru and Uasin Gishu. They also provide variation by regions, 
especially in terms of geographical and climatic variables. It is also important to note that the CFAs 
are very different in several aspects and have different levels of performance in terms of forest 
conservation, with some having as low as 2% forest cover and the highest having 98% forest cover. 
The CFA level data were collected through focus group discussions with CFA officials and other 
members at their offices in the forest station. In the second stage, a sample of 518 households were 
identified through simple random sampling, in which every third household was interviewed, and 
snowballing was used in instances where the third household was not a CFA member108. This was 
conducted using individual household-level survey administered questionnaire to household heads. 
The CFA-level focus group provided CFA-level data such as years of existence of the CFA, gender 
107 One observation raised by a reviewer was that the head of the conservancy could have identified CFAs that performed well, hence raising issues 
about the generalizability of the results. However, we can confirm that this was not the case since we visited CFAs that were in poor condition. The 
main factor considered by the head was accessibility of these CFAs and representation of all counties in the Mau forest. The results can therefore 
be generalized for the entire Mau forest. 
108 In some instances, we interviewed CFA members at the farms in the forest or when there were collective activities such as tree planting or 
transportation of tree seedlings 
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composition of the CFA executive committee, number of households within the CFA, number of 
immigrants etc. The household-level data provided information such as household size, household 
level of participation in CFA activities (whether active or not), household head education level, 
residential status, and distance to the nearest edge of the forest, main road and market. Due to the 
nature of the terrain and inaccessibility of certain areas, coupled with negative attitudes of some 
CFA members as a result of mismanagement of CFAs by officials, the households sampled were 
unevenly distributed across the CFAs, with as few as four households sampled in some cases. 
Because of the variation in climatic and geographical conditions and the vastness in the sizes of the 
CFAs, we also collected data on annual average rainfall and temperature values for the various 
forests. This data was available from the website (http://en.climate-data.org/country/124/). Most of 
the explanatory variables were based on the decomposed second-tier variables in Table 13 from 
Ostrom (2009), Ostrom (2010) and Agrawal (2001). 
To gauge the household head’s level of participation in CFA activities, respondents were assessed 
based on the last meeting they attended109, that is, whether they were just present during decision 
making (nominal), merely attended, were present when a decision was made and were informed 
but did not speak (passive), expressed an opinion whether sought or not (active), or felt she 
influenced the decision (interactive)110. 
In this study, two measures of outcomes of collective action were used: reported cases of vandalism 
in a year and forest cover as a percentage of total forest area within each CFA. The choice of these 
measures is based on the premise that, if CFAs are well organized, with formal or informal rules of 
forest management, which are in use and properly implemented, then there should be behavior 
109 We used participation in the last meeting attended as a proxy for their participation level because it is difficult for anyone to say he did not 
actively participate. However, we cannot rule out possibility of bias, in that some members may talk more in meetings but not work very much. 
110 Households were then classified as active (i.e., active or interactive) and inactive (i.e., nominal or passive). We constructed a dummy equal to 
one for active and zero for inactive. 
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change; hence, we expect changes in forest condition and patterns of forest use. Moreover, the 
better a CFA is organized, the higher the likelihood of active participation of households in CFA 
activities, with an expected outcome of improvement in forest cover and fewer cases of vandalism. 
The reported cases of vandalism and percentage forest cover are based on secondary data available 
at the forest station, which is regularly updated by the forester at each forest station. We 
acknowledge that the rate of change in forest cover would be an ideal measure of success especially 
in the short term for new CFAs as opposed to the absolute percentage forest cover as employed in 
this study. However, due to lack of baseline information on forest cover at the start of devolution 
of forest management for most CFAs, we opted to use the absolute measure of forest cover but also 
assess the reliability and consistency of the estimates using the reported cases of vandalism per 
year. It is also important to note that, before devolution of forest management to CFAs, the Mau 
forest had been highly degraded. Therefore, the absolute percentage forest cover can still be 
attributed to the actions of forest-adjacent communities through CFAs. This implies that the 
aggregate forest cover can still provide meaningful insights on the determinants of successful 
collective action. 
4.5 Results and Discussions 
4.5.1 Descriptive statistics 
The summary statistics of variables used in the econometric models are presented in Table 15. The 
table reveals significant variation in percentage forest cover, ranging from 2% to 98%, and reported 
cases of vandalism ranging from 0 to 120 per year. About 63% of the sampled households were 
reportedly active in CFA activities. There was also significant variation in the number of 
households among the 22 CFAs sampled, ranging from 100 to 100,000 households in some CFAs. 
The reported mean number of households was estimated at about 10,081 households. 
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Table 15: Summary statistics of variables used 
variable N mean sd min max 
ForestCover 518 76.85 19.15 2 97.97 
Vandalism 518 22.63 25.57 0 120 
CFAPartici n 518 0.625 0.484 0 1 
Numbhsehlds 518 10081 19667 100 100000 
GrpStructure 518 0.492 0.500 0 1 
Natives 518 74.64 27.64 0 100 
FBudget 518 299305 404142 0 1.500e+06 
ECMale 518 6.836 3.880 2 18 
VertInt 518 2.826 2.903 0 15 
HorInt 518 4.396 6.834 0 22 
GradChair 518 0.309 0.462 0 1 
Competition1 518 0.759 0.428 0 1 
SocInt 518 13.66 52.47 0.0350 251.0 
MaritSta 518 0.863 0.344 0 1 
MedAge 518 47.43 13.60 22 85 
MedAgesq 518 2434 1460 484 7225 
hhsize 518 5.678 2.579 1 16 
Education 518 0.371 0.483 0 1 
LivesVal 518 134294 343074 0 5.600e+06 
Employment t 518 0.253 0.435 0 1 
Woodlots 518 0.847 0.360 0 1 
Hlandsize 518 2.334 5.148 0 90 
LandTitle 518 0.523 0.500 0 1 
DistForest 518 1.443 1.526 0 10 
DistMroad 518 2.034 2.789 0 20 
DistMarket 518 3.580 3.605 0 20 
ResidStatus 518 0.546 0.498 0 1 
MedIncome 518 15328 19238 2500 130000 
IncentIndex 518 7.176 1.524 4 10 
InstIndex 518 5.927 2.112 2 10 
ImprIndex 518 3.678 1.532 0 6 
DepIndex 518 16.35 2.617 9 21 
Precipitat n 518 1170 181.2 937 1735 
Temperature 518 15.04 1.726 12.20 18.20 
Elevation1 518 2473 240.4 1858 2861 
In terms of organizational structure, about 49% of the CFAs reported having had the same 
leadership structure from inception to date. The mean annual budget of CFAs is approximately 
USD 3000, with the maximum about USD 0.015 million. The summary statistics of other variables 
employed in the study are also shown. Further summary statistics of other variables within CFAs 
are presented in tables C.1 to C.7 in the appendix. 
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From table C.1 we can conclude that the main source of income for most households in the various 
CFAs is farming (61%) followed by livestock keeping (31%). However, the single most important 
and reliable source of funding for all CFAs was noted to be membership fees for all CFAs (i.e. 
100%) followed by aid from external NGOs (33%) as shown in Table C.2. The main mode of 
communication to CFA members as shown in table C.3 was also found to be through mobile phones 
(85%) followed by word of mouth (71%). In terms of resource dependence levels, Table C.4 shows 
that most CFAs significantly depend on the forest for grazing (96%), water (87%), wood fuel (72%) 
and farming (64%) hence the need for alternatives aimed at reducing forest dependence. Table C.5 
presents a summary of the various rules. The table shows that only rules regarding punishment 
(45%) and role of traditional leaders (36%) are not well instituted in most CFAs an indication of 
proper organization in most CFAs. On the other hand, we found that most CFAs participate in 
various forest improvement activities as shown in table C.6. Watering and thinning are least done 
by various CFAs. Finally, regarding incentives towards deepening community participation, 
fetching water, PELIS, Grazing, Fodder collection, Fuel wood collection and herbs collection 
dominated the list of incentives that most CFAs benefit from as depicted in table C.7. 
4.5.2 Logistic regression Results 
The logistic regression results are presented in Table 16. Finding no evidence of misspecification 
or omitted variable bias, the estimated coefficients in the logistic regression have the expected 
signs. The results show that, all factors constant, households where the head has post-primary 
education tend to have higher likelihood of actively participating in CFA activities. This is 
unexpected given that education results in out-migration and increased opportunity cost of labour 
(Godoy et al., 1997). However, this could be explained by the fact that the educated often tend to 
be informed and recognize and appreciate the value of environmental conservation. They are also 
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more likely to inform decision making in CFAs because they are the most respected and are listened 
to by community members. 
Household heads employed in off-farm jobs are less likely to be active in CFA activities. This could 
be due to availability of exit options from farm work and other informal jobs. Participation in CFA 
could also be a last resort for the unemployed because their returns on labour efforts could be lower 
(Angelsen and Wunder, 2003). These results support findings by (Fujiie et al., 2005; Bardhan, 
2000). Households owning private woodlots were found to have a significantly higher likelihood 
of being actively involved in CFA activities. The ownership of private woodlots would imply 
interest in environmental conservation activities or a search for options other than farming, say, in 
the forest, after engaging private land in developing private forests111. The results also show that a 
one-kilometre increase in distance from the nearest main road increases the likelihood of being 
actively involved in CFA activities by approximately 2.2%, holding other factors constant. In this 
case, distance measures the level of infrastructure integration; therefore, households would opt for 
being active in CFA activities to enjoy the benefits as CFA members, given that accessing other 
areas and markets could be costly; hence participation in CFA activities offers a fallback option. 
These findings also lend support to the work of Fujiie et al. (2005), who found that, when 
communities are less exposed to urban centres, there is higher incentive for cooperation and hence 
active participation. 
111 During the survey, households mentioned that tree growing offered a lot of income compared to private farming, hence some households would 
consider engaging in planting of trees on their farms for income generation and opt to be active in CFA activities to derive other benefits. e.g. PELIS. 
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Table 16: Results for logistic regression for probability of active participation in CFA activities 
(1) (2) 
VARIABLES CFAParticipation Marginal Effects 
MaritSta 0.452 0.0897 
(0.293) (0.0575) 
MedAge -0.00942 -0.00187
(0.00746) (0.00147) 
hhsize 0.0805* 0.0160* 
(0.0429) (0.00842) 
Education 0.517** 0.102** 
(0.214) (0.0417) 
EmploymentStat -0.902*** -0.179***
(0.236) (0.0444) 
Woodlots 0.847*** 0.168*** 
(0.268) (0.0513) 
Hlandsize -0.000104 -2.06e-05
(0.0195) (0.00386) 
DistForest 0.103 0.0204 
(0.0699) (0.0138) 
DistMroad 0.113** 0.0224** 
(0.0499) (0.00975) 
DistMarket -0.0815** -0.0162**
(0.0374) (0.00731) 
ResidStatus -0.390* -0.0774*
(0.210) (0.0412) 
IncentIndex 0.0527 0.0105 
(0.0681) (0.0135) 
Precipitation 0.00229*** 0.000455*** 
(0.000663) (0.000126) 
Constant -3.430***
(1.112) 
Observations 518 518 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
On the other hand, one unexpected result is that of distance to the nearest market. The results show 
that a one-kilometre increase in distance from the household to the nearest market reduces the 
likelihood of active participation in CFA activities by about 1.6%, holding other factors constant. 
This contradicts findings by Fujiie et al. (2005), who found that market access often reduces 
interdependence within a local community and thus may allow exit of some members, which might 
lower the likelihood of participation in collective action. Our findings also contradict Bardhan 
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(1993) and Ostrom and Gardner (1993), who found that anonymity among actors increases the 
closer households are to markets, which loosens up traditional ties, lessens mutual dependencies 
and lowers inter-linkages for punishment in case of violation of rules resulting in reduced prospects 
for active involvement and cooperation. However, a possible reason for this finding is that, when 
households are closer to market centres, it means they are closer to forest authorities and therefore 
more likely to be active; we were informed that foresters are normally keen to notice those who 
have been active in CFAs, for instance, during transportation of seedlings to the forest and would 
often ensure they get PELIS plots as a reward for being active. Lastly, more rainfall prospects 
increases the likelihood of households actively participating in CFA activities. This could be 
because more rainfall would mean more anticipated agricultural harvest; therefore, more members 
will tend to be active in CFA activities to access PELIS plots or derive other non-timber forest 
products such as firewood for cooking and keeping warm during the rainy season. 
4.5.3 Determinants of successful collective management of forest resources 
Empirical results for the multiple regression models are presented in Table 17. We first present the 
OLS regression estimates assuming absence of endogeneity, then present the instrumental variable 
estimation with heteroscedasticity-based instruments to address the potential endogeneity issues. 
Columns 1 and 2 present the OLS model of forest cover and reported cases of vandalism 
respectively, assuming absence of endogeneity. Columns (3) and (4) present the IV estimation with 
heteroscedasticity-based instruments to address the endogeneity concerns. The last column, 
Column (5), presents the OLS estimates for the PC score. We tested for multicollinearity for all the 
regression models and found all variables to have a variance inflation factor (VIF) below 10, with 
a mean VIF of between 5.99 and 6.63112. To correct for heteroscedasticity in the models, we 
112 Other variables such as age of CFA were dropped due to multicollinearity issues. 
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estimated the three models with clustered robust standard errors113. The IV estimates were obtained 
using the ivreg2h stata command (Baum et al., 2015). 
Table 17: OLS regression results 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES ForestCover Vandalism IVforestcover IVVandalism PCA1 
InstIndex 2.048* -0.460 1.949*** 0.984*** 0.0968*** 
(1.014) (1.364) (0.259) (0.309) (0.0264) 
FBudget 1.73e-05** -2.13e-05** 1.48e-05*** -5.09e-06* 4.26e-08 
(7.29e-06) (9.03e-06) (2.17e-06) (2.85e-06) (2.42e-07) 
MedAge -0.262** 0.370** -0.298*** 0.394*** 0.00224 
(0.113) (0.140) (0.111) (0.122) (0.00254) 
MedAgesq 0.00206** -0.00269** 0.00238** -0.00312*** -2.41e-05
(0.000937) (0.00109) (0.00105) (0.00115) (2.00e-05) 
Natives 0.000743 -0.819*** -0.0366 -0.710*** -0.00247
(0.0739) (0.115) (0.0282) (0.0458) (0.00231) 
Numbhsehlds -0.000394** 0.000222 -0.000527*** 0.000457*** -1.00e-05*
(0.000142) (0.000164) (5.66e-05) (7.32e-05) (5.29e-06) 
DepIndex -2.405*** 2.545*** -2.231*** 3.738*** -0.0157
(0.698) (0.650) (0.360) (0.268) (0.0370) 
ECMale 1.166 0.122 1.178*** 1.710*** -0.0161
(0.692) (0.961) (0.282) (0.383) (0.0228) 
CFAPart_Ht 3.559** -4.966** 3.377* -3.441* 0.139 
(1.519) (2.027) (1.796) (1.873) (0.0844) 
MedIncome -2.65e-05 -4.40e-06 -2.98e-05*** 3.26e-05** 5.98e-07 
(1.96e-05) (2.20e-05) (1.06e-05) (1.64e-05) (6.42e-07) 
GradChair -7.735 -13.73* -11.04*** 1.351 -0.462***
(4.721) (7.931) (1.711) (3.130) (0.102) 
DistForest -0.529* 0.639** -0.494*** 0.501*** -0.0108
(0.269) (0.251) (0.157) (0.183) (0.00662) 
Precipitation -0.0698*** 0.141*** -0.0599*** 0.120*** 1.92e-05 
(0.0143) (0.0288) (0.00584) (0.00760) (0.000324) 
Temperature -5.883*** 14.23*** -5.262*** 14.98*** -0.0216
(1.288) (2.633) (0.679) (0.644) (0.0346) 
Elevation1 -0.00995 0.117*** -0.00753* 0.127*** 0.000751*** 
(0.0103) (0.0165) (0.00406) (0.00424) (0.000185) 
Init_NGO 10.77 4.046 10.83*** 10.19*** 
(6.804) (11.47) (1.647) (3.572) 
Init_RegGov -14.17** 49.71*** -13.88*** 57.97*** 
(6.386) (7.353) (2.120) (2.282) 
Init_NatGov -19.53*** 14.37 -19.23*** 3.253 
(6.735) (8.992) (1.883) (2.392) 
GrpStructure 13.14** -49.36*** 11.24*** -46.92***
(5.845) (9.063) (2.119) (2.104) 
Competition1 3.327 -21.01** 4.570*** -31.33***
(4.525) (8.035) (1.317) (2.170) 
SocInt 0.206*** -0.327*** 0.176*** -0.269***
(0.0291) (0.0597) (0.0167) (0.0179) 
113 It is important to note that, because reported cases of vandalism are count data, other models such as negative binomial and Poisson regression 
could be explored. Though the results are not presented here, we found that the Poisson regression was less appropriate than the negative binomial 
regression. However, the negative binomial regression results produced results almost identical to results to the IV model with heteroscedasticity-
based instruments. Hence, we settled on the IV model with heteroscedasticity-based instruments because it addresses the endogeneity problem. 
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LandTitle 2.147** -1.875** 2.242*** -1.845***
(0.816) (0.694) (0.575) (0.682) 
ImprIndex 3.855** -24.69*** 2.133** -18.71***
(1.815) (2.604) (0.929) (1.278) 
VertInt 1.057* -1.365*** 0.0953* 
(0.592) (0.523) (0.0504) 
HorInt 0.254** -1.921*** 0.0486*** 
(0.111) (0.211) (0.0154) 
ForestCover -0.0130***
(0.00405) 
PELIS 0.526** 
(0.206) 
Constant 279.1*** -504.6*** 259.3*** -579.5*** -0.795
(50.44) (94.61) (28.19) (28.50) (1.391) 
Observations 518 518 518 518 518 
R-squared 0.895 0.907 0.897 0.923 0.830 
Clustered robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
We first tested for endogeneity using the Durbin-Wu-Hausman tests for endogeneity under the null 
hypothesis that the variables are exogenous (see Table C.9 in the appendix). The test rejects the 
null hypothesis of exogeneity at the 1% significance level for the second IV model of reported 
cases of vandalism but not the first IV model where the dependent variable is forest cover. This 
suggests that OLS estimates yield better results in model one of forest cover (Column (1)), while 
the IV method with heteroscedasticity-based instruments yield better results in the second model, 
where the dependent variable is reported cases of vandalism (Column (4)). We further carried out 
performance statistics for the IV models (see Table C.10). First, we tested for under-identification 
(i.e., whether the excluded instruments are correlated with the endogenous regressors). Based on 
the Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic, we reject the null hypothesis that the equations are under-
identified in the two IV models, at the 1% significance level. Secondly, we tested for weak 
identification because, if excluded instruments are weakly correlated with the endogenous 
regressors, then the instrument may lead to poor estimates. Using the Craig-Donald Wald F statistic, 
we reject the null hypothesis of weak identification, as shown by the large F statistic. 
Lastly, we carried out a test of over-identification using the Hansen J statistic under the null 
hypothesis that the instruments are valid (i.e., that the instruments are uncorrelated with the error 
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term and the excluded instruments are correctly excluded from the estimated equation). Based on 
this test, we reject the null hypothesis that the instruments are valid. This result raises questions 
about the validity of the IV estimates. It is important to note, however, that the Hansen J statistic 
checks the validity of the over-identifying restriction. Our results imply that the validity of over-
identifying restrictions provides limited information on the ability of the instruments to identify the 
parameter of interest. This is, however, not a finite sample limitation of the test but just one of the 
intrinsic characteristics (Parente and Silva, 2012). According to Parente and Silva (2012), the 
outcome of the test of over-identifying restriction does not rely on having a reasonable number of 
valid instruments but rather the test checks the coherence of the instrument and not the validity of 
the instrument. Therefore, we can still make inferences based on the instrumental variable estimates 
of the second IV model. Recall that the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test of endogeneity revealed that the 
OLS model for forest cover (reported in Column (1)) provides better estimates than the IV model 
for forest cover, while the IV estimates for the reported cases of vandalism (reported in Column 
(4)) were superior to the OLS model for reported cases of vandalism. Our discussion will 
henceforth be focused on the results in Columns (1) and (4) along the various subsystems in 
Ostrom’s SES framework. 
Institutional organization and governance system 
Using the level of implementation of Ostrom’s design principles to assess institutional quality or 
level of organization, our results suggest that, holding all factors constant, as the index of 
institutional quality increases from zero to ten, there is a higher likelihood of successful collective 
action, as depicted by the increase in percentage forest cover. This supports findings by most studies 
(e.g., Ostrom 1990; Baland and Platteau 1996; Heltberg et al. 2000; Heltberg 2001; Johnson and 
Nelson 2004; Gautam and Shivakoti 2005; Pagdee et al. 2006; Dash and Behera 2015). However, 
the positive association of the institutional index and reported cases of vandalism suggest 
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otherwise. This finding is hard to explain given that it is highly significant, contradicting findings 
by Alló and Loureiro (2016) and other past studies. However, according to Alló and Loureiro 
(2016), it is important to understand the social aspects of the community to explain the possible 
positive association, because some vandalism may be intentional within certain communities, 
especially where communities are not satisfied with actions of their officials. 
Consistent with theory, we found that organizations initiated by NGOs and national or regional 
governments are less likely to lead to successful collective action. Our findings suggest that CFAs 
initiated by local communities themselves tend to be successful in collective action. This also 
reveals that communities generally mistrust the government and are less to likely self-organize in 
respect to directives from government, due to fear of the government’s intentions. This finding 
could also be attributed to foresters’ rent-seeking behavior and their wanton interference in the 
affairs of CFAs. These results are consistent with findings by Gebremedhin et al. (2004) and 
(Measham and Lumbasi, 2013). 
When it comes to the composition of the CFA executive committee, the results indicate that the 
higher the percentage of male executives, the lower the likelihood of successful collective action, 
as shown by the increase in cases of vandalism. These results are consistent with Agrawal and 
Chhatre (2006), who found that having more women in power leads to better forest outcomes. We 
also considered the frequency of interaction between the CFAs and local/regional government 
(horizontal interaction) and national government offices (vertical interaction) with the CFAs and 
how this affects the success of collective action. The results show that, the greater the interaction 
between CFA members and the national or regional governments, the greater the success of 
collective action, as depicted by the reduced cases of vandalism114. This suggests that face-to-face 
114 We did not include the frequency of interaction in the two OLS models of forest cover due to multicollinearity.  
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bargaining/interaction and frequent contact with CFA members encourage communities to work 
collectively in managing and conserving the natural resources adjacent to them, apparently by 
increasing trust between forest-adjacent communities and the state. This also implies that frequent 
government and community interactions can improve the success of collective action. These results 
lend support to findings by Ostrom (2000) and Liu and Ravenscroft (2016). 
The study results suggest that financial empowerment of CFAs is an incentive for successful 
collective action, as depicted by the growth in forest cover and a decline in reported cases of 
vandalism. This is expected given that, with more funding, CFAs can offer compensation to 
incentivize some members of the community to guard the forests, or can even hire forest guards. 
From the survey, we observed that CFAs with limited financial resources faced problems of forest 
degradation. However, we also noted that some CFAs with high income generating activities, such 
as eco-tourism, experienced mismanagement of funds and hence degradation of forests by 
disgruntled members who felt the CFA officials were mismanaging their resources. This implies 
that, as much as financial resources may increase the success of collective action, it may have an 
opposite effect if not properly managed, or if there is inequitable distribution. 
In terms of the organizational structure, we asked respondents during the focus group discussion 
whether the structure of the organization was still the same as when it was first constituted, in terms 
of the officials. This was used to assess the effect of trust and group structure on the success of 
collective action. Our results show that organizations that had not changed their group structure or 
where the structure does not change regularly were more successful in collective action. That is, in 
organizations where group members trust and have faith in the group structure in terms of its 
officials, then collective action is more likely to be successful. Similarly, to assess the level of 
democracy in the group and its effect on the success of collective action, CFA members and 
officials were asked during the focus group discussions whether the positions in the CFA are 
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normally competed for in an election. The study results revealed that democracy leads to successful 
collective action. This is expected, given that communities will only have faith in working together 
if they perceive the organization to be democratic and they have a say in who leads the group; 
otherwise, they might opt to sabotage the group by participating in illegal activities. 
Household/User Characteristics 
Looking at the regression results in Columns (1) and (4), the results show that, holding all else 
constant, the higher the likelihood of active household participation in CFA activities, the greater 
the success in collective action. This is expected, given that, with active involvement in CFA 
activities, communities are more likely to work collectively towards forest conservation, leading to 
better ecological outcomes. When we look at the effect of income heterogeneity, the results indicate 
that greater income inequality is detrimental to the success of collective action, in tandem with 
findings by Agrawal and Gibson (1999), Andersson and Agrawal (2011) and Tesfaye et al. (2012). 
On the other hand, we found that, for sustainability of forest conservation, allocation of property 
rights, especially land titles or allotment letters, is critical for successful collective action115. 
As expected, the study results suggest that the success of collective action increases with people’s 
age. The relationship between forest cover and age is U shaped, while it is an inverted U shape for 
age and reported cases of vandalism. These results suggest that forest cover decreases and reported 
cases of vandalism increase up to a certain age, when forest cover begins to rise and reported cases 
of vandalism begin to decrease. This is because, as people get older, they have less physical energy 
to engage in intense economic activities such as forest clearing for farming or illegal logging 
activities. Similarly, as people get old, children move away in search of new opportunities and start 
their own households; there is less available labour but also fewer mouths to feed, and, therefore, 
115 Giving forest-adjacent communities a sense of belonging encourages them to conserve forest resources, unlike the case when they know they can 
be displaced by the government at any time. 
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less dependence on forests as a source of livelihood. These results support findings by Godoy et al. 
(1997), although differing with Thondhlana and Shackleton (2015), who argued that the old often 
have more ecological knowledge regarding maximal harvest of certain resources like medicinal 
plants and wild game. 
The study also examined how group size affects the success of collective action, using number of 
households within the CFA jurisdiction. Our results suggest that the higher the number of 
households within the CFA, the lower the success of collective action, as indicated by the increased 
cases of vandalism. This can be due to the fact that the marginal private gains to an individual are 
more than the marginal social cost of defection of an individual. More households also mean greater 
demand and competition for forest products. The study findings are in accord with expectations in 
group theory (Olson, 1965; Tang, 1992; Bardhan, 1993; Fujiie et al., 2005; Hyde, 2016) but 
contradicts findings by Agrawal and Goyal (2001) and Meinzen-Dick et al. (2002), who argued 
that, as the group size increases, the transaction costs of organizing within a group may also 
increase; however, the payoff in terms of lower transaction costs between government and groups 
also increases as the size increases. On the other hand, using density of household population as a 
proxy for intensity of social interaction, our findings revealed that the higher the household density, 
the higher the incentive for successful community wide-collective action, as shown by the positive 
effect on forest cover and reduced cases of vandalism as expected. This is because, where people 
live closely in a common neighborhood or social circles, enforcing rules is much easier and there 
is a lower marginal cost of coming together in collective action. These results are in tandem with 
findings by Fujiie et al. (2005) and Akamani and Hall (2015). 
Our results also revealed that CFAs with a higher proportion of natives tend to be more successful 
in collective action, as revealed by the decline in reported cases of vandalism. This can be explained 
by the fact that immigrants may be driven by the motive of extracting forest resources for their 
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short-term gains rather than conserving the forest, because they have their own homes to go back 
to, in the event the resource gets depleted. In general, there is a good deal of ethnic tension between 
natives and immigrants within the Mau forest116. 
Resource Characteristics 
Using distance from the household in kilometres to the nearest edge of the forest to proxy for 
resource scarcity, the results suggest that the farther a household is from the nearest edge of the 
forest, the lower the success of collective action, as depicted by the decrease in forest cover and 
increased cases of vandalism. These results are as expected, given that the farther households are 
from the forest, the higher the opportunity costs of participating in CFA activities, hence the lower 
likelihood of successful collective action. It is also difficult to monitor forests when households are 
far away from the forest, hence the increased cases of reported vandalism. 
In the PCA model, we included forest cover to capture forest condition and existence of PELIS 
within a CFA to capture the effect of incentives on collective action117. The results suggest that 
greater forest cover reduces the likelihood of successful collective action. This is as expected 
because, when the forest cover or condition is good, there is an abundant supply of forest ecosystem 
services and hence no incentive for communities to self-organize and conserve the forest. 
Moreover, when the forest cover is good, people may consider returns from such collective action 
activities as low. On the other hand, if the forest condition is bad, there is more incentive to self-
organize and restore the degraded forest due to resource scarcity. Similarly, the existence of 
incentives such as PELIS increases the ability of CFAs to self-organize, supporting findings by 
Szell et al. (2013). 
116 We opted to use data on the proportion of immigrants because we could not get data on in and out migration at CFA level. 117Other variables 
such as competition, social interaction, group structure, improvement index and initiation of the CFA were dropped from the model due to 
multicollinearity 
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Interaction of the resource with the users 
To study the interaction of the resource with forest users, we constructed an additive improvement 
index ranging from zero to seven to measure the level of improvement activities undertaken by 
CFAs; this could also measure cooperation in CFA activities. The study results show that, as the 
level of forest improvement activities increases from zero to seven, there is significant increase in 
forest cover as well as significant decrease in reported cases of vandalism. This means that the more 
locals carry out forest improvement activities, such as pruning, the greater the success of collective 
action, as depicted by both improvement in forest cover and reduced cases of vandalism. This is 
attributed to the fact that forest improvement activities increase forest growth and that locals also 
monitor the forest during such activities, thereby reducing cases of vandalism. 
To assess the effect of the salience of the resource, we constructed an index of resource dependence, 
where the index was coded from 0 to 3 with the score ranging from 9 (low dependence) to 21 (very 
high dependence). Although studies such as Dietz et al. (2003) and Wade (1988) found that the 
level of dependence on a resource is key in facilitating the success of collective action, our results 
contradict these studies. We found that the higher the level of dependence on the resource for 
livelihood by forest-adjacent communities, the lower the success of collective action, indicated by 
the decreased forest cover and increased vandalism. The negative effect on forest cover and positive 
effect on reported cases of vandalism can be partly attributed to over-reliance on common pool 
resources by forest-adjacent communities’ due to lack of alternative sources of livelihood. 
Climate and Geographic Variables 
In terms of climate and geographic variables, the results suggest that an increase in precipitation 
leads to a decline in forest cover and increased reported cases of vandalism. This suggests that an 
increase in precipitation reduces the likelihood of successful collective action hence the negative 
effect on forest conservation and positive influence on reported cases of vandalism. Although we 
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expected precipitation to have a positive effect on forest cover. The unexpected results may be 
attributed to the fact that when it is rainy people tend to over exploit or take advantage to engage 
illegal activities such as illegal logging or cutting trees for cooking and keeping warm taking 
advantage of limited security during rainy seasons as depicted by the increased cases of vandalism. 
This can also be explained by increased demand for charcoal during rainy season. On the other 
hand, during period of high rainfall people may tend to engage in their private farms given that the 
opportunity cost of participating in CFA activities may be higher and therefore less monitoring 
activities. Similarly, the results show that an increase in temperature leads to a decline in forest 
cover but increase in reported cases of vandalism per year. This show that higher temperature 
lowers success of collective action hence the negative impact. This can be attributed to the fact that 
during hot or dry seasons, cases of wildfires are rampant and higher temperatures also lowers the 
productivity of members of communities thus very few may be active in collective activities. As 
expected, the results suggest that the higher the altitude/elevation, the lower the forest cover and 
the higher the reported cases of vandalism implying that the success of collective action reduces 
with the increase in altitude in tandem with findings of Tesfaye et al. (2012) but contradicting 
findings by Agrawal and Chhatre (2006). This can be attributed to the inaccessibility of certain 
sections of the forest hence illegal activities are more likely. 
4.5.4 Robustness Checks 
For robustness checks, we considered use of PCA to construct an index of collective action 
(considering collective action activities under forest management and improvement) to assess how 
our results would vary when we use a measure of collective action as opposed to the outcome of 
collective action. Because the seven types of collective action activities under forest management 
and improvement may be orthogonal to each other, we used PCA instead of an additive index 
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because it produces a more effective measure (Darnell et al., 1994). Further, the Kaiser-Meyer-
Olkin (KMO)117 measure of sampling adequacy revealed that about five out of the seven variables 
had a KMO measure above 0.5, with an overall KMO of 0.49, which justifies the use of PCA. For 
each collective action activity, households’ participation in a given CFA is recorded as one and 
non-participation as zero. In our sample of 22 CFAs, 75%, 87%, 78%, 81%, 72%, 33% and 29% 
of them successfully organized collective pruning, enrichment planting, reseeding, weeding, 
silviculture operations, thinning and watering, respectively. 
The PCA results revealed that the first of three components that had eigen values more than one 
dominates in terms of eigen values and proportion of variation; see Table C.8. Moreover, the first 
component also makes more sense economically because none of the coefficients is negative, 
unlike the other components. The first component vector contains positive weights for all collective 
action variables, which is evidence of aggregate variation as a result of varying degrees of 
cooperation (Fujiie et al., 2005). However, this approach does not guarantee that the first 
component gives the index of cooperation but just that it is consistent with economic theory (Fujiie 
et al., 2005). Following Fujiie et al. (2005), we used the first component as a measure of successful 
collective action. We classified CFAs with PC scores greater than zero as successful and those with 
scores less than zero as unsuccessful. We then conducted an OLS regression using the constructed 
measure of successful collective action using the PC score118. The results are presented in Column 
(5) of Table 17. The results do not depict much difference in terms of signs (except for the few
insignificant variables) when we compare with our results using the measures of outcome of 
collective action. 
117 The KMO measure tests for sampling adequacy for each variable in the model and for the complete model. 
118 We used Linear Probability Model (LPM) with robust standard errors rather than a logit or probit model on the dummy variable for success of 
collective action. Due to unboundedness of the predicted probabilities that may lead to inconsistent and biased estimates, we followed the approach 
of Horrace and Oaxaca (2006) by estimating and assessing the predicted probabilities outside the unit interval. We found that the predicted 
probabilities outside the unit interval were less than 30%, hence the LPM would still provide reliable estimates in this case. 
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4.5 Conclusion and Policy Recommendations 
In this study, we have attempted to analyze factors influencing households’ level of participation 
in CFA activities and the determinants of success of collective action in community forest 
management, as well as the link between households’ participation levels and the success of 
collective action. Using the SES framework for analyzing complex ecological systems, several 
conclusions can be made about factors influencing households’ participation levels in community 
forest management. The empirical results suggest that employment status, educational level, 
ownership of private woodlots, precipitation, and distance to nearest main road and nearest market 
influence the household level of participation in community forestry, lending support to the works 
of (Malla, 1997; Adhikari, 2004; Agrawal and Gupta, 2005; Maskey et al., 2006; Coulibaly-Lingani 
et al., 2011). These factors therefore need adequate consideration in devolving forest management 
to local communities in the Mau forest. 
The study further revealed that, for the success of collective action, other than just handing over 
management of CPR resources to communities, it is important to consider factors such as the 
average age of household heads, distance of households from the nearest edge of the forest, the 
institutional quality (i.e., level of institutional organization in terms of implementation of Ostrom’s 
design principles), salience of the resource (level of dependence on the resource), number of 
households within a CFA jurisdiction (group size), proportion of males on the executive committee, 
level of interaction with the various government departments in terms of frequency of meetings, 
intensity of social interaction, structure of the group and whether officials are selected 
competitively/democratically. In terms of the link, we found that the higher the probability of 
households actively participating in CFA activities, the higher the likelihood of success in 
collective action activities. The results also suggest that CFAs are more likely to be successful in 
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collective action if they are initiated by the communities themselves, with frequent interactions 
with government departments. Our PCA results also revealed that, in addition to the factors 
identified earlier, communities are more likely to self-organize in the presence of incentives such 
as PELIS and when the forest cover is low or when there is scarcity in the supply of forest 
ecosystem services. One evident point is the significantly large effect of institutional quality 
variables on measures of outcome of collective action. This shows that the principle of collective 
action within the Mau is key for better ecological outcomes. We also noted that, whether we use 
the outcome of collective action or just a measure of collective action activity or cooperation, we 
would still arrive at very similar conclusions. 
A number of policy recommendations can be made from the study. First, although devolution of 
forest management has the potential to increase efficiency and equity, it may not be an end in itself 
in terms of achieving sustainability of CFAs as well as conservation of forests. Foresters therefore 
need to understand the needs of households under their CFAs to effectively promote the objectives 
of PFM. A more robust diagnostic approach in devolution of forest management to local 
communities, considering diverse socio-economic and ecological settings, is therefore necessary. 
Secondly, there is a need to revive and re-institutionalize existing CFAs in an effort to promote 
PFM within the Mau forest and other parts of the country. Policy makers also need to promote PFM 
in areas where, despite low forest cover, communities have been reluctant to adopt the approach 
and explore other incentives and alternatives that can reduce over-reliance on forest resources. 
Thirdly, intense efforts should be geared towards design of a mix of incentive schemes to encourage 
active and equal household participation in CFA activities. In addition, public-private partnerships 
could also play a role in strengthening and nurturing existing and infant CFAs and creating 
awareness among locals. Lastly, to incentivize communities, the government should explore ways 
of allocating land rights to forest-adjacent communities. In addition, KFS should consider 
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increasing the proportion of collected revenues that goes to CFAs and forest user groups to support 
the local communities and CFAs financially as they find a way of handling wayward foresters 
through constant interaction with community members. 
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Chapter Five 
5.1 General Conclusion 
The main objective of devolution of forest management to forest adjacent communities has been to 
sustainably manage forest resources through increasing community participation in forest 
management, improving welfare of locals and addressing market, institutional and policy failures 
associated with ill-defined property rights, externalities and market imperfections. Literature also 
supports the claim that in terms of efficiency and equity, common property rights seems more 
superior. Efficiency increases due to the fact that more local input result in well targeted policies 
and lower transaction costs especially to the government. However, the equity and democratic 
benefits accrue mostly to the local communities. Agrawal and Ostrom (2001); Larson and Ribot 
(2004); Sikor (2006); Bluffstone et al. (2008) are some of the recent literature on co-management 
of forests between the state and forest adjacent communities that has been seen as effective policy 
instruments in conservation of forests. However, empirical works supporting the theoretical 
predictions are quite scant and inconclusive due to the varying socio-economic and ecological 
contexts and the methodological approaches. It is this scant literature that motivated our study to 
contribute to the academic and policy debates on this matter. Specifically, using advanced 
econometric techniques, we sought to: first, determine the economic values of forest ecosystem 
services to local indigenous communities in Kenya and assessed their implication for design of 
incentive schemes such as PES and on PFM; second, evaluate the welfare and environmental 
impact of incentive based conservation focusing on one unique incentive scheme known as the 
PELIS; and lastly, identify the determinants of successful collective management of forests in 
Kenya. The findings from the study broadens and deepens conclusions from past studies and 
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informs both academic and policy debates on community forest conservation and management 
policy in developing countries. 
This thesis contributes to the body of knowledge in the following aspects. First, we contribute to 
the Choice experiment literature using the Bayesian efficient design from a developing country 
perspective, our analysis also helps identify peasant farmers’ preferences for various salient forest 
ecosystem attributes that can help design widely accepted conservation programs through PFM and 
also inform the design of PES schemes to incentivize forest adjacent communities. We also extend 
this literature through application of state of the art discrete choice econometric models to test for 
preference heterogeneity and sources of these heterogeneity. 
Second, the thesis contributes to the rigorous literature on impact evaluation of government policies 
and programs by specifically looking at one unique incentive scheme known as PELIS. Most 
literature on impact evaluation assume constant treatment effect across the population. To identify 
the true welfare impact, it is important to assess the heterogeneous impact of the scheme on 
household welfare. This also assists in assessing the sustainability of the scheme in terms of forest 
conservation. We therefore contribute to this literature by employing a mix of PSM and 
instrumental variable method specifically the endogenous QTE model to identify the heterogeneous 
impact of the program as we address selection issues and potential endogeneity. This empirical 
approach therefore extends previous literature by identifying the correct program impact for policy 
and academic debates especially on how incentives can sustainably promote livelihoods of forest 
adjacent communities while simultaneously conserving the forests. The main interest of policy 
makers would be on the scheme’s equity and whether the program can help the poor rise up the 
income ladder. Identifying the heterogeneous impact of the scheme on household welfare, would 
thus supply policy makers with the requisite information for policy formulation specifically with 
the design, implementation and roll out of incentives like PELIS to other CFAs. 
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Lastly, the empirical results contribute to the debate on whether devolution of forest management 
can be taken as blue print for successful collective management of forest resources under different 
socio-economic, cultural and ecological settings through empirical validation of the theoretical 
views in the commons literature. We also extend this literature empirically by identifying context 
specific factors that incentivize households to actively participate in collective management of 
forest resources. Policy makers also need to understand the contextual factors influencing 
successful collective management for design and implementation of PFM. 
A number of findings emerged from the research. Results from chapter two revealed that the 
average respondent has high WTP for improvement in forest structure, flood risk reduction and 
high water quality and quantity but would experience a loss in welfare for choosing an intervention 
with medium wildlife population. The results thus show that there is much appreciation by the 
average respondent for the role of forest ecosystem services and that forest-adjacent communities 
are more pro conservation mainly motivated by the direct and few indirect benefits they derive 
from these forest ecosystems. These results also point to the context specific variations in terms of 
values and preferences for ecosystem services within developed and developing countries. A 
significant finding from the study was the high WTP values for reduction in flood risk, thus 
revealing the altruistic nature of forest adjacent communities that they are not only concerned with 
direct use values but also non-use values for the welfare of other members of the society. This 
aspect of the society thus motivates the design of incentive schemes such as PES. We also found 
considerable preference heterogeneity which to a large extent was determined by employment 
status of household head, ownership of PELIS plot, household size, and distance to the nearest edge 
of the forest. In terms of welfare, respondents revealed that forest conservation policy and a 
combination of flood mitigation and forest conservation policy would have high welfare impacts 
on livelihoods of locals. A number of policy recommendations can be highlighted from the 
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valuation exercise. First, the WTP estimates lays foundation for the design of market based 
instrument such as PES which can significantly incentivize communities and enhance the roll out, 
design and implementation of PFM. However, more research on the demand and supply side is 
needed as well as consideration of issues as to what private partners may consider worth involving 
in PES schemes. Bundling different ecosystem services together may also help in diminishing 
transaction costs. A cost benefit analysis and assessment of political climate in cases where 
communities have strong attachment to their forests either for cultural values or other ecosystem 
services may also be important in designing the PES schemes. 
In addition, a demonstration of the value of ecosystem services as input in the production process 
can play a role in increasing environmental awareness and motivating forest adjacent communities 
to conserve forest resources through PFM. This can also encourage shifts from socially 
unacceptable land management activities towards ecosystem oriented approaches. Lastly, policy 
makers need to focus on policy options with higher mean welfare impacts to increase community 
involvement in forest conservation. A comparison of the different marginal willingness to pay for 
the various forest ecosystem attributes may also contribute to the understanding of the relative 
importance that respondents hold for them as well as the computation of TEV of the forest reserve. 
In effect, the study provides policy makers with reliable input for maximizing social welfare which 
has always been shown to be determined by non-market forest externalities. The study also presents 
recommendation to policy makers and business communities at the national, international, regional 
and local levels on how to take proper account of the value of ecosystem services in decision 
making. It is thus evident that communities consider the forest of significant values hence the need 
to consider more roll out of PFM to forest adjacent communities that have been hesitant to self-
organize into CFAs. 
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In the third chapter, we found that on average PELIS meets the dual objective of improving 
household welfare and improving forest cover. However, the QTE model under endogenous 
assumption, revealed that the scheme had positive impact on household welfare from the fourth 
quantile households and above only. We can therefore, infer that there is some distributional 
inequity on the impact of the scheme that needs to be addressed for the sustainability and success 
of the scheme and for it to be able to make low income household rise up the income ladder and 
lead to improvement in forest cover at the same time. We also found that the scheme is less pro 
poor since the scheme raises welfare of the least poor as well even though the poorest and 
marginalized sections of the community are left out. The results show that on average PELIS leads 
to improvement in forest cover and generates income thereby reducing poverty for the rural poor 
who have always been thought to be the most dependent and agents of environmental degradation. 
Its sustainability is however compromised by the distributional inequity. The determinants of 
households’ level of participation that are essential for consideration in allocation of PELIS plots 
to forest-adjacent communities were also identified. 
In terms of policy implications, there is need for a balanced and all-inclusive approach (involving 
the participation of all members regardless of economic status) to forest management to ensure 
equitable distribution of PELIS plots and other incentives across the income groups. Attention to 
equity in resource management and access should therefore be given prime consideration 
particularly with respect to forest resources and existing incentives to avoid further marginalization 
of any income group. The design and implementation of the scheme with much emphasis on 
method of plots distribution should also be given due consideration if it is not to discriminate the 
very group that it is meant to benefit and to ensure sustainability of the scheme. Failure to address 
the equity concerns could lead to increased degradation and worsened welfare outcome for lowest 
income groups with the rising population since the short-term gains from illegal logging may not 
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be sustainable following a decline in forest cover and reduced soil fertility119. Secondly, there is 
need to explore ways of training forest adjacent communities on modern farming techniques and 
product diversification and improving market opportunities and linkages for various non-timber 
harvests from the PELIS farms by households either through formation of forest user cooperatives 
or partnership with other relevant organizations. 
Finally, in the fourth chapter, factors affecting households level of participation in community 
forest management as well as the determinants of successful collective management of forest 
resources are identified. We found that for the success of collective action, other than just handing 
over management of CPR resources to communities, it is important to consider factors such as; age 
of household heads, distance an household is from the nearest edge of the forest, the level of 
institutional organization in terms of implementation of Ostrom design principles, salience of the 
resource (level of dependence on the resource), level of interaction with the various government 
departments in terms of frequency of meetings, among other factor. In terms of the link we found 
that, the higher the probability of a household actively participating in CFA activities the higher 
the likelihood of successful collective action. The results also revealed that CFAs are more likely 
to be successful in collective action if they are initiated by the communities themselves with 
frequent interaction with government departments. The PCA results also confirmed that in addition 
to the identified factors, communities are more likely to self-organize hence in effect successful in 
collective action in presence of incentives such as PELIS and when the forest cover is low or when 
there is scarcity in supply of forest ecosystem services. Our findings therefore, show how the 
contribution of these factors to the success of collective action significantly vary with and within 
country context. Overall, we found that better welfare and ecological outcomes are realized not 
119 This is mainly attributed to the fact that poorest sections of the community are often attracted by short term gains than the long-term costs which 
the key concern of policy makers. 
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only through incentives but also as a result of higher levels of organization, cooperation and 
participation among communities. 
A number of policy implications can be drawn from these results. First, foresters within the various 
CFAs need to understand the households needs under their CFAs to effectively promote the 
objectives of PFM. A more robust diagnostic approach in devolution of forest management to local 
communities considering diverse socio-economic and ecological settings is therefore necessary. 
Second, there is need for revival and re-institutionalizing existing CFAs in an effort to promote 
PFM within the Mau forest and other parts of the country. Policy makers also need to promote PFM 
in areas where communities have been reluctant to adopt the approach. Third, intense efforts should 
be geared towards design of a mix of incentive schemes to encourage active household participation 
in CFA activities. It is important to note however, that participation is broad based and 
achievements of objectives of PFM may be a challenge equal participation is therefore necessary. 
In addition, public private partnership through NGOs could also play a role in strengthening and 
nurturing existing and upcoming CFAs and creating awareness among locals. Finally, to reduce 
pressure on forest resources, there is need to explore alternative sources of income and employment 
opportunities for local communities. 
The study findings reveal that collective action can be successful under careful policy design and 
targeted interventions and incentives schemes based on context specific understanding of 
household and community level profiles and preferences. Incorporation of local community values 
and preferences for various forest ecosystem services could also enhance participation and 
ownership hence increasing sustainability of devolution efforts. Overall the study provide support 
to further PFM as alternative policy instrument to improve forest-adjacent communities’ welfare 
and conserve the forests as well. The welfare gains can be maximized with well-designed programs 
that take into account attributes that communities value most and accounting for preference 
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heterogeneity in program implementation. Our study also show that PFM should not be 
implemented as a one size fits all approach given the contextual variation. The study therefore 
provides an entry point for understanding how to build capacity of rural poor towards poverty 
reduction and environmental conservation. Given the positive impact of incentive schemes such as 
PELIS, forest adjacent communities can therefore be positively influenced through incentives such 
as PES and PELIS to accept and participate in PFM related activities. 
The study suggest that future research should focus on; first, valuation of forest ecosystem services 
from the demand and supply side to inform the design of efficient and effective PES schemes. 
Second, we focused on the impact of PELIS on household welfare, however, considering that farm 
produce like potatoes, peas among others are sold to traders and consumers in other areas, within a 
given CFA, county or to other counties or CFAs, there may be other indirect impacts e.g. health 
wise in terms of nutritional supplies and spillover effects not specific to CFA members only. 
Further, we suggest an evaluation of whether duration of household participation in PELIS may 
have varying welfare impact across households. Due to the cross-sectional nature of the data, 
controlling for other political economy factors like election years was not possible hence panel data 
may be more appropriate for impact assessment. In addition, an exploration of the impact of other 
incentives that can be more pro poor could help in designing a mix of incentives with high impact. 
Lastly due to the variation in values, preferences ecological and socio-economic profiles within the 
country, a comparative analysis would provide a better understanding of the determinants of 
successful collective management of forest resources. 
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Appendix A: Appendix for Chapter Two 
Table A. 1: Summary statistics of the respondents 
Variable N mean sd 
Waterforest: dummy=1 if household collect water from the forest and 0otherwise 321 0.732 0.443 
MedIncome: Household monthly income 321 13492 10660 
Fetch Firewood: Dummy=1 if respondent fetch firewood from forest, 0 otherwise 321 0.776 0.224 
ForestValue: Dummy =1 if respondent consider forest as of value, 0 otherwise 321 1 0 
DistForest:: Distance from household to the nearest edge of the forest in km 321 1.445 1.408 
hhsize: Number of people in the household including household head 321 5.994 2.541 
MaritSta: Dummy=1 if married, 0 not married 321 0.882 0.323 
Education:Dummy=1 if household head has post primary education 0 otherwise 321 0.361 0.480 
Employment: Dummy=1 if employed in off farm, 0 if self employed i.e. farming 321 0.293 0.455 
PELIS: Dummy=1 if household owns a PELIS plot and 0 otherwise 321 0.607 0.488 
HHWealth: Total value of household asserts 321 1.160e+06 1.346e+06 
Table A. 2: Welfare change from hypothetical future scenarios 
Attributes 
Hypothetical future scenarios 
Forest conservation 
policy 
Flood mitigation and 
Forest conservation 
policy 
Water conservation 
and 
Flood mitigation 
policy 
Water conservation and 
Forest conservation 
policy 
Water conservation and 
Wildlife conservation 
policy 
Wildlife SQ SQ Medium Medium Medium 
Forest 
structure 
High High Medium High Medium 
Water High SQ High High High 
Flood risk Medium Low Low Medium Medium 
Welfare 
change 
Ksh. 10419 
(USD104.19) 
Ksh.10379 
(USD(103.79) 
Ksh. 
7321(USD73.21) 
ksh.9818 (USD98.18) ksh. 6542(USD(65.42) 
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Appendix B: Appendix for Chapter Three 
Table B. 1: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable PELIS Beneficiaries Non PELIS Beneficiaries Mean Difference 
mean s.e mean s.e Mean s.e
PCMonthlyExp 2404.52*** (128.42) 1905.33*** (75.14) 499.19** (159.82) 
Forestcover 79.72*** (0.95) 75.73*** (1.41) 3.99*** (1.72) 
HHWealth 1.256e+06 (135333) 1.283e+06 (98298) 27294.18 (176098) 
HHsex 0.767*** (0.028) 0.798*** (0.030) -0.031 (0.042) 
Numbchild 5.171*** (0.181) 4.472*** (0.196) 0.699** (0.268) 
BornVil 0.531*** (0.033) 0.655*** (0.036) -0.125** (0.049) 
MedAge 49.285*** (0.841) 46.67*** (1.112) 2.611* (1.369) 
hhsize 6.109*** (0.181) 5.399*** (0.184) 0.711*** (0.261) 
MaritSta 0.895*** (0.020) 0.837*** (0.028) 0.058* (0.034) 
Education 0.351*** (0.032) 0.371*** (0.036) -0.019 (0.048) 
ResidStatus 0.570*** (0.033) 0.578*** (0.037) 0.008 (0.050) 
Hsepartic 0.907*** (0.019) 0.899*** (0.023) 0.009 (0.030) 
Multilingual 0.491*** (0.033) 0.438*** (0.037) 0.053 (0.050) 
Employment Status 0.167*** (0.025) 0.337*** (0.035) -0.170*** (0.042) 
LandTitle 0.513*** (0.033) 0.533*** (0.037) -0.021 (0.050) 
MedIncome 17862*** (1721.409) 13132*** (681.868) 4729.798** (2039.709) 
HHEducyrs 8.328*** (0.235) 8.500*** (0.281) -0.171 (0.364) 
Woodlots 0.912*** (0.019) 0.770*** (0.032) 0.143*** (0.035) 
CFAParticipation 0.697*** (0.030) 0.528*** (0.038) 0.169*** (0.048) 
Hownership 0.917*** (0.018) 0.888*** (0.024) 0.029 (0.030) 
DistMroad 2.485*** (0.198) 1.211*** (0.155) 1.274*** (0.262) 
DistMarket 3.885*** (0.232) 2.707*** (0.261) 1.177*** (0.349) 
DistForest 1.406*** (0.093) 1.578*** (0.117) -0.173 (0.148) 
Hlandsize 2.473*** (0.465) 2.578*** (0.245) -0.104 (0.569) 
Membership 0.0702*** (0.017) 0.0674*** (0.019) 0.003 (0.025) 
Temperature 15.51*** (0.114) 14.46*** (0.125) 1.044*** (0.170) 
Precipitation 1197*** (12.134) 1122*** (12.792) 74.437*** (17.787) 
Elevation 2401*** (16.875) 2498*** (14.233) -97.059*** (22.869) 
Table of mean differences and test of significance. Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table B. 2: Performance of Matching estimator 
Household Level CFA level 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Matching estimator Bal test* Ps R2 LR chi2 P>ch2 Matched n Bal test* Ps R2 LR chi2 P>ch2 Matched n 
NN (4) 11 0.048 24.44 0.041 362 11 0.055 10.50 0.653 207 
NN (5) 11 0.047 24.08 0.045 362 12 0.047 9.07 0.768 207 
Radius (=0.0025) 14 0.033 9.89 0.770 284 13 0.073 6.26 0.936 169 
Radius (=0.005) 11 0.046 19.46 0.148 331 13 0.036 5.07 0.974 189 
* covariates with insignificant mean difference between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries after matching
Table B. 3: Sensitivity Analysis of Matching Estimates 
PCMonthlyExp Forest Cover 
Gamma sig+ sig- sig+ sig- 
1 0.00141 0.00141 0.0956 0.0956 
1.100 0.00759 0.000191 0.167 0.0493 
1.200 0.0273 2.30e-05 0.256 0.0244 
1.300 0.0720 2.50e-06 0.356 0.0117 
1.400 0.150 2.50e-07 0.457 0.00549 
1.500 0.261 2.40e-08 0.554 0.00252 
1.600 0.393 2.20e-09 0.643 0.00114 
1.700 0.529 1.90e-10 0.719 0.000506 
1.800 0.655 0 0.784 0.000223 
1.900 0.761 0 0.836 9.70e-05 
2 0.842 0 0.877 4.20e-05 
*gamma: Log odds of differential assignment due to unobserved factors
sig+ : Upper bound significance level
sig-: Lower bound significance level
Table B. 4: Per Capita Monthly Expenditure across the quantiles 
Quantile Mean PCMonthly Exp No of Households 
1st Quantile 695.19 46 
2nd Quantile 1111.58 47 
3rd Quantile 1370.93 43 
4th Quantile 1596.29 45 
5th Quantile 1847.10 45 
6th Quantile 2082.26 45 
7th Quantile 2375.71 45 
8th Quantile 3019.14 46 
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9th Quantile 5673.27 44 
All households 2185 406 
Figure B. 1: Kernel density before and after matching 
Table B. 5: Distribution of adopters and non-adopters of PELIS by CFAs 
No CFA No PELIS PELIS Total 
1 Bahati 1 26 27 
2 Dondori 9 12 21 
3 Menengai 4 0 4 
4 Koibatek 0 24 24 
5 Molo 3 9 12 
6 Sorget 10 9 19 
7 Longman 3 9 12 
8 Likia 56 0 56 
9 Tendeno 1 13 14 
10 Kerisoi 3 13 16 
11 Baraget 5 0 5 
12 Saino 1 12 13 
13 Sururu 25 0 25 
14 Esageri 0 24 24 
15 Malagat 0 16 16 
16 Kericho 6 15 21 
17 Makutano 1 24 25 
18 Kiptunga 7 11 18 
19 Nyangores 10 0 10 
20 Nairotia 20 0 20 
21 Olenguruone 10 0 10 
22 Chepalungu 3 11 14 
Total 178 228 406 
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Table B. 6: Heteroscedasticity Based Instrumental Variable Estimation Results 
(1) (2) 
VARIABLES PCMonthlyExp Forestcover 
PELIS 1,270** 4.229** 
(635.6) (2.051) 
HHsex -184.0 0.439 
(191.7) (1.366) 
EmploymentStat -236.4 -0.261
(185.9) (1.427) 
LandTitle 285.3** 0.767 
(139.8) (1.135) 
Woodlots -162.4 0.225 
(247.1) (1.644) 
ResidStatus -260.1 -0.0392
(233.8) (2.297) 
CFAParticipation 151.9 2.244* 
(155.6) (1.253) 
Hsepartic -522.2* 4.153*** 
(302.2) (1.504) 
DistForest -98.40** -0.981***
(44.75) (0.349) 
DistMroad 43.32 -0.126
(42.18) (0.305) 
DistMarket 13.10 0.699*** 
(25.45) (0.238) 
HHEducyrs 85.65*** -0.0167
(23.36) (0.165) 
Hlandsize 4.909 -0.208**
(19.86) (0.0953) 
hhsize -292.4*** 0.0641 
(36.34) (0.269) 
HHWealth 0.000127 6.00e-07 
(9.53e-05) (4.43e-07) 
Numbchild 41.08 0.246 
(38.94) (0.295) 
MedAge 4.254 -0.481**
(41.05) (0.239) 
MedAgesq -0.0577 0.00374* 
(0.351) (0.00207) 
MedIncome 0.0126* 1.64e-05 
(0.00745) (1.95e-05) 
Temperature -191.3*** -3.827***
(58.40) (0.463) 
BornVil 58.28 -5.203**
(263.5) (2.286) 
Precipitation 0.0920 -0.0748***
(0.427) (0.00665) 
Membership 175.3 0.637 
(315.4) (1.683) 
Other Controls 
Institutional variables 
No Yes 
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Constant 5,279*** 212.7*** 
(1,322) (13.60) 
Observations 404 404 
R-squared 0.351 0.721 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table B. 7: Re-estimated Endogenous Quantile Treatment Effects Model Estimation Results 
VARIABLES QT_1 QT_2 QT_3 QT_4 QT_5 QT_6 QT_7 QT_8 QT_9 
PELIS 162.1 370.8 482.7 655.2 624.1 803.3* 1,064* 1,219*** 2,170*** 
(170.5) (477.9) (436.2) (441.7) (410.8) (483.1) (578.5) (384.4) (671.7) 
DistForest -135.4*** -53.25 -64.62 -118.1 -136.4* -152.2 -191.5* -339.3*** -469.3***
(27.08) (92.87) (77.47) (75.95) (77.39) (101.8) (99.99) (59.45) (89.86) 
DistMroad 74.14 13.32 3.623 -8.944 28.83 12.06 3.815 24.38 2.863 
(45.11) (53.89) (40.36) (66.98) (51.88) (53.02) (60.72) (45.31) (66.27) 
DistMarket -76.14*** -75.65** -40.77 -10.60 -29.04 -20.71 -54.91 -86.38*** -117.3** 
(21.18) (30.79) (39.29) (26.09) (29.14) (31.68) (47.15) (30.47) (50.33) 
HHEducyrs 43.99*** 22.59* 25.01** 15.45 17.72 37.46** 11.72 3.230 57.65*** 
(14.05) (12.60) (12.35) (15.20) (13.89) (18.33) (26.36) (12.30) (22.14) 
Hlandsize 49.49*** 66.17* 53.28** 12.21 -3.604 -9.359 -5.548 -71.82*** -50.73** 
(17.18) (36.62) (23.54) (30.98) (20.65) (23.33) (24.48) (15.63) (20.46) 
hhsize -165.2*** -201.2*** -170.0*** -160.0*** -188.1*** -230.4*** -193.9*** -270.5*** -313.4*** 
(22.03) (73.41) (57.94) (56.51) (55.50) (53.58) (43.55) (45.19) (70.70) 
HHWealth 0.000109*** 0.000128 0.000163 0.000433** 0.000491*** 0.000505*** 0.000617*** 0.000874*** 0.000737***
(1.55e-05) (0.000229) (0.000163) (0.000182) (0.000126) (0.000117) (0.000110) (6.85e-05) (0.000122) 
Numbchild 14.54 -0.451 1.115 9.959 -11.70 -5.098 -63.05 -66.23 -149.2** 
(19.95) (31.36) (31.06) (47.17) (39.37) (44.04) (55.18) (52.16) (60.47) 
MedAge 47.52** 10.59 5.439 -17.79 26.46 18.49 -10.40 35.84 45.94 
(23.73) (36.31) (40.97) (47.78) (47.00) (45.99) (46.00) (34.89) (108.6) 
MedAgesq -0.410* -0.121 -0.0859 0.181 -0.184 -0.171 0.0926 -0.519 -0.507 
(0.235) (0.388) (0.424) (0.506) (0.455) (0.432) (0.420) (0.336) (1.159)
Temperature 4.961 11.30 -1.874 -42.89 -67.50* -44.73 -11.07 17.60 -10.96 
(25.79) (29.02) (33.16) (43.54) (37.41) (49.41) (41.78) (51.57) (69.94)
Precipitation -0.190 -0.130 -0.651** -0.922*** -1.036*** -1.470*** -1.438*** -2.229*** -2.475***
(0.190) (0.237) (0.319) (0.343) (0.295) (0.373) (0.379) (0.394) (0.652) 
HHsex 255.7 -22.71 65.84 81.11 -299.7 -312.3 -480.0 -201.7 -636.9 
(310.1) (381.5) (313.1) (318.0) (323.9) (269.7) (350.8) (258.2) (436.5)
EmploymentStat -111.1 123.2 173.4 226.9 335.3* 155.6 41.66 -778.8*** -662.5 
(86.45) (160.4) (166.3) (231.4) (175.8) (181.5) (205.8) (174.0) (416.2) 
LandTitle -106.4 -149.9 -233.6 -180.9 -89.41 3.083 277.8 804.0*** 1,724*** 
(118.9) (173.3) (188.0) (214.7) (164.0) (199.1) (287.1) (220.6) (288.9) 
Woodlots 150.3** 182.1 210.4* 224.5 405.0** 397.4** 388.4** 207.0 375.6* 
(71.49) (130.6) (115.7) (192.4) (178.4) (175.0) (195.8) (145.9) (206.0) 
ResidStatus -236.5** -121.8 -172.8 -231.8 -174.6 -297.6 -424.0** -353.3** -726.4***
(110.8) (118.7) (183.4) (183.3) (156.6) (204.7) (183.7) (154.6) (157.5) 
Hsepartic 463.5*** 344.9** 528.5*** 563.8*** 439.2*** 386.4* 203.7 710.5*** -325.8 
(105.5) (145.7) (104.5) (119.3) (134.1) (225.8) (282.8) (133.2) (299.3) 
Constant -152.4 1,528* 2,113** 3,377*** 3,250*** 4,053*** 5,091*** 5,419*** 7,472*** 
(732.3) (855.3) (1,036) (905.7) (871.0) (971.1) (1,077) (935.8) (2,614) 
Observations 404 404 404 404 404 404 404 404 404 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix C: Appendix for Chapter Four 
Table C. 1: Major sources of Income within CFAs 
Source of Income Percent Cumulative
Farming 60.81 60.81
Livestock Keeping 30.50 91.31
Bee Keeping 3.86 95.17
Tree Nursery 4.83 100.00
Table C. 2: Major sources of finance for the CFA 
Sources of Finance N mean sd min max 
Voluntary Contribution 518 0.286 0.452 0 1 
Membership Fee 518 1 0 1 1 
Payments for labour input 518 0 0 0 0 
Fines 518 0.0888 0.285 0 1 
Development agency 518 0.129 0.336 0 1 
National/Regional govt 518 0.0483 0.215 0 1 
Forest product sales 518 0.317 0.466 0 1 
Own taxes 518 0 0 0 0 
Special levies 518 0.0483 0.215 0 1 
Aid from External NGO 518 0.330 0.471 0 1 
Aid from Indigenous NGO 518 0.0637 0.244 0 1 
Aid from Foreign govt 518 0 0 0 0 
Table C. 3: Mode of communication to CFA members 
Mode N mean sd min max
Letters 518 0.290 0.454 0 1
Schools 518 0.141 0.348 0 1
Vilhead 518 0.403 0.491 0 1
Cellphone 518 0.847 0.360 0 1
Mouth 518 0.707 0.456 0 1
Table C. 4: Scale of dependence on forest resources 
Scale of Dependence (%) 
Resource Not dependent Slightly dependent Moderately dependent Very dependent 
Wood fuel 4.83 0 22.78 72.39 
Timber 95.17 4.83 0 0 
Bee keeping 8.69 31.47 33.78 26.06 
Herbs 5.02 41.12 30.89 22.97 
Thatching 46.14 21.24 25.87 6.76 
Fish farming 0 79.15 10.04 10.81 
Water 3.09 4.83 5.02 87.07 
Grazing 0 3.86 0 96.14 
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Poles harvesting 63.51 18.15 18.34 0 
PELIS 23.36 4.83 8.11 63.71 
Tree Nursery 92.28 2.90 0 4.83 
Quarrying 92.28 7.72 0 0 
Cultural activties 87.07 2.90 0 10.04 
Table C. 5: Existence of rules 
Rules regarding N mean sd min max 
Forest access 518 0.759 0.428 0 1 
Fire Management 518 0.938 0.241 0 1 
Logging/charcoal burning 518 0.900 0.301 0 1 
Punishment 518 0.448 0.498 0 1 
Conflict Resolution 518 0.562 0.497 0 1 
Role of EC/GR 518 0.965 0.183 0 1 
Sharing benefits 518 0.550 0.498 0 1 
Role of traditional 518 0.355 0.479 0 1 
Conservation areas 518 0.961 0.193 0 1 
Table C. 6: Summary of forest improvement activities 
Activity N mean sd min max 
Pruning 518 0.745 0.436 0 1 
Enrichment planting 518 0.871 0.336 0 1 
Reseed 518 0.780 0.415 0 1 
Weeding 518 0.813 0.390 0 1 
Silviculture 518 0.720 0.449 0 1 
Thinning 518 0.330 0.471 0 1 
Water 518 0.290 0.454 0 1 
Table C. 7: Existing incentives within CFAs 
Incentive N mean sd min max 
PELIS 518 0.766 0.424 0 1 
Grazing 518 0.932 0.251 0 1 
Herbs 518 0.830 0.376 0 1 
Fuel wood 518 0.952 0.215 0 1 
Bee Keeping 518 0.909 0.288 0 1 
Milling 518 0.143 0.350 0 1 
Fodder 518 0.749 0.434 0 1 
Thatching 518 0.459 0.499 0 1 
Eco-tourism 518 0.309 0.462 0 1 
Fish farming 518 0.156 0.364 0 1 
Fetching Water 518 0.969 0.173 0 1 
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Table C. 8: Principal Components of Collective Action by CFAs 
Comp 1 Comp 2 Comp 3 
Eigen Value 2.227 1.571 1.147 
Proportion of total variance 31.8 22.5 16.4 
PC Vector 
Pruning 0.403 0.428 -0.224
Enrichment planting 0.177 0.041 0.723 
Reseeding 0.464 -0.294 0.292 
Weeding 0.431 0.275 0.310 
Silviculture 0.461 -0.417 -0.279
Thinning 0.432 -0.047 -0.398
Water 0.073 0.690 -0.099
Table C. 9: Durbin-Wu-Hausman test for endogeneity 
ForestCover Vandalism 
InstIndex_res1 0 InstIndex_res2 0 
F (1,491) 0.80 F (1,491) 78.77 
Prob > F 0.3792 Prob > F 0.000 
Table C. 10: Performance statistics of IV models 
Test Forestcover Vandalism 
Under-identification test (Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic 182.080 182.080 
Chi-sq(25) p-val 0.0000 0.0000 
Weak identification test (Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic) 2084.697 2084.697 
Hansen J statistic (over-identification test of all instruments) 161.272 200.273 
Chi-sq(24) p-val 0.0000 0.0000 
Appendix C1: Chapter Four Model Frameworks 
Framework for the IV model with heteroscedasticity based instrument 
In the presence of endogeneity, the standard approach most often applied is the 
standard IV estimation method. However, the main challenge with this approach is 
identifying a plausible instrument that satisfies the three standard conditions namely: 
(i) The instrument Z must be highly correlated with the endogenous variable (X); (ii)
The orthogonality condition i.e. the instrument is uncorrelated with the error term i.e. 
𝐸(𝑈𝑍)  =  0 and (iii) Exclusion restriction. That the effect of the instrument on the 
outcome variable should be only through the endogenous variable (X). 
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Finding an instrument that satisfies the three conditions is often a challenge hence the 
biggest obstacle in standard IV estimation. The most recent approach that has gained 
cognizant is the Lewbel (2012) heteroscedasticity based instrumental variable 
approach. The method serves to identify structural parameters in regression models 
with endogenous or mis-measured regressors in the absence of plausible external 
instruments. It can also be used to supplement existing instruments to improve 
efficiency of the IV estimates. 
Lewbel’s Approach 
In this approach, identification is achieved by having regressors that are uncorrelated 
with the product of heteroscedastic errors. Consider Y1, Y2 as observed endogenous 
variables, X a vector of observed exogenous regressors and 𝜀 =  (𝜀1, 𝜀2)  as
unobserved error process. Given a structural model of the form: 
Y1 = X + Y2γ1 + ε1 
(20) 
Y2 = X β2 + Y1γ2 + ε2 
The system is triangular when 𝛾2 =  0  (or with renumbering when 𝛾1 =  0 ).
Otherwise it is fully simultaneous. The errors ε1, ε2 may be correlated with each other. 
If the exogeneity assumption, 𝐸(𝜀𝑋)  =  0 holds, the reduced form is identified, but 
in the absence of identifying restrictions, the structural parameters are not identified. 
These restrictions involve setting certain elements of β1 or β2 to zero, which makes 
instruments available. The third assumption is however difficult to establish. 
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In Lewbel’s approach, identification is achieved by restricting correlation of 𝜀𝜀’ with 
X. This approach is likely to be less reliable than identification based on coefficient
zero restriction since it relies on higher moments. But in the absence of plausible 
instruments it is the only plausible approach. 
However, under the assumption of homoscedasticity i.e. 𝐸(𝜀𝜀’|𝑋) is a matrix of 
constants, the structural model remains unidentified therefore identification can only 
be attained in the presence of heteroscedasticity related to some elements of X. In a 
fully simultaneous system, assuming that 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑋, 𝜀𝑗
2) ≠ 0 j=1,2 and 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑍, 𝜀1𝜀2)  =
 0 for observed Z will identify the structural parameters. Z may be a subset of X, 
hence no information outside the model specified is required. The key assumption 
that 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑍, 𝜀1𝜀2)  =  0 will automatically be satisfied if the mean zero error process
are conditionally independent: 𝜀1 ⊥  𝜀2|𝑍 =  0. This condition is however not strictly
necessary. 
Source: Adopted from Lewbel (2012) 
Appendix D: Community Forest Association and Household Questionnaires 
1 
No. 
UNIVERSITY OF CAPE TOWN  
COMMUNITY FOREST ASSOCIATION QUESTIONNAIRE 
This questionnaire is part of research being conducted by Mr. Okumu from the 
University of Cape Town. The research has been approved by the Commerce Faculty 
Ethics in Research Committee. Relevant authorization has also been obtained from the 
National Council for Science and technology in Kenya and the Kenya Forest Service. 
The student is carrying out a survey to examine how communities’ self-organize to 
manage forests adjacent to them under Participatory Forest Management 
arrangements. The values and preferences local communities attach to these forests 
and the existing incentives towards forest management and how it impacts on the 
livelihoods of locals as well as the environment are examined. Please be assured that 
your answers are anonymous and all information collected is confidential. The 
questionnaire will take approximately 20 minutes of your time. Your participation in 
this research is voluntary and you can withdraw from the research at any time. Should 
you have any question regarding the research please feel free to ask. 
Name of enumerator ________________________________Date: _______________  
Time started: _________Time Ended: ___________CFA Name__________________ 
Forest Name ______________________ County_____________________________  
District ___________________Ward ______________________________________ 
Village _________________________ CFA code____________________________  
Point Longitude Latitude 
Forest location (CFA 
office)   
Nearest Main Road 
Nearest Market 
Nearest entrance to the 
forest   
2 
Elevation in meters 
A: HISTORY OF THE ASSOCIATION 
 A1: What year was the CFA formed________________________________? 
A2: Who initiated the initial formation of the CFA? 
 Local community members
 Non-governmental program (local/international)
 Local/regional government program
 National government program
 International government program
A3: Is the group’s present structure the same as it was in the beginning? 
 Yes
 No
A4: How many years has this CFA had its present structure?_________________years 
B: RESOURCE CHARACTERISTICS 
B1:   What   is   the   size   of   the   forest   under this CFA 
___________________________acres   
B2: Is the boundary or jurisdiction of the CFA well defined? 
 Yes
 No
B3: Is it possible to exclude non-members from using or accessing the forest?  Yes 
 No
B4: In your view, what is the current condition of the forest compared to when you first 
formed the association?  
 Worse
 Good
 Better/improved condition  Very good condition
B5: What is the extent to which one person’s use of the resource limits the other   
person’s use of the resource (e.g. grazing in the forest/grass for thatching) tick one. 
Code Activity 
1 Does not Affect at all 
2 Limits to some extent 
3 Affects the usage 
4 Affects very much 
5 Extreme limitation 
B6: What is the CURRENT FOREST COVER as a percentage of forest area under 
the CFA’s 
jurisdiction 
? _____________________ 
B61: What is the forest cover under the CFA in hectares . _____________________ 
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B8: What is the average number of reported cases of vandalism/ (e.g. fire, illegal   
logging, and other unauthorized activities) within the CFA in the periods specified? 
Period No of cases 
Weekly 
Monthly 
Quarterly 
Semi annually 
Annually 
B9: What are the available species of trees in the forest within the CFA area (if 
information 
available). 
Tree Species No of Trees 
C: GROUP CHARACTERISTICS 
 C1: How many households are within the CFA area (both members and nonmembers)? 
_________________________ 
 C2: How many households are members of this forest association? 
________________   
C3: What is the number of members of this association (list in terms of gender)? 
Gender Number of individuals 
Males 
Females 
Total 
C4: What is the average age of CFA members? ____________________________ 
4 
C5: What is the distribution of CFA members in terms of locals and immigrants? 
Distribution Percentage 
Locals/Natives 
Immigrants/settlers 
Total 
 C6: What is the employment status of CFA 
members? 
Employment status Percentage 
Unemployed 
Employed (permanent/casual) 
Self Employed 
Retired 
C7: Name ethnic groups in the forest association and the number of individuals within 
each ethnic 
group 
Ethnic group Percentage 
 C8:   Which   is   the   dominant ethnic group in the area? 
____________________________   
C9: Name the religious groups in the association and percentage of individuals within each 
religious 
group. 
Religious group Percentage 
Catholic 
Protestants 
Muslims 
Other sects 
C10: Can CFA members buy/sell land to non-forest adjacent communities? 
 Yes
 No
C11: If No in C10 is it entrenched as a rule or just a norm? 
 Written rule
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 Norm
C12: Are forest benefits shared equally among members? 
 Yes   No
C13: What are the existing incentives to encourage community participation in forest 
conservation?    
Incentives Tick those that 
apply 
PELIS (cultivation in forest) 
Pure grazing 
Herbs/medicine collection 
Fuel wood collection 
Bee Keeping (Honey) 
Full time saw millers 
Fodder collection 
Collection of grass for thatching 
Use of revenues accrued through ecotourism 
Fish farming 
Water 
C14: Do all the CFA members benefit from PELIS? 
 Yes
 No
C15: What criterion is used to determine beneficiaries of PELIS? 
Criteria Tick appropriately 
Balloting 
First come first serve 
Rotation 
Others (Specify) 
C16: If CFA members benefit from PELIS, which year was PELIS first introduced 
within this 
CFA? 
 _______________ 
C17: How many members are beneficiaries of PELIS? _____________________ 
C18: Since the first initiation of PELIS has it been suspended by the government at 
any 
one particular 
time? 
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 Yes  No
C19: If yes in C18, how many times has it been suspended? Indicate the years and 
reason    
Year Reason 
C20: What are some of the challenges you face with adoption and implementation of  
PELIS?   
_____________________________________________________________________ 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
C21: Are members of the CFAs allowed to cultivate their plots using tractors or other 
machineries? 
 Yes   No
C22: In the last five years how many members of the CFA have migrated to other 
areas?  ________________________________________   
C23: In the last five years how many members of the CFA have left the group (but 
still 
around)?  _________________________________________ 
Others (specify) 
C25: What is the MAJOR source of income for CFA members? 
 Farming
 Livestock keeping
 Bee keeping
 Fish Farming
 Selling forest resources
 Ecotourism
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 Others specify________________
C26: What are the other sources of income for CFA members (Tick the ones 
mentioned)? 
 Farming
 Livestock keeping
 Bee keeping
 Fish farming
 Selling forest resources
 Ecotourism
 Others specify________________
C27: How many households within the CFA own title for the land they occupy? 
_____________   
 C28: What is the dominant roofing material used in the CFA area? 
 1= Thatch
 2=Wooden boards
 3=Iron or other metal sheets
 4=Tiles
 5=Other (Specify)
C29: Are majority of the households connected to electricity in the area? 
 Yes
 No
C30: What is the MOST popular fuel for cooking in CFA households? 
 Electricity or gas
 Oil
 Wood
 Charcoal
 Small sticks or scrap wood
 Weeds, leaves, dungs
 Others (specify)
C31: What is the MOST popular source of lighting in CFA households? 
 Electricity or gas
 Oil
 Wood
 Charcoal
 Small sticks or scrap wood
 Weeds, leaves, dungs
 Others (specify)
C32: What are some economic activities in the CFA area? (Tick all that apply) 
 Pure agriculture
 Livestock farming/Pure grazing of animals
 Charcoal burning
 Fuel wood collection for selling
 Herbs collection for selling
 Fish farming
 Bee keeping (Honey)
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 Full time saw millers
D: ACTIVITIES CARRIED OUT BY THE ASSOCIATION  
D1: If members of the association graze livestock in the forest, are there periods when 
there is shortage of pasture? 
 Yes
 No
D2: Are there alternative grazing areas outside the forest? 
 Yes
 No
D4: How many members of the forest association know about the rules that govern 
the 
forest 
association? 
 None
 A few people
 Half the people
 Almost everyone
 Everyone
D5: Are members of the association made familiar with these rules at the time of 
joining? 
 Yes
 No
E: INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS 
EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OR GENERAL REPRESENTATIVE BODY  
E1: Does the association have a constitution or by laws? 
 Yes
 No
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E2: How easy are the rules to understand? 
 Very easy
 Average
 Difficult
 Very difficult
E3: Does this association have an executive committee or general representative 
body? 
 Executive committee
 General representative body
E4: How many members comprise this general representative body or executive 
Committee?    
Gender Number 
Males 
Female 
Total 
E5: Has a woman ever been the CHAIRPERSON of the executive committee or 
general representative body of the 
association? 
 Yes
 No
E6: How are most of the members of the executive committee or general 
representative 
body of the association selected? 
 Elected by members
 Inherited e.g. from father to son or mother to daughter)
 Appointed
E7: IF some members are appointed in E6 above who appoints? 
 Local village head/chief or village elders
 Appointed by national or county government
E8: If members elect the EC or GR officials, how are the elections conducted? 
 Secret ballot
 Acclamation
 Queuing (Mlolongo)
E9: How often does the EC or GR body of the association meet? 
 Once a week
 Twice a month
 Once a month
 Quarterly
E10: How long a period can the EC or GR body of the association serve? 
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Official (1) Life (2) Fixed
period elected
(3) 
period, 
elected 
Fixed 
not 
(4) Variable,
subject to vote
Chair 
Vice Chair 
Secretary 
Treasurer 
Most members of the 
EC or GR   
E11: If the president of the association serves association for a fixed term. Please 
record 
number of 
years 
. ___________ 
E12: How many chairpersons have led the association since its inception? 
_____________________   
E13: In the past decade has there been any competition for any position on the 
executive 
committee or general representative 
body 
 Yes, always
 Yes, in some elections
 No
E14: Is it possible for users to remove the members of the executive committee or 
general representative 
body? 
 Yes
 No
E15: Can an external or higher-level authority remove the members of the executive  
committee or general representative 
body? 
 Yes
 No
E16:   If   yes   in   E15,   under   what   circumstances?  
_____________________________________________________________________ 
E17: Are members of the executive committee remunerated or paid for their services? 
 Yes
 No
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E18: If yes in E17, how are they remunerated? 
 Funds from the general budget of the association
 Allocated extra shares of the forest products
 Obligations to forest association are reduced
 Funds from external or local government   Funds from a development agency
E19: What is the highest level of education for members of executive committee or 
general representative 
body? 
Position Education level 
Chair 
Vice Chair 
Secretary 
Treasurer 
Most members of the EC or GR 
E20: Do any members of the executive committee or general representative body hold 
12 
leading positions in other collective or government bodies? 
 Yes   No
E21: If yes in E20 state position held by the members of the executive committee or 
general representative body in different 
bodies 
Position in CFA Position in other (state the body) 
F: INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS, MEETINGS AND GENERAL 
MEMBERSHIP OF THE FOREST 
ASSOCIATION 
F1: How many members have left the association since its inception? _____________ 
F2: Are meetings held in which all members of the assosciation are eligible 
to 
participate? 
 Yes
 No
F3: How frequently are meetings organized? 
 Once a week
 Twice a month
 Quarterly
 Half Yearly  Once a year
 Irregular intervals
F4: What is the attendance of these meetings? 
 Almost all members attend
 About half the members attend   Few members attend
F5: How many meetings have been held between the association members and the 
local/county/regional government in the last one 
year______________________ 
F6: How many meetings have been held between the CFA members/executive with 
the  
national officials i.e NACOFA, KFS national representative per year? 
_________ 
F7: Can members of the association call a general meeting when they want to discuss a 
special problem (such as lack of rainfall or the breaking of association rules by members 
of executive committee or members of executive body)?  
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 Yes
 No
F8: If yes in F7, has a special meeting been called during the last one year 
 Yes
 No
F9: Has the rules of the association been changed as a result of suggestions made by 
members of the forest association? 
 Yes
No
F10: If  yes  in  F9,  describe  an  example  of  such  a  change  in 
rules _________________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________________
_   
F11: level of implementation of Ostrom design principle 
 Ostrom Principle Tick  
appropriately 
Clearly defined boundaries (physical boundaries of the CFA) 
Well defined membership (rules as to who can join the association) 
Free entry or exit of members 
Rules regarding the appropriation   
Appropriation rules match availability of resource 
Collective choice arrangements   
Effective monitoring by community members 
A scale of graduated sanctions   
Mechanism of conflict resolution that are cheap 
Self-determination of the community (no external influence) 
Organization in the form of nested enterprises   
F12: How does the CFA rank the condition of this forest? 
 Very sparse
 Somewhat sparse
 About normal for this ecological region
 Somewhat abundant   Very abundant
F13: To what extent does community enjoy user rights? 
Extent 
1 No user rights 
2 Limited user right 
3 Full user rights 
F14: Existence of rules and regulation 
14 
Rule Tick appropriately 
Rules regarding access to forest 
Rules regarding fire management 
Illegal logging/charcoal burning 
Punishment 
Conflict resolution 
Role of Executive committee/or GR  
Sharing benefits 
Role of traditional leaders 
Forest conservation areas 
F15: Do the local or higher authorities recognize CFA rules and regulations? 
 Yes
 No
F16: Which other parties apart from CFA members participate in setting the CFA 
rules? 
 Local/county council
 County government
 KFS
 All the above
F17: Who is involved in monitoring forest resource use? 
 Local communities
 Employed forest rangers
 Executive committee or general representative body
 County council
 County government
 Kenya Police service
 All the above
F18: Is there punishment/penalty for members of the community who deviates? 
 Yes
 No
F19: Are the penalties commensurate (fair or equal to) to the crime committed 
 Yes
 No
F20: Are the penalties increased if you are a second/frequent rule breaker? 
 Yes
 No
F21: Is there a committee to administer justice for rule breakage and grievances? 
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 Yes   No
F22: How long does it take to initiate and complete a disciplinary action or process 
for 
an errant member (Indicate 
days/weeks/months 
) ? ____________ 
F23: How costly is the group justice system in terms of money paid to access it? 
 Costless
 Affordable
 Very Expensive
 Unaffordable
F24: Do you think the group justice system is effective in deterring potential offenders 
within the 
group? 
 Yes
 No
F25: To what extent are penalties complied with 
 No one complies with penalties imposed on them
 Few members comply with the penalties imposed
 About half the members comply with penalties imposed
Most users comply with penalties imposed on them

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Penalties are fully complied with when imposed 
F26: During the last two years have individuals in this group faced any issues that 
have 
engendered conflict within the 
association 
 Yes
 No
F27: During the last one year would you say the level of conflict in the group has? 
 Increased
 Remained same
 Decreased
F29: Do CFA members undergo training related to forest management activities? 
 Yes   No
F30: What is the mode of communication to CFA members? 
Communication Tick 
Word of mouth 
Cell phone 
Village heads 
Schools 
Letters 
G: CLIMATE AND GEOGRAPHIC VARIABLES  
G1: What is the average rainfall and temperature in the Forest area during this 
seasons? 
Season  Rainfall Temperature 
Yearly Average 
G2: What is the soil type in the CFA forest area? 
Soil type Tick 
H: OFFICE MANAGEMENT  
H1: What is the registration and annual renewal fee for members to join the forest 
association? 
Amount 
Registration 
17 
Annual renewal 
H2: Has the association employed anyone? 
 Yes
 No
H3: How are guards selected to watch over the forest? 
 By election
 By appointment
Volunteer
 By lots
H4: On average how many forest guards are on duty on a daily 
basis______________   
H5: What were the major financial sources for this association during the most recent 
year? 
1. Voluntary contribution of funds
2. Membership fees
3. Payments that substitute for labor inputs
4. Fines
5. Development agency
6. National or regional government
7. Sales of forest products from the forest
8. Own taxes(taxes raised by a general purpose government
9. Special levies
10. Aid from external NGOs
11. Aid from Indigenous NGOs
12. Aid Foreign government  13. Others Specify
H6: From the above sources of funding, what was the single most important source
of 
 
finance for the forest association?  _______________________ 
H7: What is the total financial budget per year of this CFA (specif y year for which 
data 
is available)?  ________________________ 
H8:   What   is   the   average   annual   amount spent on security 
enforcement _____________________________ 
 H9: If the association did not receive any funds from external agenc 
on contribution from members or its user groups, or other funds raised locally, could
it 
ies and had to 
rely 
support all its expenditure? 
 Yes

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 No
H10: What is the largest item on which the association spends its income? Mark one 
 Salaries to official
 Salaries to hired personnel
 Court cases
 Account keeping
 Fees paid to specialized staff or contractor
 Expenses of the community
 Monitoring the forest resource
 Guarding the forest resource
 Maintaining the forest resource
 Improving the forest resource
 Travel and entertainment of CFA officials
H11: Is any of the association’s income supposed to be used for specific purposes? 
Yes 
No   
H12:   If   yes   in   H11,   specify the income source and 
purpose ____________________________ 
H13: Does any other organization determine how the forest association spends or 
earns 
income? 
 Yes
 No
H14: Are the rules of this forest association based on a set of rules provided by a 
government 
agency? 
 No
 Yes
H15: Can the association be sued or sue? 
 Yes
 No
H16: Do internal conflict exists? 
 Yes
 No
H17: Are there internal conflict resolution mechanisms? 
 Yes
 No
H18:   How   does   internal   conflicts   get resolved? 
____________________________________________________________________
_  
____________________________________________________________________
_  
H19: Have there been any problems in selecting officials for the association?   
19 
 Yes
 No
H20: How have the rules created by the association been reinforced? Are they 
enforced  
by? 
 Members of the user group
 External officials appointed by the government
 Officials appointed by the forest association
 Other ways (specify)
H21: How does the association perceive itself, in terms of relating to other forest 
governing 
structures? 
 Non-cooperating
 Cooperating, but independent of other organization’s rules and regulations 
Cooperating jointly in determining rules/regulations
Thank you very much once more for your cooperation 

1 
No. 
UNIVERSITY OF CAPE TOWN  
HOUSEHOLD QUESTIONNAIRE 
This questionnaire is part of research being conducted by Mr. Okumu from the 
University of Cape Town. The research has been approved by the Commerce Faculty 
Ethics in Research Committee. Relevant authorization has also been obtained from 
the National Council for Science and technology in Kenya and the Kenya Forest 
Service.  
The student is carrying out a survey to examine how communities’ self-organize to 
manage forests adjacent to them under Participatory Forest Management 
arrangements. The values and preferences local communities attach to these forests 
and the existing incentives towards forest management and how it impacts on the 
livelihoods of locals as well as the environment are examined. Please be assured that 
your answers are anonymous and all information collected is confidential. The 
questionnaire will take approximately 20 minutes of your time. Your participation in 
this research is voluntary and you can withdraw from the research at any time. Should 
you have any question regarding the research please feel free to ask. Please be assured 
that your answers are anonymous and all information collected is confidential  
Name of enumerator ________________________________Date: _______________ 
Time started: _____________________Time Ended: __________________________ 
Forest Name __________________County__________District 
__________________   Ward ___________Village _______Household 
No____________________________   
2 
HOUSEHOLD PHYSICAL LOCATION  Point 
HA: KNOWLEDGE OF THE FOREST CATCHMENT AREA 
HA1: Have you visited the forest in the last 3 months? 
 Not visited
 Visited between one and 5 times
 Visited more than five times
 I live permanently in the forest catchment
HA1-1: How many times do you think you have visited the forest in the last 12 
months?   
 Below 10 times
 10 times
 11-30 times
 Always in the forest every day
HA2: If you visited the forest in the last three months, what was the reason for the 
visit? 
Activity Tick all that apply 
Farming (PELIS 
Fetched Firewood/charcoal 
Fetched timber/other wood 
Fetched medicine/herbs 
Grazing/Fetched fodder/forage 
Bee keeping 
Fish farming 
Fetched water 
Bird watching 
Walking 
Camping 
Taking tourists/visitors around 
Others specify 
HA3: Think about the forest cover around the forest named above, which statement 
do 
Longitude  Latitude 
Household location  
Nearest Main Road  
Nearest Market  
Nearest entrance to 
the forest   
Elevation in meters  
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you think best describes the current condition of the forest?  
 Very bad
 Quite bad
 Neither good nor Bad
 Quite good   Very good
 Don’t Know
HA4: Think about the rivers and water bodies in the forest, which statement do you 
think best describes the current condition (cleanliness/purity of the water) of the   
rivers in this forest?  
 Very dirty
 Somehow dirty
 Quite clean   Very clean
 Don’t Know
HA5: Think about the rivers and water bodies in the forest, which statement do you 
think best describes the current condition (volume of water) of the rivers in this   
forest?  
 Very low
 Somehow low
 High
 Very high
 Don’t know
HA6: Where do you get your water for domestic use? 
Source Tick all that apply 
Borehole/well 
Stream river 
Spring protected 
Spring unprotected 
Pond/Dam 
Lake 
Other Specify 
HA7: Does your water come from the forest? 
 Yes  No
HA8: Who mainly collects water in the household? 
Person Tick all that apply 
Children 
Female adults 
Male adults 
Domestic workers (Hired labor) 
Other Specify 
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HA9: How many 20L jerry cans do you use per day in your household? __________   
HA10: Do you buy water for domestic use?   
 Yes
 No
HA10-1: IF you buy water how much do you pay per 20L jerry can? 
Kshs ___________________   
HA11: What type of treatment do you use to purify drinking water?  
Treatment Method Tick all that apply 
Nothing 
Boiling 
Boiling and filtering 
Chemicals 
Other Specify 
HA12: If you fetch water from the forest, does the quantity of water change during 
the  
year? 
 Yes
 No
HA13: What is the quality of your drinking water?  
 Very dirty
 Somehow dirty
 Quite clean   Very clean
 Don’t Know
HA14: If you fetch water from the forest, does the quality of water change during the 
year?  
 Yes  No
HA15: How would you describe the quality of water for your domestic use over 
the  
following 
periods 
Time Quality (1 Very dirty, 2. Somehow 
dirty, 3. Quite clean, 4. Very clean, 5. 
Dont know)  
10 years ago 
5 years ago 
1 year ago 
HA16: How do you expect the water quality to change in the future?  
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 Improve
 Deteriorate   No change
 Don’t know
HA17: How far is the water source from the dwelling? (Read out options)  
 Less than 100m
 Between 100 and 200m
 More than 200m but less than 500m
 More than 500m but less than 1 km
 1km or more
HA18: Do you know the kind of wild animals that exist in this forest?  
 Yes
 No
HA19: If yes above can you list some of the animals that you know exist in this forest? 
____________________________________________________________________  
HA20: Do you have any problems with crop/animal raiding animals from 
the forest (tick the one you have problems with) 
Animal Tick all that apply 
Elephants 
Buffaloes 
Antelopes 
Chimpanzees 
Baboons 
Hedgehogs 
Monkeys 
Porcupines 
Warthogs 
Rabbits 
Wildpigs 
   HA21: Which of the animals in HA20 is most problematic?   
____________________________________________________________________
_   HA22: Do you ever trap some of these animals?   
 Yes  No
HA23: What is the main source of energy for this household? 
Source Cooking Heating Lighting 
Wood 
Charcoal 
Kerosene 
LPG gas 
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Solar Energy 
Electricity 
D-light
HA24: Do you buy firewood? 
 Yes
 No

HA24-1: If u don’t buy firewood, how far on average do you travel each day to collect 
firewood? 
_________kms 
A24-2: How long does it take you to collect firewood from the forest? (include 
walking  
time to and from the forest) 
_______________________ 
 
HA25: Is the firewood from the forest reserve?  
 Yes  No
HA26: How many hours per week do members of your household spend on 
collecting firewood for family use? (Adult time should be reported; child time is 
50% of adult   
time) 
___________________________________ 
HA27: How much time do you spend on getting firewood today compared to five 
years  
ago?    
 Same time
 More time
 Less time
 Don’t Know
HA28: How has availability of firewood changed over the last five years?  
 Declined
 About same   Increased
 Don’t know
HA29: If firewood has declined in HA28 above, how has your household responded to 
decline in availability of 
firewood? 
  
 Use of energy saving Jiko
 Use of biogas
 Use of Kerosene stove
 Use of charcoal
7 
 Others specify_______________
HA30: Which quarters of the year do you use the forest most?  
Quarter Reason 
January-March 
April-June 
July-September 
October-December 
HA31: How would you rank the following benefits derived from forests 
Benefit Rank (0= not important, 1=slightly 
important, 2=Important, 3= very 
important)  
Farming (PELIS) 
Water 
Firewood 
Medicine/herbs 
Fruits/food/vegetables/mushroom 
Grazing 
Timber 
Leisure 
Fish farming 
Honey 
Wildlife 
Reduced erosion 
Carbon sequestration 
HA32: Overall do you consider this forest to be of value to you?  
 Yes
 No
A33: What is the most significant value of this forest to you (list in order of 
importance)?   
____________________________________________________________________
_  CE1: CHOICE EXPERIMENT EXERCISE   
In each question 1-5, we ask you to make a choice between alternative future options 
for managing the named forest reserve. The forest reserve and some future 
management actions are described in the poster.   
OPTIONS   
OPTION C (STATUS QUO): is the same in each question 1-5. In this option 
described “as at today”’. This option involves no new management actions and no cost 
to you. It is not represented pictorially but left to your imagination how the forest 
would be in the next five years if there is no any other policy intervention.  
OPTION A & B involves combination of new management actions. These actions are 
likely to affect the future condition of the forest catchment. The impact that the new 
actions will have in 5 years’ time are predicted and described by  
 Population of wildlife animals
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 Tree population/forest cover/ nature of the forest/ structure of the forest
 Water purification: availability of clean water (quantity and quality)
 Flood control/flood risk
Attribute description  
Population of wildlife animals: the no of wildlife that will be available if the given 
alternative is chosen   
Tree population/forest cover (wood fuel): the amount of wood fuel that will be 
available if the given alternative is chosen   
Water purification and supply: the quality and quantity of water that will be 
available if the alternative is chosen   
Flood Risk: the risk of flooding downstream if the alternative is chosen   
Cost: cost to the household per year if the alternative is chosen  
COSTS   
Taking action to change the way the forest catchment is managed would involve higher 
costs. The money to pay for the management changes would come from all the people 
living around the forest including your household, as a one off levy on rates collected 
by the government during the year. The size of the levy will depend on which new 
management actions are proposed. The money from the levy would go into a special 
trust fund specifically set up to fund management and changes in forest catchment. 
The fund will be managed by a committee comprising of elected community members 
and other state and non-state actors. An independent auditor will make sure the money 
is spent properly.   
MAKING A CHOICE   
Now I will present you five different choice scenarios with three options to choose 
from in each choice scenario. Two of the three options are based on differences in the 
attributes of forest ecosystem services I have explained to you. The third option is 
choosing None of the forest management options. You are requested to choose only 
ONE of the three alternatives in each round which is most suitable for your household. 
There is no right or wrong answer (only your opinion matters). When deciding the 
option, you prefer, please consider:  
 The different future outcomes that scientists have predicted
 The one off payment you would need to make to pay for the new catchment
management actions
 Your available income is limited and you will have other expenses
 Other issues and other catchments in the forest reserves may also need your
payments.
You are presented with five choice scenarios to choose from. Consider each question 
separately by referring to information on the poster for each of the choice scenarios. 
(Indicate the choice scenario presented and the option picked in each choice 
scenario for each round)  
Round Choice scenario presented Option picked A, B or C 
(status quo)   
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1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
CE1: If you have chosen, the status quo in all the choice sets. What is the main reason for 
this ? 
____________________________________________________________________ 
CE2: How certain are you about the choice you made in question 
3? 
 
(Indicate percentage certainty on the scale)   
 0%-10  41-60
 11-20  61-80
 30-34  60-64
 35-39  65-69
 40-44  70 and above
 45 -49
HB3: Do you have children?   
 Yes
 No
HB4: If you have children, how many ? _________________ 
HB5 : How many people live in your household?  
People Number 
Adults (including respondent) 
Number of children (Below 18 years) 
HB6: Marital Status of household head 
Marital Status Tick appropriately 
Married 
Divorced 
 21 - 30    81 - %100 
 31 - 40
H   B: DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS 
H B1:  Gender of household head  
Gender Tick appropriately  
Male 
Female 
H B2:  Age of household head   
 20 - 24
 25 - 29
 50 - 54
 55 - 59
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Single/never married 
Separated 
Widow/Widower 
HB7: What is your highest level of education?  
 Never went to school
 Primary
 Secondary school
 College diploma/certificate
 University degree
 Post graduate degree
 Others (specify)
HB7-1: Specify the number of years spent in school (whatever highest level reached) 
___________________________yrs.   
HB8: Residential status of the household head  
 Native
 Immigrant/settler
 On employment
HB9: Are you a member of any CFA?  
 Yes
 No
HB10: If a member, specify name of CFA_______________ 
HB10-1:  IF a member of the CFA, which CBO are you affiliated to?________________ 
HB10-2: Do you attend CFA/CBO meetings?   
 Yes
 No
HB10-3: How often do you attend CFA/CBO meetings?  
 Always  Rarely
 Mostly  Hardly
HB11: Are you a member of any other environmental organization?  
 Yes
 No
HB12:  If a member, specify the environmental organization _____________ 
HB13: Were you born in this village?   
 Yes
 No
HB14: If no in HB13, how long has your household been in this village? 
______________Years   
 _________________________  HB15-
1: Which other language do you speak?  
HB15: What is your mot her 
tongue? 
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HC3: What is the distance from your house/homestead to the nearest market?  
________________Kms   
HC3-1: How long does it take you to walk from your house to the nearest market?   
____________________   
HC4:  What is the distance from your house/homestead to the nearest main road?  
__________Kms   
HC4-1: How long does it take you to walk from your house to the nearest main road  
____________________   
HC5: Do you own the house you live in?   
 No
 Yes
HC6: What is the type of house (Make discrete observations on approach)?  
Type of house Tick  
Appropriately 
Permanent (stone/concrete brick wall with corrugated iron sheet 
roof  
Semi-permanent House (Plastered mud wall and roof of corrugated 
iron sheet)  
Iron sheet walled house with corrugated iron sheet roof 
Wooden walled house with roof of corrugated iron sheet 
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Mud walled house with a roof of corrugated iron sheet 
Mud walled, grass thatched 
HC7: What is the size of the household land __________________acres 
HC8: Do you own a title deed for this piece of land?    
 Yes
 No
HC9: Which of these incentives does your household benefit from? 
No Incentives Tick all that apply 
1 PELIS (cultivation in forest) 
2 Pure grazing 
3 Herbs collection 
4 Fuel wood collection 
5 Bee Keeping (Honey) 
6 Full time saw millers 
7 Fodder collection 
8 Collection of grass for thatching 
9 Use of revenues accrued through ecotourism 
10 Fetching water 
11 Fish farming 
HC10: If your household benefits from PELIS when did the household start 
participating in the PELIS 
scheme? 
__________________________________ 
HC11: If your household benefits from PELIS, how many acres does the household 
have under 
PELIS? 
_______________________ 
HC12: If your household benefits from PELIS, how far is your plot in the forest from 
your 
house 
 _____________________kms 
HC12-1: How long does it take you to walk from your house to the plot in the 
forest 
? 
__________________   
HC13: If you are a beneficiary of PELIS, have you ever withdrawn or stopped from 
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participating in 
PELIS? 
 
 Yes
 No
HC13-1: If yes, what were the reasons for withdrawal?   
__________________________________________________________________ 
HC14: What would you say the last month’s household income was?  
Income Level Tick appropriately 
Below 5000 
5000-10000 
10001-20000 
20001-30000 
30001-40000 
40001-60000 
Above 60000 
HC15: What are the major sources of income 
Source Tick all that apply 
Employment (Salaries and wages) 
Agriculture and Livestock sales 
Land rented out 
Compensation from mining or logging com pany 
Pension 
Gifts/support from friends 
Payment from CFA 
HC16: How much money did this household spend on all its expenses in the last 30 
days?  _______________________________   
HC 17:  Please indicate the approximate amount of annual expenditure on the 
following 
items 
 Expenditure Amount 
Education (Fees, Tuition, books, uniforms) 
Food and household supplies 
Farming (livestock and Agriculture) 
Clothing and apparel 
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Medical 
Other expenses 
Total Expenditure 
ASSET OWNERSHIP  
HC18: Livestock Assets  
Livestock Number Value 
Cows 
Goats 
Sheep 
Pigs 
Donkeys 
Ducks 
Chicken 
Rabbits 
Guinea pigs 
Turkey 
Total value 
HC18-1: Other 
Assets 
Item Tick all that apply Value (current sales 
value of all units not 
purchase price)  
Household land size and value 
Tractor 
Motorcycle 
Motor vehicle 
Wheel barrow 
Ox/Donkey cart 
Posho mill 
Bicycle 
Sewing machine 
Welding machine 
Mobile phone 
TV 
Radio 
Cassette/DVD/VCD player 
Refrigerator/Freezer 
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Cooking stove 
Chain saw/Power saw 
Ox/Disc plough 
Household furniture 
Water pump 
Solar panel 
Total value 
HC18-2: Household agricultural 
produce 
Item Volume Value 
Maize 
Beans 
Potatoes 
Peas 
Vegetables 
Milk in litres 
Others specify 
Total 
HD: HOUSEHOLD INVOLVEMENT IN COMMUNITY ACTIVITIES AND 
FOREST 
MANAGEMENT 
HD1: Do you consider your village or community to be a good place to live? 
 Yes
 No
HD2: Do you in general trust people in the village (community)  
 No
 Partly trust some and not others
 Yes
HD3: Can you get help from other people in the village (community) if you are in 
need for example if you need extra money because someone in your family is 
sick 
 
 No
 Can sometimes get help, but not always
 Yes
HD4: How well off is your household today compared with the situation five years 
ago?  
 Less well off
 About the same
 Better off now
HD5: How did you learn about the CFA and its activities?  
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 Friends
 Village meetings/barazas
 Media
 Local chief
HD6: What was one of the greatest motivation for joining the CFA?  
 The will to conserve the environment
 To be together with friends
 Participating in making forest beautiful (Aesthetic value)
 For Social prestige (class)
 For Income (from selling forest products)
 For agricultural purposes
 Employment Opportunity
 Access to forest resources (fruits, timber, wood fuel, grazing etc)
HD6-1: What other reasons motivated you to join the CFA?  
 The will to conserve the environment
 To be together with friends
 Participating in making forest beautiful (Aesthetic value)
 For Social prestige (class)
 For Income (from selling forest products)
 For agricultural purposes
 Employment Opportunity
 Access to forest resources (fruits, timber, wood fuel, grazing etc)
HD6- 2: Do you know the functions of the CFA? 
 Yes
 No
HD6-3: What are some of the activities the CFA of which you are a member is 
involved 
in ?  
Activity Tick all that apply 
Fire fighting 
Farming (PELIS) 
Prunning 
Transporting seedlings 
Monitoring 
Others specify 
HD7: How many person days (=full working days) did the household members spend 
in total on CFA activities in the last one year (probe approximate number of days)?     
HD8: What is ONE OF THE MOST important use of the forest for your household? 
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 No
HD10: Does anyone in your household normally/regularly attend CFA meetings?  
 Yes
 No
HD11: Who normally represents the household in CFA meetings?  
 Mother  Daughter
 Father  Grand children
 Son
HD12: Does your household normally participate in CFA activities?  
 Yes
 No
HD13: What is the household level of participation in CFA meetings (specifically in the  
last meeting 
attended) 
 
1. Nominal: participant present when a decision was made; 2. Passive: member
merely attended and was informed about the decision but did not speak up; 3. Active:
expressed an opinion whether it was sought or not; 4. Interactive: participant felt she
influenced the resolution
Participation level Tick one that applies 
Nominal 
Passive member 
Active member 
Interactive 
HD14: If your household participated which activities did the household participate 
in?: 
____________________________________________________________________
_   
HD15: How many hours does your household contribute to monitoring and security 
enforcement in the forest per 
month? _______________________________________ 
Activity Tick all that a pply 
Farming (PELIS)   
W ater 
Firewood /charcoal 
T imber/other   wood 
Medicine 
Fodder/ forage 
Bee k eeping 
O thers specify   
H D9:  Would you conserve the forest given the importance of these resources to you?   
 Yes
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HD16: Does your household make any cash payments/contribution to CFA and 
activities of the CFA?  
 Yes
 No
HD17: If yes in HD16 how much did you pay in the last 12 months?  
_________________________   
HD18: Did the household receive any cash payment from the CFA (e.g. share of sales) 
in the last 12 months?   
 Yes
 No
HD19: Have you ever contravened any of the rules of the CFA?  
 Yes
 No
HD19-1: Have you ever been summoned for contravening the CFA’s rules?  
 Yes
 No
HD20: Has your household planted any woodlots or trees on farm over the past five 
years?  
 Yes
 No
HD21: Overall, how would you say the existence of the CFA has affected the benefits 
that the household gets from the forest?  
 Large negative effect
 Small negative effect
 No effect
 Small positive effect
 Large positive effect
Thank you very much for the cooperation; once more this information will be 
used purely for research purposes.    
